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THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


BY 

W.  F.  REDDAWAY,  B.A. 

FELLOW    OF    KING'S    COLLEGE,     CAMBRIDGE. 


SECOND   EDITION 


NEW-YORK 

G.  E.  STEGHERT  &  Co 

1905 


HISTORf  i 


PREFACE. 


•The  following  pages  are  published  for  the 
most  part  in  the  form  in  which  they  were  written 
during  the  summer  of  1896  in  competition  for  the 
Members'  Prize.  Some  rearrangement  has,  how- 
ever, been  made,  and  in  particular  Chapter  II., 
describing  generally  the  diplomatic  situation  in 
1828,  has  been  condensed  fro  in  what  was  originally 
a  more  elaborate  examination  of  those  interna- 
tional relations  which  may  be  regarded  as  the 
remoter  causes  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  One  of 
the  factors  which  produced  these  relations,  the 
group  of  revolted  colonies  that  may  be  collectively 
described  as  Spanish  America,  has  been  separa- 
tely treated  of  in  an  Appendix. 

Nothing  newly  published  has  seemed  to  the 
author  to  render  necessary  any  modification  of 
the  main  conclusions  of  the  essay  :— that  the 
evolution  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  gradual;! 
that  the  peculiar  form  of  the  Message  of  1823  was 
due  to  John  Quincy  Adams ;  that  he,  and  he  alone, 


3379S! 


VI  PREFACE. 

logically  applied  it  in  politics;  and  that  it  produced 
its  desired  effect  as  an  act  of  policy,  but  in  no  way 
modified  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  recent  policy 
of  the  United  States  towards  both  Cuba  and  Hawaii 
appears  to  add  strength  to  the  argument  of  the 
last  chapter— that  since  1829  appeals  to  the 
Doctrine  have  been  regulated  by  neither  the 
nature  nor  the  limits  of  the  original. 

It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that,  while 
the  use  of  the  name  'Monroe  Doctrine'  serves  a 
purpose  in  exciting  and  rendering  intelligible  to 
the  world  a  particular  American  feeling  which 
may  be  the  outcome  of  legitimate  national 
aspirations,  it  too  often  reveals  the  defects  of  a 
formula  imperfectly  expressed  and  inappropriately 
applied.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  of  current  politics, 
indeed,  seems  to  have  become  rather  an  '  Adams 
sentiment,'  changed  by  the  development  of 
circumstances  from  anything  that  Adams,  as  a 
statesman  of  the  Thirties,  can  be  said  to  have 
expressly  advocated.  The  author  has  therefore 
chosen  to  dwell  on  the  evolution  and  application 
of  the  original  Doctrine,  rather  than  on  the 
twisted  and  spasmodic  products  which  have, 
during  the  last  half-century,  been  labelled  with 
its  name. 

Among  the  published  authorities  on  which 
the  work  has  been  based  are  the  '  Memoirs  of 
John  Quincy  Adams,'  the  various  writings  of 
Richard  Rush,  the  biographical  works  of  A.  G. 
and  E.  J.  Stapleton  dealing  with  George  Canning, 


PREFACE.  vii 

E.  T.Williams'  'Statesman's  Manual,'  the  'Ame- 
rican Annual  Register/  D.  G.  Gilmans  '  Life  of 
Monroe,'  Chateaubriand's  '  Congres  de  Verone,' 
Senator  T.  H.  Benton's  'Thirty  Years' View,'  a 
series  of  articles  in  the  'Political  Science  Quar- 
terly,' a  series  of  despatches  and  discussions  in 
the  '  Times,' W.  B.  Lawrence's  '  Commentaire  sur 
Wheaton,'  Professor  Bryce's  '  American  Com- 
monwealth,' Mr  Goldwin  Smith's  'United  States,' 
and  the  writings  of  A,  H.  Everett.  A  mass  of  the 
unpublished  documents  in  the  Public  Record 
Office  bearing  upon  the  subject,  together  with 
the  printed  papers  which  they  contain,  has  also 
been  largely  laid  under  contribution. 

I  have  to  express  my  thanks  to  Messrs  Hubert 
Hall  and  A.  E.  Stamp,  of  the  Public  Record  Office, 
for  facilitating  the  production  of  this  essay,  to 
Professor  T.  E.  Holland,  Professor Westlake,  and 
Dr  Cunningham  for  their  valuable  criticism  and 
corrections,  and  to  many  friends  for  their  kind 
suggestions  and  advice. 


lBO' 


W.  F.  REDDAWAY. 


King's  College,  Cambridge, 
January  1898. 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  closing  clays  of  the  year  1895  furnished  much 
material  worthy  the  study  of  the  pathologist  of  democracy. 
They  showed  the  spectacle  of  the  two  most  powerful 
nations  of  the/ modern  world— nations  united  by  the  closest 
ties  of  blood,  of  speech,  and  of  common  interest,— stan- 
ding on  the  brink  of  war  for  a  cause  that  might  have  been 
accounted  light  by  patrimonial  sovereigns.  Weeks,  and 
even  months,  passed  before  the  ferment  was  allayed,  with 
the  result,  as  Americans  admit,  of  a  paralysis  on  business 
and  a  loss  of  property  in  the  depreciation  of  securities  that 
no  arithmetic  can  estimate.  The  source  of  all  was  to  be 
sought  in  a  doctrine,  a  principle,  a  precept,  formulated  as 
men  believed,  by  a  statesman  whose  authority  had  ceased 
seventy  years  before. 

This  Monroe  Doctrine,  then,  in  defence  of  which  the 
United  States  thus  showed  themselves  ready  to  expend  so 
vast  a  quantity  of  blood  and  treasure,  and  which  has  even 
more  recently  complicated  the  question  of  Arbitration,  is  a 
force  which  calls  for  the  attention  of  every  student  of  mo- 
dern international  politics.  A  volcano  is  ever  threatening 
r.  1 


2    '  '  THE'Al'ONkOE    DOCTRINE. 

us,  and  we  must  know  its  size  and  nature.     The  United 
States,    Great  Britain,   Spain,  and    the   States   of  Spanish 
America,  are  the  parties  whose  interests  at  stake  are  the 
greatest.     But  the  whole  family  of  nations  is  at  the  same 
time  concerned.    The  biography  of  the  Doctrine,  again^y 
tends  more  and  more  nearly  to  become  a  history  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States.    In  the  New  World,  far 
more  than  in  the  Old,  foreign  and  home  politics  are  linked 
together,  and  to  follow  either  is  to  study  the  institutions  of 
Republicanism.     Throughout    its    course,    moreover,   the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  never  ceased  to  raise  questions  ofi 
national  independence,  of  intervention,  of  the  equality  of  1 
States,  of  treaties,  and  of  the  acquisition  of  territory,  which] 
are  at  once  the  most  important  and  the  most  difficult  pro- 
blems ot  the  International  Law  of  Peace.    vAnd  whatever 
be  the  truth  about  it,  a  glance  at  its  history,  either  from  the 
speculative  or  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  establishes 
beyond  a  doubt  its  claim  to  a  full  chapter  in  the  record  of 
human  error. 

An  examination  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  cannot  be 
deemed  complete  rf  it  does  not  strive  to  trace  its  evolution 
out  of  the  complex  circumstances  which  preceded  it.  Its 
authorship,  again,  forms  a  problem  of  some  historical  and 
practical  interest.  From  the  investigation  of  origins  it  is* 
natural  to  proceed  to  a  study  of  the  effects,  political  audi 
legal,  which  it  produced.  Recent  international  contro-\ 
versies  have  shown  the  necessity  of  scrutinising  its  later 
history.  And  lastly  an  attempt,  however  imperfect,  must 
be  made  to  estimate  its  bearing  upon  the  politics  of  the 
world. 


CHAPTER   I. 
The  Postulates  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Doctrine  proclaimed  by  James  Monroe  in  his  pre- 
sidential Message  of  December  2,  1823,  may  be  roughly 
described  as  a  prohibition  by  the  United  States  of  European 
interference  with  the  political  arrangements  of  the  New 
World.  For  such  a  prohibition  it  is  easier  to  find  analogy 
than  exact  parallel.  Modern  Europe,  it  may  be  maintained, 
has  its  Monroe  Doctrine  against  the  Turk,  just  as  ancient 
Hellas  had  its  Monroe  Doctrine  against  the  barbarian. 
Apart,  however,  from  the  fact  that  nations  have  been  wont 
to  condemn  classes  of  acts  dangerous  to  themselves,  it 
might  at  first  sight  seem  that  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  were  independent  of  the  past.  In  the  sense  that 
the  words  of  1823  were  not  the  outcome  of  a  series  of 
approximations  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
the  doctrine  which  they  express,  this  view  indeed  appears 
to  be  the  true  one.  But  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  for  forty  years  the  United  States  had  been  hastening 
towards  the  position  that  they  assumed  in  1823,  while  in  ' 
their  progress  itis  possible  to  distinguish  several  landmarks 

1-2 


4  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

on  the  road  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Both  their  mental  attitude 
and  its  expression  in  words  become  intelligible  in  the 
light  of  previous  history. 

The  self-assertiveness  and  ambition  of  the  men  who 
threw  off  the  yoke  of  Laud  descended  after  four  generations 
to  the  fathers  of  American  independence.  At  the  outbreak 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War  the  thirteen  British  Colonies, 
diverse  in  origin,  in  religion,  and  in  interests,  had  formed 
a  mere  strip  of  territory  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard,— a  strip 
hemmed  in  and  dwarfed  by  huge  provinces  of  France,  and 
Spain.  At  the  peace  of  4763,  however,  Canada,  Florida 
and  the  Mississippi  frontier  became  British,  while  the  re- 
maining French  possessions  in  North  America  passed 
under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  The  English  colonies, 
therefore,  had  no  longer  a  formidable  rival  on  their  fron- 
tiers, and  sixteen  years  later  they  fulfilled  the  prophecies 
of  foreign  statesmen  by  their  revolt. 

During  three  campaigns  France  looked  on  while  the 
British  generals  failed  to  deal  the  decisive  blow.  Then,  as 
her  own  writers  and  statesmen  have  avowed,  she  seized 
the  opportunity  to  humble  her  ancient  rival,  and  threw  the 
weight  of  Spain  also  into  the  scale  of  revolution.  Four 
more  campaigns  were  needed,  and  then— forty  years  before 
the  Monroe  Doctrine — the  Americans,  bankrupt  and  exhau- 
sted, found  themselves  struggling  with  the  support  of 
England  against  the  Bourbon  monarchs  for  the  line  of  the 
Mississippi.  "  It  is  impossible,  "  says  Mr  Lecky,  "  not  to 
be  struck  with  the  skill,  hardihood,  and  good  fortune  that 
marked  the  American  negotiations.  Everything  the  United 
States  could,  with  any  shadow  of  plausibility,  demand  from 
England  they  obtained,  and  much  of  what  they  obtained 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.     5 

was  granted  them  in  opposition  to  the  two  great  Powers 
by  whose  assistance  they  had  triumphed." 

At  Versailles,  then,   the  doctrine  that   even  the  east 
coast  of  North  America  was  closed  to   European   coloni- 
sation would  have  flowed  with  strange  grace  from  the  lips 
of  Franklin  or  the   pen    of   Washington.     In   the  darkest 
hours  of  Valley  Forge,   however,    men    in    authority    had 
shown  something   of  the    buoyant  spirit    which   inspired 
their  successors  to  declare  that  the  gates  of  the  New  World 
were   shut    against   the    politics    of    the    Old.      Congress, 
though   powerless  to   furnish  men  or  money,   was   never 
weary  of  requesting  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  conquer 
Canada.    Lafayette,  whose  imagination   prompted  him  to 
attack  India  as  well,  was  saved  only  by   his  affection  for 
Washington  from attemptincthe  improbable  at  the  bidding 
oi  these  military  theorists.     Unable  to  hold  New  York,  they 
were  burning  to  hoist  the  American  Hag  amid  the  sands  of 
Florida.     It  even  seemed  at  variance  with   the   new-born 
continental  destiny  that  the  West  Indies  should  own  the 
sway  of  Britain.     These  visions,  indeed,  were  hardly  more 
likely  to  expand  the  boundaries  of  the   United   States  than 
was  the  grave  demonstration  of  Franklin  that  England,  still 
mistress  of  New  York,  should  cede  Canada  to  atone  for  the 
damage   done   by  her  troops  during   the  war.)    Like  the 
Doctrine  of  1823,  they  were  due  to  a  transcendent  national 
self-confidence,  itself  the  product  of  the  miracles  already 
achieved.     Thirteen  colonies  of  the  most  diverse  origin, 
climate,  and  institutions,  had  belied  the  predictions  of  the 
world  by  joining  together  in  a  common  cause.     A  new  force 
had  arisen,  and  that  a  force  unhampered  by  the  neighbour- 
hood of  other  forces  like  itself.     Having  vanquished  internal 


°  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

opposition,  it  had  frustrated  the  most  strenuous  efforts  of 
the  British  king.  Such  success,  stimulating  men  whose 
powers  of  speculative  thought  had  brought  the  quarrel  to 
the  test  of  arms,  turned  logicians  into  seers,  and  gave 
expression  to  the  belief  that  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  must 
soon  be  members  of  a  Union  destined  to  spread  over  the 
northern  part  of  that  whole  quarter  of  the  globe.  The 
immediate  practical  effect  of  aspirations  bounded  only  by 
the  ocean  was  seen  in  the  tenacity  with  which  the  Ameri- 
cans clung  to  the  Mississippi  frontier.  When  peace  was 
signed  they  rejoiced  in  the  acknowledgment  of  a  title  to 
perhaps  a  fifth  part  of  habitable  North  America.  Of  know- 
ledge of  their  hemisphere  to  the  west  and  south  of  the 
Mississippi,  still  less  of  influence  or  authority  over  it,  they 
possessed  scarcely  a  trace. 

The  history  of  the  four  decades  which  followed  the 
Peace  of  Versailles  is  the  story  of  how  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
became  possible.  After  six  years  of  exhaustion  and  anar- 
chy, the  colonies  achieved  a  government,  and  by  the 
exchange  of  Ministers  with  European  Powers,  prepared  to 
inaugurate  a  foreign  policy.  Their  population  steadily 
rose.  Less  than  four  millions  in  1790,  it  had  increased  by 
a  constant  ratio  to  more  than  ten  millions  in  1823.  Suc- 
cessive Presidents,  whether  Gallican  or  Anglican,  Repub - 
lican  or  Federalist,  united  in  seizing  every  opportunity  to 
enlarge  their  bourdaries.  Settlement  to  the  west  of  the 
Alleghanies  pursued  an  unbroken  course,  and  in  1803  the 
Federal  area  was  doubled  by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana 
from  Napoleon.  France  thus  once  more  consented  to 
her  own  obliteration  from  the  map  of  North  America.^  She 
left   the    United    States   hedged    in  by  the  territories  of 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.      / 

Great  Britain  and  Spain,  and  by  the  unexplored  country  of 
Oregon. 

Standing  midway  between  the  achievement  of  inde- 
pendence by  the  United  States  and  the  swelling  declaration 
of  1823,  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  forms  a  landmark  onV 
the  road  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  common  with  the 
growth  of  internal  communication,  it  promoted  the  national, 
cohesion  of  the  Federation  suddenly  called  upon  to  rule  an 
empire.  Among  its  more ,  tangible  results  were  titles, 
though  doubtful  ones,  to  the  Oregon  district  and  to  the 
western  portion  of  Florida.  The  former,  indeed,  could 
present  no  immediate  attractions  to  the  United  States,  but 
the  maritime  value  of  the  Floridas,  now  cut  off  from  the 
great  mass  of  Spanish  dominions,  had  not  failed  to  arouse 
their  attention.  The  tide  of  circumstances  ran  strongly  in 
their  favour.  In  1809,  when  the  Presidency  of  Madison 
began,  Spain  found  herself  so  paralysed  in  Europe  that  she 
could  hardly  lift  a  finger  to  prevent  her  New  World  domi- 
nions from  throwing  off  her  yoke.  Great  Britain,  whose 
representative  at  Washington  could  say  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  with  the  approval  of  his  Government,  "Such  are  the 
ties  by  which  His  Majesty  is  bound  to  Spain  that  he  cannot 
see  with  indifference  any  attack  upon  her  interest  in  Ame- 
rica," was  forbidden  by  her  strained  relations  with  the 
United  States  from  maintaining  by  diplomacy,  and  by  her 
struggle  with  Napoleon  from  maintaining  by  force  that 
guarantee  of  Spanish  possessions  to  which  Spain  appealed. 
The  United  States,  therefore,  enjoyed  perfect  freedom  of 
action  in  their  dealings  with  West  Florida,  and  a  curious  [ 
prototype  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  the  result 

On  the  1st  November,  1810,  Mr  J.  P.  Morier,  the  British 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

charge  d'affaires,  reported  that  a  set  of  American  despe- 
radoes, posing  as  a  convention  of  Spanish  subjects,  had 
seized  Baton  Rouge  and  declared  the  province  indepen- 
dent. A  month  later,  the  rumour  was  current  that  the 
United  States  had  agreed  with  the  convention  to  despatch 
a  Governor.  A»  Committee  of  the  Senate  had  reported 
that,  "If  we  look  forward  to  the  free  use  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  Mobile,  and  the  Apalachicola,  and  the  other  rivers  of 
the  West,  by  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  New  Orleans  and 
the  Floridas  must  become  a  part  of  the  United  States, 
either  by  purchase  or  by  conquest."  The  presidential 
message,  therefore,  announced  the  occupation  of  West 
Florida  so  far  as  it  was  claimed  by  the  United  States,  not 
as  an  act  of  war,  but  pending  the  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion. Morier,  unable  to  galvanise  Spain  into  precautions, 
or  to  extort  frolm  the  Secretary  of  State  anything  more  than 
a^romise  of  explanations  in  London*  vented  his  indigna- 
tion in  a  bitter  description  tor  his  (Government  of  the 
Congressional  Debates  from  December  18th  onwards.  "These 
immaculate  republicans,  "  he  reported,  "  conscious  of  the 
weakness  of  their  case,  very  quietly  reconcile  the  usurpation 
to  their  conscience  on  the  pretence  of  self-defence.''  Both 
Houses  had  gone  into  secret  Session,  and  showed  the 
national  appreciation  of  the  crisis  by  debating  many  days 
with  closed  doors.  When,  towards  the  end  of  June,  a« 
newspaper  tore  down  the  veil,  it  was  seen  that  just  one/ 
month  before  Monroe  took  office  as  Secretary  of  State,  the/ 
Doctrine  which  bears  his  name  had  been  in  part  outlined 
by  Madison  and  accepted  by  the  Houses.  In  a  confidential 
message  recommending  to  Congress  the  policy  of  taking  / 
temporary  possession  of  West  Florida,  the  President  had! 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.     9 

advised  "A  declaration  that  the  United  States  could  not 
see,  without  serious  inquietude,  any  part  of  a  neighbouring 
territory  in  which  they  have,  in  different  respects,  so  deep 
and  just  a  concern,  pass  from  the  hands  of  Spain  into  those 
of  any  other  foreign  power."  A  long  and  secret  debate 
had  followed,  and  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  March  3rd, 
Congress  had  passed  a  resolution,  or  declaration,  accepting 
the  policy  of  the  President.  "Taking  into  view  the  pecu- 
liar situation  of  Spain,"  they  said,  "  and  of  her  American 
Provinces,  and  considering  the  influence  which  the  destiny 
of  the  territory  adjoining  the  southern  boundary  of  the 
United  States  may  have  upon  their  security,  trauquillity,  and 
commerce. .  .the  United  States,  under  the  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances'of  the  existing  crisis,  cannot,  without  serious 
inquietude,  see  any  part  of  the  said  territory  pass  into  the 
hands  Of  any  other  foreign  power."  Having  thus  placed  on 
record  their  motives,  Congress  proceeded  to  pass  an  act 
for  the  occupation  of  West  Florida. 

This  Madison  Doctrine, as  amended  by  Congress,  seems 
in  part  to  surpass  and  in  part  to  fall  short  of  the  language 
of  1823.     It  is  more  fortunate  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine  inv 
receiving  the  sanction  of  the  Legislature,  and  it  is  at  once 
translated  into  action.  It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  particular 
solution,  not  a  general  principle,  and  instead  of  dictating  to 
the  world  the  permanent  inviolability  of  a  hemisphere,  it 
almost  apologetically  provides  for  the  momentary  safety  ofN 
the  United  States.    What  is  common  to  both  declarations  x 
is  the  assumption  by  the  United  States  of  a  right  to  limit 
the  action  of  foreign  powers  with  regard  to  territory  within 
the  western  hemisphere  but  beyond  their  own  borders,  in 
order  to  prevent  possible  injury  to  their  own  interests;  and 


10  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

the  treatment  of  theories  of  destiny  as  a  factor  in  interna- 
tional relations. 

Destiny,  in  the  days  of  Madison,  however,  revealed 
herself  in  far  less  shadowy  guise  than  that  in  which  she 
had  appeared  to  the  statesmen  of  the  Revolution.  Was- 
hington had  founded  the  Union,  and  had  bequeathed  to  it 
a  policy  which  above  all  things  may  be  called  American. 
Jefferson,  repeating  his  precepts,  had  doubled  the  area  to 
which  they  might  apply.  And  now  Madison,  though  Spain 
brands  his  conduct  as  *  treacherous,'  and  England  laughs 
at  its  pretence  of  righteousness,  receives  the  tribute  of  an 
enemy  to  the  advance  of  the  Republic.  In  a  despatch  so 
biting  that  the  hand  of  authority  at  home  has  removed  the 
possibility  of  international  offense  by  blotting  out  several 
lines,  Morier  jeers  at  the  lack  of  energy  to  be  expected 
from  a  State  with  an  army  of  five  thousand  men  and  an 
empty  treasury.  He  is  compelled  to  acknowledge,  howe- 
ver, that  '-The  Floridas,  from  their  situation  and  from  the 
rapid  increase  of  population  in  this  country"  are  "  destined 
to  form  a  part  of  the  government  of  the  United  States." 
Ten  years  later,  when  Monroe  had  become  President  andx 
the  number  of  United  States  had  risen  to  twenty-four,  this 
destiny  received  its  fulfilment.  The  Floridas,  burdensome  \ 
to  Spain,  were  in  1819  assigned  by  treaty  to  the  Republic  ; 
and  in  1821,  after  a  thousand  perils,  the  treaty  received  theN 
ratification  of  King  Ferdinand. 

The  scale  of  political  power  in  North  America  thus 
turned  decisively  in  favour  of  the  United  States.  Their 
increasing  importance  was  attested  by  their  relations  with 
foreign  powers.  In  deference  rather  to  internal  faction 
than  to  Spain,  they  renounced  the  unsubstantial  claim  to 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    11 

Texas,  but  Great  Britain  shrank  from  opposing  their  prepa- 
rations to  make  settlements  within  the  area  drained  by  the 
Columbia  River — a  territory  which  she  regarded  as  her 
own.  While  their  northern  neighbour  showed  herself  thus 
little  disposed  to  resist  them,  the  provinces  on  their  south- 
western frontier  passed  from  the  sway  of  Spain  to  a  state 
of  precarious  and  unaggressive  independence.  Thus  potent 
in  their  own  continent,  therefore,  the  United  States  gained 
credit  with  the  world  outside.  Cuba,  the  Ionian  Islands 
and  even  Greece,  were  ready  to  welcome  their  interfe- 
rence. Humoured,  if  not  feared,  by  Great  Britain,  courted 
by  Spain,  by  France,  by  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  by  the 
South  Americans,  with  unity  at  home  and  a  generation  of 
unprecedented  progress  to  look  back  upon,  their  faith 
in  their  destiny  increased,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
expressed  it. 


CHAPTER    II. 
The  International  Situation  in  18l23. 

Although  an  augmented  territory  and,  still  more,  a 
swelling  spirit  of  self-confidence  were  required  before 
Americans  could  utter  the  words  of  1823,  it  must  not  be^ 
supposed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  called  forth  by\ 
internal  considerations  alone.  It  must  rather  be  regarded v 
as  the  product  of  complex  circumstances  existing  in  Ame- 
rica, North  and  South,  and  in  Europe.  To  investigate  its 
origin,  then,  we  must  define  the  national  factors  which 
were  at  work,  and  examine  the  contact  between  them  by 
which  the  result  in  question  was  produced.  The  United 
States,  indeed,  gave  the  Doctrine  birth,  but  writers  and 
statesmen  have  often  ascribed  its  paternity  to  Greatx 
Britain.  The  former  opposed  it  chiefly  to  the  Holy 
Alliance;  the  latter,  it  is  probable,  to  France.  Spain  and 
Spanish  America  were  the  parties  to  the  quarrel  which  it 
was  designed  to  bring  to  a  close. 

The  attitude  and  motives  of  Great  Britain  admit  of 
brief  statement.  Two  great  principles  seem  to  have  gover- 
ned all  her  action  after  the   downfall  of  Napoleon.     Her 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  IN  1823.        43 

newly-won  commercial  supremacy  must  be  maintained  and 
developed,  and  the  slave-trade  must  be  swept  from  the  face 
of  the  earth.  Thus  far  public  opinion  was  supreme,  but 
in  other  directions  the  Ministry  was  unchecked  by  popular 
feeling. 

Having  shared  in  the  salvation  of  Europe,  and  in  the 
arbitrary  settlement  of  her  destinies  at  Vienna,  Great 
Britain  did  not  at  once  cease  to  exercise  that  guardianship 
and  supervision  of  the  Continent  with  which  a  common 
danger  had  invested  the  Allies.  Wellington  and  Castle- 
reagh  felt  no  repugnance  at  the  principles  of  Metternich 
or  the  aspirations  of  Alexander.  While  not  desirous  of 
meddling  in  the  gouvernment  of  Russia,  Austria  and 
Prussia,  as  being  "  branches  of  one  Christian  nation,"  and 
while  resolved  not  to  tolerate  any  extension  of  such 
government  to  their  own  country,  a  king  and  ministers  in 
daily  danger  from  mobs  and  assassins  could  hardly  fail  to 
sympathise  with  the  Holy  Alliance  as  upholding  authority 
against  revolution.  Between  constitutional  and  autocratic 
government,  however,  there  could  be  no  lasting  union,  and 
in  May  1820  a  British  State  paper  laid  down  in  the  clearest 
terms  the  principle  of  national  independence.  This 
principle,  however,  was  not  fully  maintained,  and  British 
sanction  of  the  government  of  Europe  by  Congresses  not 
finally  withdrawn,  until  in  September  1822  Georges^ 
Canning  was  placed  by  Liverpool  in  the  office  left  vacant 
by  the  death  of  Castlereagh.  The  policy  of  the  new 
Foreign  Secretary,  though  not  bellicose,  was  essentially 
British.  Pursuing  her  own  ends  in  her  own  way,  striving 
to  hold  the  balance  between  the  contending  principles  ol 
absolutism   and  democracy,  Great  Britain  recovered  her' 


14  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

independence  and  her  isolation.     Still   a  member  of  the 
Quintuple  Alliance,  and  influential  at  the  Court  of  Vienna, 
she  escaped  the  violent  hostility  of  Europe,  but  retained 
the  real  friendship  only  of  weaklings  such  as  Sweden  and 
Portugal.      Canning's    system    of   policy,   indeed,    if    his 
secretary    understood    it   aright,   was    opportunistic   and  J 
mechanical.    The   interests   of  Great  Britain  were  to  be 
regarded  as  a  plane,  which,  if  depressed  in  any  part,  must, 
be  restored  to   its  general  Jevel  by  elevation   elsewhere. J 
In  carrying  out  this  system,  he  endeavoured  by  favouring 
revolution   in  Spanish    America    to    counterbalance    the 
success  of  legitimacy  in  Spain,  where  the  French  armies, 
had  restored  despotic  government.     To  further  the  plan  he- 
called  for  the  help  of  the  United  States;  and  the  negotia- 
tions for  this  help,  though  not  directly  successful,  deterJ 
mined   the  time  and  manner  of  the    enunciation    of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

In  seeking  the  help  of  the  United  States  Canning  was 
but  little  handicapped  by  history.  After  the  miserable  and 
indecisive  war  of  1812—14,  Great  Britain  had  shown 
herself  nervously  anxious  to  avoid  all  chance  of  further 
rupture.  Actual  concessions  were  made  most  grudgingly, 
but  the  discussion  of  disputed  points  was,  whenever 
possible,  postponed,  and  Castlereagh  allowed  English 
Ministers  at  Washington  to  be  active  only  on  the  subject 
of  the  slave-trade.  The  result  was  that  the  American 
people  might  regard  the  British  nation  as  afraid  to  provoke 
the  victors  of  New  Orleans,  while  their  Secretary  of  State 
wrote  down  her  policy  as  ';  wavering  and  unsteady," — 
"  willing  to  wound  and  yet  afraid  to  strike."  Canning, 
however,  upheld  the  system  of  conciliation,  and  in  1823 


THE    INTERNATIONAL    SITUATION    IN   1823.        15 

something  like  concert  between  the  two  governments  had 
been  arrived  at. 

In  that  year  the  interests  of  both  were  threatened  by 
the  conduct  of  France  and  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  story 
of  the  relations  between  France  and  the  United  States 
forms  a  curious  chapter  in  the  history  of  sentimental 
alliances  between  nations.  The  frenzy  of  enthusiasm  for 
American  liberty  tnat  had  driven  Lafayette  across  the 
ocean  while  fashionable  Paris  thronged  round  Franklin, 
had  calmed  as  quickly  as  it  had  risen.  In  the  negotiations 
at  Versailles,  France  was  not  altogether  on  the  side  of  her 
protege,  while  the  American  Commissioners  showed  a 
want  of  gratitude  and  good  faith  in  signing  preliminaries 
of  peace  without  consulting  her.  Among  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  however,  the  Republican  or  Democratic 
party,  claiming  the  allegiance  of  Jefferson,  Madison  and 
Monroe,  was  in  its  origin  the  disciple  and  devotee  of 
France.  The  outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  therefore,  was 
the  signal  for  the  frantic  approbation  of  America ;  and 
Monroe,  her  ambassador  at  Paris,  showed  that  he  fully 
shared  in  it.  We  can  hardly  understand  the  rapture, 
indeed,  which  must  have  filled  young  America  at  the  sight 
of  a  mighty  European  nation  determining  to  tread  with 
them  the  untried  path  of  Republicanism.  Four  million 
people,  it  must  never  be  forgotten,  werre  putting  to  the 
proof  a  form  of  government  of  which  the  Christian  era  had 
seen  no  real  example,  while  the  monarchs  of  the  Old 
World  frowned  and  prophesied  evils  to  come.  It  is  the 
proudest  trophy  of  their  government  that  at  such  a 
moment  the  pen  of  Jefferson  could  formulate  against 
France  broad  principles  of  neutrality  to  which  time  has 


16  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

added  nothing.  Washington  must  have  had  the  Democrats 
and  France  in  view  when  in  his  famous  Farewell  Address 
he    solemnly   warned  the  American  people  against  "  the^ 

insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influence one  of  the  most^ 

baneful  foes  of  republican  government,"  dooming  the 
small  or  weak  nation  to  be  the  satellite  of  its  great  and 
powerful  favourite. 

One  year  later,  France  and  the  United  States  found 
themselves  at  war.  The  overbearing  government  of  the 
Directory  had  dictated  humiliation  and  corruption  as  the 
attitude  of  the  Americans,  and  Pinckney  had  immortalised 
himself  by  the  reply  "  Millions  for  defense,  but  not  a  cent 
for  tribute."  John  Adams,  the  Federal  President,  showed 
true  but  unpopular  patriotism,  by*  nipping  the  war  in  the 
bud,  and  in  September,  1800.  a  Convention  was  concluded. 
With  the  new  century,  the  democratic  party  triumphed; 
and,  up  to  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
harmony  between  the  two  nations  was  never  seriously 
impaired.  Napoleon,  having  acquired  Louisiana  from 
Spain,  did  not  hesitate  to  shock  the  feelings  of  his  ally  by 
selling  it  to  the  United  States;  and  Jefferson,  President 
from  1800  to  1809,  so  far  forgot  his  Democratic  principles 
as  to  strengthen  the  Federal  bond  by  purchasing  it  as  a 
national  possession.  So  long  as  the  First  Empire 
continued,  however,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the 
Republican  institutions  of  America  were  exposed  to 
danger  from  France,  while  in  England  even  George  III  had 
accepted  as  irrevocable  the  verdict  of  1783.  Sentiment 
and  tradition,  however,  proved  too  strong  for  political 
wisdom.  When,  in  the  struggle  between  the  rivals,  the 
rights  of  the  United  States  were  invaded  by  both  alike, 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  IN  1823.         17 

hereditary  sympathy  for  France  caused  the  government  of 
Madison  to  choose  Great  Britain  for  its  foe. 

The  events  of  1815  left  France  a  monarchy,  England 
pledged  to  its  preservation,  and  the  United  States  at  peace 
with  both.  In  the  New  World,  Louis  XV 111  had  few  appa- 
rent interests.  [The  ambition  of  his  ministers,  however, 
caused  the  United  States  some  uneasiness,  in  particular 
lest  Cuba  might  be  ceded  to  France  by  Spain.  Montmo- 
rency, as  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  despatched 
secret  agents  to  America,  and  Chateaubriand,  his  succes- 
sor, followed  the  same  policy,  in  the  hope  of  transforming 
the  insurgent  republics  into  monarchies  under  Bourbon 
sovereigns.  The  danger  first  seemed  imminent,  however, 
when  France,  having  stationed  an  army  of  observation  to 
prevent  yellow  fever  and  constitutional  principles  from 
crossing  her  southern  frontier,  gained  the  goodwill  ot  the 
allied  sovereigns  in  a  design  for  putting  down  the  Spanish 
revolution.  She  succeeded  in  the  task, and  nothing  seemed 
to  the  administration  at  Washington  more  likely  than  that, 
monarchical  principles  apart,  she  should  indemnify  herself 
by  wresting  from  Spain  its  claims  to  some  of  the  revolted 
colonies.  Canning,  at  the  same  time,  saw  the  tacit  revival 
of  the  Bourbon  Family  Compact.  The  Pyrenees  had  fallen,' 
but  he  was  resolved  to  maintain  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Itv 
the  interests  of  England  and  of  Europe  he  sought  the  aid 
of  the  United  States,  at  the  moment  when  their  fears  had 
been  raised  on  account  of  America.  Prince  Polignac,  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London,  it  was  true,  disclaimed  for 
his  country  any  aims  at  transatlantic  conquest.  Even  had 
the  news  of  this  disclaimer  reached  the  Monroe  Cabinet, 
however,  it  could  not  have  blinded  them  to  the  fact  that 
b.  2 


18  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

the  French  Ministers  were  neither  omnipotent  nor  unani- 
mous. The  presidential  message  of  1823,  in  so  far  as  it 
warned  France  to  go  no  farther,  was  a  boon  to  the  Old 
World  devised  in  the  interests  of  the  New. 

Though  the  peril  from  the  power  actually  under  arms 
was  perhaps  more  real,  greater  danger  of  an  extension  to 
the  New  World  of  the  political  system  of  the  Old  seemed 
to  the  United  States  to  come  from  the  Holy  Alliance.  This 
league  of  European  sovereigns  under  the  hegemony  of  the 
Czar,  though  less  capable  than  France  of  determining  a 
policy,  seemed  infinitely  more  capable  of  putting  it  into 
execution.  Originally  conceived  of  by  Alexander,  perhaps, 
as  a  society  for  the  realisation  of  Christian  principles  ofl 
government,  it  had  degenerated  into  an  association  of  I 
autocrats  to  stifle  every  aspiration  after  constitutional/ 
freedom.  Of  this  association,  to  which  the  sovereigns  of 
Russia,  Austria,  Prussia,  France,  Spain,  Naples  and  Sardi- 
nia had  fully  pledged  themselves,  the  Austrian  Chancellor, 
Metternich,  was  the  centre  and  the  soul.  Castlereagh  he 
had  esteemed  his  second  self— devoted  to  him  in  heart  and 
spirit.  Canning  he  was  bound  to  regard  with  more  distrust, 
but  he  clung  to  the  hope  that  England  might  be  induced  to 
continue  that  policy  of  general  acquiescence  in  the  acts  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  which  she  had  not  yet  finally  abjured. 

The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  had  repulsed  the 
persistent  overtures  of  the  Czar  to  accede  to  the  Holy 
Alliance.  Their  government  had  come  to  regard  it  as  "  a 
mere  hypocritical  fraud,"  while  they  knew  that  Alexander  , 
and  Metternich  regarded  the  Republic  as  "  a  standing  rem- ,7 
tation  of  their  doctrines."  When  it  is  added  that  Monroe 
and  his  advisers  believed  both  that  Great  Britain  might  be 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   SITUATION    IN    18u23.        19 

induced  to  return  to  her  allegiance,  and  that  the  object  of 
the  European  league  was  the  overthrow  of  liberty,  first  in 
South  and  then  in  North  America,  the  relation  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  to  the  words  of  1823  becomes  clearer. 

The  danger  to  America  from  the  Holy  Alliance,  or  from 
France,  or  from  both  powers  seemed  to  be  made  imminent 
by  the  events  of  1823  in  the  Peninsula. 

The  intervention  of  France  in  Spain,  opposed  by  Can- 
ning in  Paris,  London,  and  Madrid  with  an  eloquence 
lacking  nothing  but  success,  was  sanctioned,  though  not 
dictated,  by  the  Holy  Allies.  The  revolutionary  Ministers 
and  Cortes,  although  their  government  had  estranged  the 
mass  of  the  nation,  held  it  a  point  of  honour  to  present  an 
unyielding  front  to  the  French  demands;  and  on  the  6th 
April  the  Due  d'Angouleme  crossed  the  Bidassoa.  The 
slightness  of  the  resistance  offered  to  her  troops  almost 
lent  colour  to  the  professions  of  France  tnat  she  was  not 
at  war  with  her  neighbour.  The  Cortes  carried  the  king  to 
Seville,  and  before  the  close  of  May  D'Angouleme  had 
entered  Madrid.  He  had  now  only  to  obtain  the  release  of 
Ferdinand,  who  was  dragged  by  the  Cortes  to  Cadiz,  and 
there  besieged.  In  the  last  extremity,  the  Constitutiona- 
lists decided  to  throw  themselves  on  the  mercy  of  their 
king,  and  on  the  1st  October  they  allowed  him  to  join  the 
French  army. 

The  fall  of  Cadiz  seemed  an  ill  omen  for  the  liberties 
of  America.  Ferdinand  abandoned  himself  to  a  reactionary 
Reign  of  Terror,  which  D'Angouleme  was  unable  to  check. 
Order  could  be  maintained  only  by  the  troops  of  France, 
and  it  was  vain  to  look  to  the  shattered  finances  of  Spain 
for  their  support.  France,  though  Chateaubriand  was  any- 

9—9 


20  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

thing  but  mercenary,  might  seek  indemnity  in  the  New- 
World;  and  the  state  of  the  young  republics  promised  her 
little  difficulty  in  finding  it.  As  the  informal  agent  of  the 
Holy  Alliance,  therefore,  she  had  brought  about  a  state  of 
things  is  Spain  which  revived  European  interest  in  Spanish 
America.  So  long  as  the  mother-country  had  been  tainted 
with  constitutional  principles,  the  cause  of  absolutism 
could  gain  little  from  a  crusade  to  restore  her  rule.  When 
the  clerical  party  was  clamouring  for  the  Inquisition, 
however,  no  one  could  doubt  that  the  doctrines  of  Legiti- 
macy would  be  sufficiently  maintained.  In  Naples,  in  Pied- 
mont and  in  Spain,  interference  had  triumphed.  Was  it  not 
due  to  themselves,  to  Ferdinand  and  to  the  world,  that  the 
Allies  should  turn  to  America— to  bring  rebels  under  the 
sceptre  of  their  sovereign,  and  to  check  the  contagion  of 
example  ? 

Such  was,  in  brief,  the  position  of  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  the  Holy  Alliance  and  Spain  in  the  ) 
international  situation  out  of  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  I 
arose.    To  describe  this  situation  is  to  become  conscious 
of  an  influence  which,  though  vague,  was  felt  on  all  sides — 
the  influence  of  Spanish  America. 

The  huge  empire  founded  in  the  sixteenth  century  by 
Cortes  and  Pizarro  had  for  three  hundred  years  remained 
almost  without  a  history.  Within  a  frontier  of  many  thou- 
sand miles,  Spain  had  decreed  death  to  the  foreigner  who  J 
should  set  foot  in  her  possessions.  In  the  memory  of  the 
generation  which  achieved  the  independence  of  Columbia, 
the  rule  had  been  broken  only  by  three  Frenchmen  and  a 
Danish  doctor.  Natives  who  on  any  pretext  traded  with 
the  foreigner,  were  pitilessly  condemned  to  death.    When, 


THE  INTERNATIONAL   SITUATION  IN   1823.        21 

during  the  Peninsular  War,  some  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  South  America  were  impelled  by  the  vicissitudes  of  thei 
home  government  to  act  for  themselves,  their  population, 
resources  and  aspirations  were  unknown  outside  their 
borders.  When  the  eyes  of  North  Americans  had  been 
fixed  on  them  for  fifteen  years,  and  Monroe  had  officially 
championed  their  cause,  few,  it  was  held  indisputable, 
could  discern  clearly  their  actual  condition.  Even  at  the 
present  day,  their  share  in  the  events  which  preceded  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  received  but  little  attention. 

Jti  the  appendix  to  this  essay  an  attempt  is  made,  with 
the  help  of  contemporary  evidence^  to  describe  Spanish 
America  at  the  time  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  policy  pursued  by  Great  Britain  with  regard  to  the 
revolted  colonies  during  the  period  anterior  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  seems  to  have  been  opportunistic.  The  forces 
impelling  her  to  action  long  rested  in  equilibrium.  In 
South,  as  in  North  America,  British  commerce  was  the 
lOde-star  of  the  British  statesman.  Regarding  the  ancient1 
colonial  exclusion  as  suspended  if  not  abrogated  by  events, 
he  taught  Spain  to  enter  into  a  ''  tacit  compact  "  to  coun- 
tenance the  British  trader,  at  least  while  the  struggle  con-  i 
tinued.  This  gained,  it  was  easiest  to  let  events  take  their 
own  course.  A  treaty  of  neutrality  was  conceded  to  Spain, 
and  to  enforce  it  Parliament  imitated  the  legislation  of  the 
United  States  against  Foreign  Enlistment.  Offers  of 
mediation  were  made  in  1810,  1812,  and  1815,  but  without 
result.  Their  failure  was  attributed  by  Canning  to  the 
obstinacy  of  the  Spanish  government,  but  by  hostile  cri- 
tics to  the  captiousness  and  insincerity  of  Great  Britain. 
On  the  one  hand,  Spain  had  for  years  been  the  ward  of  j 


22  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

England,  and  her  guardian  could  not  be  indifferent  to  th,e 
ruin  of  her  empire  and  finances.  More  than  one  half  of 
Liverpool's  colleagues,  again,  were  ultra-Tories,  a#d  all 
would  in  the  abstract  regret  to  see  monarchical/institu- 
tions displaced  by  republican.  The  prevailing  ignorance 
of  the  spirit,  resources  and  dispositions  of  the  South  Ame- 
ricans was  an  additional  deterrent  from  action.  Until  time 
gave  them  the  lie,  the  friends  of  Ferdinand  and  Metternich 
never  wearied  of  repeating  that  the  rebels  might  overthrow, 
but  could  never  construct  a  government.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Spanish  colonial  system  was  acknowledged  by 
all  Europe  to  be  an  anachronism,  and  even  Spain  could  not 
deny  that  the  exercise  of  her  power  over  some  of  the 
colonies  was  interrupted.  The  United  States  pressed  Great 
Britain  to  take  the  lead  in  acknowledging  the  independence 
of  the  provinces  which  had  evidently  terminated  in  their 
own  favour  the  contest  with  the  mother-country.  The  cry 
was  echoed  by  the  agents  of  the  provinces  themselves, 
and  by  a  growing  chorus  of  British  subjects  with  South 
American  interests.  If  the  preferences  of  the  new  States 
were  disregarded,  the  restoration  of  a  modified  form  of 
Spanish  government  seemed  the  most  convenient  solution 
of  the  difficulty;  and  all  parties  joined  in  beseeching  Spain 
to  take  steps  to  terminate  the  anarchy  and  to  strive  to  end 
the  contest  on  such  tei  ms  as  these.  Their  appeal,  however. 
save  when  the  government  of  Spain  was  constitutional,) 
and  therefore  offensive  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  fell  on  deaf) 
ears.  Spain  denied  much,  hoped  much,  and  did  nothing. 
Meanwhile  the  forces  striving  to  overcome  the  inertia  of 
Great  Britain  slowly  gathered  strength.  By  a  regular 
eries  of  steps,  she  was  driven  to  warn  Spain,  to  threaten 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  IN  1823.        23 

her,  to  seek  independent  information  as  to  the  new  States, 
and  to  declare  to  the  Court  of  Madrid  that  her  action  with 
regard  to  them  would  be  likewise  independent.  To  the 
final  display  of  this  independence,  she  was  spurred  by  the 
United  States,  which  first  recognised  the  new  Republics, 
and  then,  by  promulgating  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  seemed 
to  come  forth  as  their  protector. 

Opposition  to  the  interference  of  Europe  in  South. 
AnTerina  had  thus  for  frame  ti<ne__engage£J[  the  aUenti<»n  of 
Gj^at_Britain.  Her  policy  with  regard  to  the  new  states 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  aimed  chiefly  at  promoting  hevj 
commerce.  Its  success  is  attested  by  the  fact  that,  at  the 
end  of  1823,  even  the  Prime  Minister  of  France  spoke  of 
her  as  the  power  most  immediately  interested  in  the 
affairs  of  South  America.  According  to  Chateaubriand 
himself,  the  new  republics  had  become  a  species  of 
English  colonies.  As  her  stake  increased,  however,  (she  J 
more  and  more  felt  the  need  of  gaining  for  it  the  protec-j 
tion  of  a  government.  Her  own  political  prepossessions,  as 
Canning  confessed,  were  in  favour  of  monarchy,  and  even 
of  the  restoration  of  a  modified  Spanish  rule.  Her  commis- 
sioners to  the  new  States,  therefore,  were  instructed  to 
promote,  though  not  to  propose,  a  settlement  in  accor- 
dance with  these  principles ;  and  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Madrid  believed  that  they  might  save  Mexico  from 
Republicanism.  The  success  of  the  Colonies  and  the 
obstinacy  of  Spain  had  justified  her,  none  the  less,  in 
asserting  full  liberty  of  action,  and  the  British  commercial 
classes  began  to  exercise  a  steady  pressure  on  their 
Government.  In  1822,  the  merchants  and  shipowners  of 
Liverpool    and    the     merchants    and     manufacturers    of 


24  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Glasgow  impressed  upon  Canning  their  desire  for  the 
establishment  of  political  relations  between  Great  Britain 
and  South  America.  Next  year,  the  request  for  consuls 
and  protection  was  renewed  by  the  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce of  Manchester  and  Belfast,  by  the  Shipowners' 
Society,  and  by  numerous  British  merchants.  Canning, 
meanwhile,  had  been  seeking  the  assistance  of  the  Board 
of  Trade,  the  Treasury,  and  the  King's  Advocate,  and  in 
the  middle  of  October  he  was  able  to  announce  thatl 
consuls  would  be  sent  forthwith  to  twelve  places  in 
Spanish  America.  Formal  recognition  of  the  new  govern- 
ments, on  the  other  hand,  would  offend  Spain  and  the 
Allies  without  clearly  benefiting  Great  Britain.  Canning 
disclaimed  the  quest  of  exclusive  commercial  advantages, 
and  the  new  states  had  nothing  else  save  their  gratitude 
to  oiler.  He  was  resolved^  moreover,  that  Spain  should 
have  no  ground  on  which  to  impugn  the  good  faith  of 
British  neutrality,  and  up  to  the  present  she  had  denied 
the  facts  on  which  alone  impartial  recognition  could  be 
founded.  lie  was  content,  therefore,  to  secure  protection; 
for  commerce,  and  despatched  commissioners  to  examine  j 
South  America,  as  a  preliminary  to  proceeding  further,  j 
The  policy  of  Spain_towards  Spanish  America,  then,  was 
dictated  by  pride ;  that  of  Great  Britain,  by  in_t£r££j;.  In 
September,  4823,  indeed,  Canning  had  informed  Polignac 
that,  whenever  the  position  of  Spain  should  be  hopeless, 
"  neither  justice,  nor  humanity,  nor  the  interests  either  of 
Europe  or  of  America,  would,  in  the  opinion  of  His 
Majesty's  Government,  allow  that  the  struggle...  should  be 
taken  up  afresh  by  other  hands;"  but  would  rather  pres- 
cribe   recognition.    This,    however,    is    almost   the   sole 


THE  INTERNATIONAL   SITUATION  IN   18-23.        25 

allusion  by  an  European  Power  to  any  interest  that  the 
Americans  might  possess  in  their  own  destiny.  As  mere 
belligerents,  it  is  true,  they  could  claim  no  strict  right  to 
be  treated  as  adult  states.  But  so  soon  as  it  was  evident 
that  they  possessed  all  the  distinctive  features  of  a  sove- 
reign power,— the  absence  of  foreign  control,  a  definite^ 
territory,  and,  above  all,  a  civilised  government  desirous 
of  entering  the  family  of  nations, — they  acquired  at  least 
a  moral  title  to  consideration  ;  and  to  facts  and  morals  alike 
Europe  seemed  to  have  shut  her  eyes.  Great  Britain,  the 
power  best  informed  and  most  concerned,  could  not  join 
the  rest  in  pleading  that  the  principle  of  legitimacy  stood 
in  the  way.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  seemedV 
to  have  pursued  a  more  disinterested  policy.  They  had  in 
fact  exposed  themselves  to  the  charge  of  being  too  hasty 
in  recognizing  some  of  the  new  communities.  It  is  signift-) 
cant  that  while  Great  Britain  sent  consuls,— the  sure- proof  \ 
of  local  interest,— before  diplomatists,  the  United  States  i 
sometimes  reversed  the  order.  Long  solicited  by  agents 
from  South  America,  the  government  at  Washington  sent 
commissioners  thither  in  1818.  Several  of  the  men  chosen 
were  known  to  be  fanatics  in  the  cause  of  emancipation, 
and  in  their  reports  their  political  opinions  were  faithfully 
reproduced.  In  1822,  however,  the  Government,  spurred 
on  by  Henry  Clay,  took  the  decisive  step,  and  recognized 
Columbia,  Mexico,  Buenos  Ayres,  Chili  and  Peru  as  sove- 
reign and  independent  states.  It  is  possible  to  hold  the 
view  that  in  this  measure  the  United  States  exceeded  their 
duty  in  order  to  steal  a  march  on  Great  Britain.  The  evi- 
dence shows,  however,  that  many  of  their  people  genui- 
nely   sympathised    with    the     South    Americans.     Their 


26  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

enthusiasm  rose  as  they  saw  how  the  revolutions  exter- 
nally resembled  their  own.  Bolivar  was  acclaimed  as  a 
second— even  a  greater— Washington,  and  the  fetters  of 
the  old  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  were  too  weak  to  prevent 
them  from  helping  him.  Their  feelings  were  shared  by 
some  at  least  of  the  administration.  The  Secretary  of 
State,  indeed,  laughed  at  those  who  stood  "  looking  in 
ecstatic  gaze  at  South  America,  foretelling  liberty  to  it  as 
the  Jews  foretell  the  Messiah;"  but  his  words  show  that 
only  a  bold  man  would  declare  that  he  saw  with  other 
eyes.  The  President  had  for  years  declared  in  his  messages 
the  sympathy  of  the  people  of  the  North  with  their 
Southern  brethern.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  in 
4817  advocated  a  mission  of  enquiry  into  their  position, 
and  next  year  the  Cabinet  had  discussed  the  question 
"  whether  an  armed  force  should  be  sent  to  visit  both 
sides  of  the  coast  of  South  America,  for  the  protection  of 
our  commerce,  and  to  countenance  the  patriots."  They 
formally  invited  Great  Britain  and  France  to  join  in  recog- 
nizing Buenos  Ayres,  the  independence  of  which  appeared 
to  be  established.  The  British  Government  left  such  sym- 
pathy to  Mackintosh  and  the  opposition. 


CHAPTER    III. 

James  Monroe  and   his  Cabinet. 

Such  then,  was  the  position  and  policy  of  the  national 
factors  in  the  production  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Thei 
Doctrine  itself,  however,  was  formulated  by  Americans/ 
to  promote  American  interests.  It  is  to  the  United  States, 
therefore,  that  we  must  look  for  a  continuous  history  of 
its  evolution.  Great  Britain,  France,  the  Holy  Alliance, 
Spain  and  Spanish  America  all  helped  to  shape  it,  but 
they  could  guide  the  hand   of  Monroe  only  through   thei 


I 


usually  first  be  appreciated  in  the  Cabinet— a  body  of 
some  six  heads  of  the  departments  of  state  nominated  and 
consulted  ljyJJie^Presideru^,  The  spheres  of  the  Legis- 
lature and  Executive,  indeed,  can  in  no  Government  be 
wholly  separate.  The  administration  of  the"*  United  States 
could  complete  none  of  the  greater  acts  of  foreign  policy 
without  the  assent  of  the  Senate  to  a  treaty  or  of  the 
House  to  an  appropriation.  The  Monroe  Cabinet  knew 
this,  and  their  Democratic  principles  forbade  them  to 
strive   against   it.   The   result,   the   outcome   of    political 


28  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

prudence,  was  that  before  leading  they  looked  to  see 
Whether  the  representatives  of  the  people  would  follow. 
The  Legislature  viewed  askance  the  project  of  annexing 
the  FJoridas,  and  the  Executive,  which  desired  the 
annexation,  recommended  its  postponement.  The  Legist 
lature  showed  its  sympathy  with  the  South  Americans,  anc 
the  Executive,  with  a  clear  conscience,  discovered  that  the 
time  had  come  at  which  the  United  States  would  do  well 
to  grant  them  recognition.  The  several  members  of  thet 
Executive,  again,  though  they  still  scorned  to  court  th 
favour  of  the  electorate,  could  not  forget  that  their  op- 
position was  but  temporary.  Human  nature  forbade  them 
to  watch  passively  their  political  rivals  captivating  the 
Assemblies  from  which  they  themselves  were  excluded. 
Their  ambition  and  their  circumstances  alike  impelled  thenar 
towards  a  popular  policy.  The  Presidential  message  was 
their  annual  manifesto  to  the  country,  and  the  instructions 
to  diplomatists  abroad  the  side  on  which  the  Constitution 
trammelled  them  the  least. 

The  principles  of  the  Cabinet  of  Mnnrrp,  arp  dpdiipjhiA 
from  e|glit_j^ejTS^_pj^Ltiej£.  From  1817  to  1825  the  same 
hands  held  the  reins,  and  at  the  close  of  that  time  the 
President  was  able  witch  satisfaction  to  reviewr  his  admi- 
nistration'as  a  whole.  Foreign  affairs  had  been  controlled 
without  interruption  bi  John  Quincy  Adams,  but  never 
without  the  supervision  of  Monroe,  himself  promoted 
from  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State.  What  Adams  and 
Monroe  devised,  J.  C.  Calhoun,  the  Secretary  for  War,  and 
at  times  WTilliam  Wirth,  the  Attorney-General,  had  criti- 
cised. The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  W.  H.  Crawford, 
when  not   incapacitated  by  ill-health,  had  show  himself  a 


JAMES  MONROE   AND    HIS  CABINET.  29 

bitter  rival  of  Adams.  A  few  officials  of  less  weight  had  at 
times  shared  in  the  deliberations  ;  and  from  outside  the 
Cabinet  had  received  impulses  from  two  men  of  striking 
character— Andrew  Jackson  and  Henry  Clay.  The  former, 
by  his  military  severity  in  the  South,  did  much  to  influence 
their  relations  with  Spain,  and,  not  impossibly,  with 
Mexico;  while  the  latter,  glowing  in  the  cause  of  uni- 
versal liberty,  harassed  ministers  by  his  ascendancy  in  the 
House  of  Representatives. 

In  Monroe  and  Adams,  the  United  States  had  secured 
strong  and  honest  men  to  fill  the  chief  places  of  its 
government.  United,  they  could  dominate  the  Cabinet, 
and  When  their  opinions  on  foreign  affairs  coincide,  it 
would  be  idle  to  look  further  for  the  source  of  its  policy. 
For  eight  years,  indeed,  harmony  prevailed  between  them. 
Their  political  opinions,  none  the  less,  differed  widely; 
while  in  personality  few  men  could  be  more  unlike. 
Monroe,  a  Virginian,  and  a  descendant  of  the  Cavaliers, 
was  old  enough  to  have  won  renown  in  the  War  of  Inde- 
pendence, and  to  have  sat  in  the  Continental  Congress 
which  followed  it.  An  uncompromising  democrat,  he 
opposed  the  Constitution,  but  sat  in  the  Senate  until  des- 
patched on  an  adventurous  embassy  to  the  government  of 
the  Director/.  His  enthusiasm  for  France,  however,  car- 
ried him  too  far  for  the  approbation  of  his  Government, 
and  in  two  years  he  was  superseded  and  recalled.  His 
rejoinder  was  a  lengthy  indictment  of  the  Executive,  which 
evoked  the  strong  and  detailed  censure  of  Washington. 
Virginia,  none  the  less,  made  him  her  Governor,  and 
maintained  him  in  office  till  1803,  when  he  was  again 
dispatched  to  Europe.    He  reached  Paris  in  time  to  share 


30  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

with  Livingston  the  honour  of  arranging  for  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana.    Negotiations  with  Great  Britain  and  Spain, 
however,  brought  him  only  political  experience,  and  on  his 
return  to  America,  he  again  defended  himself  with  his  pen. 
Virginia,  though  preferring  Madison  for  President,   once 
more  elected  him  Governor,  and  in  1811,  immediately  after 
the  seizure  of  West  Florida,  he  became  Secretary  of  State 
In  this  capacity,  his  utmost  efforts  were  called  forth  by 
the  struggle  with  England,  of  which  he  has  been  called 
"  the  prime  mover.  "  Summoned  to  the  War  Department  by 
the  failure    of    the   first   three   campaigns,    he    checked 
the   British   triumph  with   unflinching    determination    till 
peace  was  signed.    Thenceforward  the  lustre  of  his  career 
was  less  dimmed  by  failure.    In  1817,  he  was  chosen  to 
succeed  Madison  by  so  overwhelming  a  majority  that  he 
could  afford  to  regard  the  Federalist  Party  as  extinguished. 
He  was  happy  iu  possessing  ability  sufficient  for  his  post 
without   being    so    great  as   to  arouse  jealousy.    In  the 
reception   of  foreigners    his  awkwardness   and    lack    of 
fluency  were  concealed  by  the  dignified  reserve  which  he 
believed  that  his  office  demanded,  while  in   intercourse 
with  Americans  such  defects  were  obliterated  by  his  kind- 
ness and  courtesy  to  all.    Experience  had  developed  in 
him  a  leniency  of  judgment  and  a  magnanirhity  that  did 
much  to  make  him  beloved.     Though  at  times  he  might 
seem  impressionable  and  stubborn,  he  was  fitted  to  lead 
a  cabinet  by  his  readiness  to  receive  advice  and  bv  his. 
firmness  when  he  had  once  made  up  his  mind.     Above  all, 
he  was  entirely  and  inflexibly  honest.    His  soul,  men  felt, 
"  might  be  turned  wrong  side  outwards   without   disco- 
vering a  blemish  to  the  world. "  From  his  own  character, 


JAMES  MONROE  AND    HIS    CABINET.  31 

as  much  as  from  the  paucity  of  burning  questions,  his 
Presidency  was  called  "  the  era  of  good  feeling,  "  and  the 
chorus  of  his  praise  was  marred  by  scarcely  one  discor- 
dant note.  His  opponents  could  only  declare  that  his 
career  was  closed,  and  that  he  had  not  the  slightest 
influence  in  Congress.  Jefferson  and  Madison  were  among 
Jrjg_nlde*tr  apri  most,  faithful  fri finds ;  and  he  could  reprove 
Andrew  Jackson  without  causing  a  cloud  to  rise  between 
them.  His  chief  eulogist. was,  after  his  death,  his  ambitious 

lieutenant,  M-iftjiarsh  and  ontspnkpn  j Q    A  dams.    Better 

than  formal  panegyric  is  the  narrative,  mingled  as  it  is 
with  criticism,  in  which  the  Secretary  of  State  has  recorded 
his  daily  intercourse  with  the  President.  Other  subor- 
dinates took  no  less  warm  a  tone.  "  A  noble-minded  man 
he  was,  "  says  Richard  Rush,  ''  without  a  particle  of 
selfishness  or  ill-directed  ambition  in  his  whole  nature  ;  a 
man  of  Roman  mould ;  honest,  fearless  and  magnani- 
mous ".  "  Love  of  country  and  devotion  to  duty  "  appeared 
to  one  who  knew  him  intimately  to  be  the  causes  of  his 
position  and  repute.  "  There  was  not  the  least  particle 
of  conceit  in  Mr  Monroe,  and  yet  he  seemed  always 
strongly  to  feel  that  he  had  rendered  great  public  service... 
He  was  wholly  unselfish.  "  Viewed  with  English  eyes,  he 
appears  in  no  darker  colours.  Early  in  the  century,  Lord 
Holland  found  him  "  plain  in  his  manners,  and  somewhat 
slow  in  his  apprehension,  but. ..diligent,  earnest,  sensible 
and  even  profound.  "  During  his  Presidency,  he  impressed  ( 
Stratford  Canning,  no  friendly  critic  of  Americans,  as  / 
"  really  an  amiable  and  upright  man,  "  whose  personal 
character  diminished  the  risks  of  fresh  quarrel  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.    In  a  word,    he  is 


32  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

portrayed   throughout  his  life    as.  sound,    but_  uexqv  _as 
brilliant,  fir_nx.to  execute,  but  nnlikply  tn  ni-iginnto 

In  almost  every  point  save  that  of  honesty,  J.  Q.  Adams 
was  the  antithesis  of  Monroe.  A  new  Englander  and 
Puritan,  the  son  of  the  second  President  of  the  United 
States,  he  had  begun  his  career  as  a  member  of  that 
Federalist  party  which  his  father  had  led  to  its  destruction. 
Monroe  had  been  educated  on  the  battlefield;  Adams,  in 
the  embassy.  A  scholar  almost  from  his  birth,  he  found 
life  without  Cicero  and  Tacitus  like  "  a  privation  of  one  of 
his  limbs. "  His  ability  was  great,  and  his  ambition 
equalled  it.  His  self-confidence  could  not  fail  to  be 
increased  by  the  strength,  which  enabled  him  in  middle 
life  to  battle  for  an  hour  with  the  current  of  the  Potomac, 
and  to  toil  with  unremitting  diligence  in  a  climate  which 
surrounded  him  with  "vermin  of  all  filths.  "  A  fluent 
speaker,  he  lamented  that  in  social  intercourse  he  was 
*'  by  nature  a  silent  animal.  "  His  "  coarseness  and  vio- 
lence "  evoked  the  bitter  complaints  of  the  young  Stratford 
panning,  and  nearly  sixty  years  later,  his  "  very  uneven 
temper  "  and  "  manner  somewhat  too  often  domi- 
neering "  were  not  forgotten.  From  his  childhood  as  a 
diplomat  to  his  old  age  as  an  obstructionist  congressman, 
he_w_as_ above  all  things  originaj.  His  invaluable  Diary,  as 
well  as  the  witness  of  his  contemporaries,  shows  that  in 
affairs  of  private  and  public  life  alike  he  thought  out  his_ 
principles  and  acted  upon  them,  without  the  slightest 
regard  for  the  opinions  and  feelings__of  ^others.  His 
judgments,  even  of  himself,  show  a  prevailing  tendency 
to  harshness.  In  the  midst  of  the  most  violent  explosions' 
of  wrath,   his  head  was  cool  and  his  vision  clear;  but  he 


JAMES   MONROE  AND  HIS  CABINET.  33 

never  learned  to  tolerate  men  whose  opinions  differed 
from  his  own.  Matchless  in  ability,  diligence  and 
uprightness,  he  commanded  respect  rather  than  love. 
As  President,  his  administration  was  never  popular. 
Monroe  had  been  re-elected  by  a  practically  unanimous 
vote.  Adams,  chosen  in  the  first  instance  almost  by 
accident,    was  defeated  in  4829  by  Andrew  Jackson. 

Under  the  guidance  of  Monroe  and  Adams  the  foreign 
policy   of  the  Administration  was  a  policy  of  peace  and 
patriotism.    In  securing  peace,  their  best  friend  was  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.    Despatches  from  England  to  Washington 
breathe  little  of  the  air  of  mutual  suspicion  and  intrigue 
that  seems  vifal  to  the  capitals  of  Europe.    The  Minister 
of  the  United  States  in  London  can  congratulate  himself 
that  for  his  country  he  has  only  to  be  just  and  fear  not. 
At  several  courts  the  Republic  was  not  yet  represented, 
and  everywhere   its  agents  were  notorious  for  their  lack  of 
secrecy.  The  attitude  of  the  powers  of  Europe  towards  the 
United  States,  again,  was  designed  to  express  friendship. 
Great  Britain,  with  whom  alone  there  was  chronic  danger 
of  a  rupture,  showed  herself  nervously  anxious  for  peace. 
Her  representatives  in  the  United  States  were  instructed 
above  all  things  to  be  conciliatory.    Two  years  after  the 
Treaty   of   Ghent,   the  lawless    execution    of  two    British 
subjects  by  Andrew  Jackson  in  Florida  roused  the  nation, 
but  the  Ministry  refused  to  hold  up  the  finger  which  would 
have   let  slip   the  dogs  of  war.    The  subjects  in  dispute 
between  the  two   countries  were  submitted  to  a  general 
negotiation  ;    and  a  convention  in  respect  to  the   north- 
western   territorial    dispute,     of    a    merely    temporising 
Character  was  the  result.    Though  the  British  press  was 
r.  3 


34  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

indignant  at  the  cession  of  the  Floridas,  ministers  forbore 
to  frown  upon  it,  and  disclaimed  all  share  in  causing  Spain 
to  delay  its  ratification.  Castlereagh,  indeed,  was  regarded 
by  the  United  States  as  their  friend,  and  when  he  was 
succeeded  by  "  the  dashing  and  flashy  spirit  of  George 
Canning, "  something  like  sympathy  between  the  two 
Governments  had  been  established. 

Individual  monarchs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  vied  for  thei 
favour    of  the   trans-Atlantic    republicans.     The    Spanish 
Minister  desired  their  alliance,  and   his  French  colleague 
concluded  a  commercial  convention  with   them.    Austria 
hinted  a  wish  to  exchange  diplomatists,  and  Portugal  laid 
before  them  a  scheme  for  the  Federation  of  the  New  World. 
With  Russia,  extraordinary  amity  prevailed.     The  Czar  had 
consented  to  overlook  the  violation  of  Legitimacy  involved 
in  the  very  existence  of  the  United  States  so  far  as  to 
propose  that  they  should  join  the  Holy  Alliance.     Monroe 
had  reciprocated  his  friendliness  by  forgiving  his  minister 
for   behaviour   which  from    the    representative    of   Great 
Britain  would  have  hazarded  war.    Alexander  himself  was 
entrusted  with  the  arbitration  of  disputes  arising  out  of 
the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  and   when   his    Ukase  was    held  to 
invade   the  rights  and  even  the   territory  of  the    United 
States,    the    diplomatic    calm    remained   unruffled.      The 
policy  of  peace,  it  was  clear,  would  be  broken  only  in  a 
cause  exclusively  American.    The  fate  of  Florida,  of  Cuba, 
and  finally  of  Spanish  America  became  in  turn  the  bur- 
ning question  of  the  day.     For  none  of  them,  indeed,  were 
the  people  really  anxious  to  fight.     It  is  to  the  credit  of 
the  President  and  Cabinet,  none  the  less,  that  they  avoided 
extraneous  sources  of  war.     The   Holy  Alliance  courted 


JAMES    MONROE  AND   HIS  CABINET.  35 

them  in  vain.  Refusing  to  acknowledge  that  the  United 
States  could  have  more  than  a  commercial  interest  in  the 
Mediterranean,  they  declined  to  acquire  the  Ionian  Islands. 
In  spite  of  the  strongly-worded  sympathy  of  the  Presi- 
dential Message,  they  rejected  the  prayer  of  the  Greeks 
for  "  recognition,  alliance  and  assistance.  "  They  waited 
nearly  two  years,  though  with  an  ill  grace,  for  Spain  to 
ratify  the  cession  of  Florida ;  and  they  refused  to  receive 
Cuba  at  the  price  of  assisting  her  to  throw  off  the  Spanish 
yoke.  They  seem  even  to  have  refrained  from  encouraging 
Guatemala  to  cede  its  territory  to  the  Union  as  the  price 
of  protection  for  its  people. 

Their  policy,  then,  was  patriotic  in  that  they  pursued 
the  real  advantage  of  their  own  country  by  avoiding  entan- 
glements with  foreign  powers.  Where  its  interests  were 
really  concerned,  however,  they  showed  no  lack  of 
firmness.  Inspired  by  the  President,  they  carried  out  a 
scheme  of  national  defence.  An  island  claimed  by  Spain 
had  become  a  nest  of  pirates,  and  they  did  not  hesitate  to 
occupy  it.  On  the  same  principle,  they  showed  a  dispo- 
sition to  interfere  in  Texas,  though  as  yet  without  the 
design  of  annexation.  Ancient  claims  against  Spain  had 
been  vindicated  by  a  law  professing  to  establish  a  kind  of 
United  States  mortgage  on  the  territory  of  Florida,  and 
they  informed  South  American  belligerents  that  ho  third 
power  could  be  allowed  to  prejudice  the  rights  thereby 
acquired.  They  commissioned  Andrew  Jackson,  if  the 
need  arose,  to  pursue  hostile  Indians  into  Spanish  terri- 
tory, and  the  commission  was  carried  out.  On  the  ground 
that  they  could  not  subject  citizens  of  the  United  States  to 
the  judgment  of  foreigners,  they  rejected  the  slave-trade 

3-2 


36  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

convention  for  which  Great  Britain  was  clamouring.  In  the 
far  north-west,  they  allowed  no  British  claim  to  check  the 
development  of  the  Republic.  In  their  South  American 
policy,  again,  though  defying  the  Holy  Alliance,  they  de- 
clined u  to  come  in  as  a  cock-boat  in  the  wake  of  the  Bri- 
tish man-of-war.'1  They  took  the  lead  in  recognising  the 
new  states,  and  they  crowned  the  work  by  enunciating  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

This  policy  of  peace  and  patriotism,  of  confining  them- 
selves to  America  and  brooking  no  interference  within  their 
sphere,  Monroe  and  his  Cabinet  were  not  unwilling  to  defend 
on  grounds  of  principle.  Though  fully  aware  of  the  repug- 
nance of  Europe  to  republicanism,  the  President  seized 
every  opportunity  of  proclaiming  his  belief  in  that  "  most 
excellent  system  of  government  .  "  He  strove  with  tongue 
and  pen  to  show  that  the  United  States  system  would  soon 
attain  to  what  Burke  and  Wellington  claimed  for  the  Bri- 
tish—" the  highest  degree  of  perfection  of  which  human 
institutions  are  capable."  His  public  utterances,  moreover, 
rivalled  those  of  Clay  and  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
their  expressions  of  sympathy  with  the  peoples  in  the  Old 
World  and  in  the  New  who  were  struggling  to  free  them- 
selves from  absolute  monarchy.  Adams  also,  though  he 
objected  to  such  paragraphs  as  exotics  in  the  presidential 
Messages,  did  not  hesitate  to  express  to  the  British  Minister 
his  own  opinions  on  European  politics.  Early  in  1823,  he 
commented  with  severity  on  the  principles  expressed  by 
France,  and  stated  his  satisfaction  at  the  policy  of  Great 
Britain,  "  more  particularly  as  it  affected  the  great  princi- 
ple of  national  independence,  which  he  seemed  to  consider 
as  brought  into  immediate  danger  by  what  he  termed,  the 


JAMES  MONROE    AND    HIS  CABINET.  37 

impending  conflict,  '  between  autocracy  and  parliamentary 
government  '."  "  The  whole  system  of  colonisation,"  he 
had  previously  maintained,  "  was  an  abuse  of  government, 
and  it  was  time  that  it  should  come  to  an  end."  Speaking 
as  a  private  individual,  he  is  said  to  have  argued  that  Great 
Britain  had  no  right  to  prevent  her  colonies  from  being 
supplied  by  the  United  States ;  while  in  a  Fourth  of  July 
oration  he  voiced  the  sentiments  of  the  people  by  a  fero- 
cious attack  on  the  American  policy  of  George  the  Third. 

Expressions  of  opinion  such  as  these,  however,  might 
be  defended  as  domestic.  The  Secretary  of  State,  at  least, 
was  anxious  to  go  further.  In  declaring  his  determination 
to  refuse  to  receive  ministers  from  South  America,  the  Czar 
had  enunciated  to  the  United  States  the  principles  of  the 
Holy  Alliance.  At  the  same  time  the  constitutional  cause 
in  Spain  was  tottering  to  its  fall,  and  Great  Britain  was 
making  overtures  to  the  United  States  which  they  desired 
to  decline.  Adams  declared  the  time  ripe  for  the  Adminis- 
tration to  proclaim  republican  principles  to  the  world, 
and  at  the  first  blush  "  this  idea  was  acquiesced  in  on  all 
sides  "  Later  councils,  it  is  true,  suggested  doubts  and 
difficulties,  and  the  scheme  was  in  part  withdrawn.  There 
can  be  little  doubt,  however,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter, 
that  it  was  embodied  in  the  message  of  the  President,  and 
that  the  patriotic  policy  of  the  Cabinet  found  its  expression 
the  Mon7oe~DoCtrme~ 

The  policy  of  peace  and  patriotism  may  be  further 
illustrated  from  the  annals  of  the  years  during  which  it 
prevailed.  One  of  the  earliest  acts  of  the  Monroe  Admi- 
nistration was  the  dispatch  of  three  citizens  to  examine  the 
condition  of  South  America.     Next  vear,  neither  the  trou- 


38  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

bles  in  Florida  nor  the  disagreement  of  the  commissionners 
prevented  the  South  American  question  from  making  sub- 
stantial progress.  Rush  and  Castlereagh  mutually  disclai- 
med the  pursuit  of  exclusive  advantages  in  commerce,  and 
the  United  States  had  decided  to  stand  aloof  from  the  me- 
diation between  Spain  and  her  colonies  which  the  congress 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle  proposed.  Spurred  on  by  Clay,however, 
at  the  end  of  the  year  they  requested  the  co-operation  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  in  the  recognition  of  Buenos 
Ayres.  Though  the  allies  had  failed  to  devise  a  plan  of  me- 
diation, the  answer  of  both  was  unfavourable,  and  for  the 
time  being  Buenos  Ayres  was  obscured  by  Florida.  In  the 
spring  of  1819,  Spain  offered  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  against  her  by  ceding  the  province  to  them 
in  full  sovereignty,  and  her  plenipotentiary  signed  a  treaty 
to  this  effect.  On  grounds  which  seemed  insufficient, how- 
ever, the  Court  of  Madrid  withheld  its  ratification,  and  for 
two  years  the  Administration  of  the  United  States  wavered 
between  diplomacy  and  force.  Their  suspicions  pointed 
to  Great  Britain  as  the  cause  of  delay,  but  Castlereagh 
showed  that  he  had  given  instructions  with  an  opposite 
tendency.  Russia  lent  her  influence  at  Madrid,  and  France 
sent  word  that  the  great  stumblingblock  was  the  policy  of 
the  United  States  towards  South  America.  A  Commission, 
however,  had  been  sent  to  Brazil,  and  the  general  cause  of 
recognition  was  upheld  by  resolutions  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives carried  by  the  influence  of  Clay.  The  South 
American  envoys,  especially  those  from  Columbia,  clamou- 
red for  favours  in  the  supply  of  arms,  and  their  northern 
champions  complained  of  the  restrictions  of  the  Act  restrai- 
ning Foreign  Enlistment.     The  embarrassments  of  the  Ad- 


JAMES  MONROE  AND    HIS    CABINET.  39 

ministration  were  completed  by  anxiety  with  regard  to  Cuba, 
while  in  the  autumn  of  4820  Stratford  Canning  arrived  with 
instructions  to  press  home  the  subject  of  the  slave-trade. 
The  triumph  of  the  Constitutionalists  in  Spain,  however, 
brought  relief.  It  cooled  the  feelings  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
with  regard  to  Spanish  America,  and  it  facilitaed  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  treaty  ceding  the  Floridas.  In  1821,  therefore, 
the  President  could  enter  on  his  second  term  of  office  with 
an  Address  of  general  congratulation — The  events  of  the 
year,  however,  were  hardly  calculated  to  bear  him  out. 
The  violence  of  Andrew  Jackson  as  Governor  of  Florida  rou- 
sed the  wrath  of  Spain,  wliile  the  discussion  with  reference 
to  settlements  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  River  alienated 
the  minister  of  Great  Britain.  At  the  same  time,  Clay  was 
urging  the  House  of  Representatives  to  force  the  hand  of  the 
Executive  with  regard  to  South  America,  and  every  question 
was  liable  to  complication  by  the  struggle  for  the  Presi- 
dency. The  year  closed  with  the  reception  of  the  Russian^ 
Ukase,  by  which  Alexander  claimed  the  coast  of  North 
America  as  far  as  the  51st  parallel  of  latitude,  and  denoun- 
ced confiscation  against  the  ship  and  cargo  which  should 
approach  within  100  Italian  miles  of  the  shore.  The  foreign 
policy  of  1822  was  marked  by  recognition  of  South  America, 
dictated  by  a  special  presidential  message  in  March.  The 
Spanish  Minister  protested  in  vain,  and  the  necessary  mea- 
sures were  carried  with  little  excitement  or  debate.  In  June, 
a  charge  d'affaires  from  Columbia  was  formally  received  at 
Washington,  and  early  next  year,  the  President  determined 
to  send  diplomatic  agents  to  all  the  more  important  Spanish 
American  States.  The  recognition,  however,  was  felt  by 
many  to  be  premature.     As  in  their  own  revolution,  so  now 


40  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

in  favouring  the  revolution  of  their  imitators,  the  Unit 
States  were  conscious  of  their  isolation.  In  the  interests  of 
liberty  and  of  their  republic,  therefore,  it  became  their  ob- 
ject to  induce  other  powers  to  follow  them,  and  the  power 
to  which  they  turned  was  Great  Britain.  With  regard  to 
the  north-west  coast,  the  Administration,  though  treating 
the  question  as  of  no  great  moment,  never  dreamed  of  sub- 
mission to  the  pretensions  set  up  by  Russia.  They  took 
steps  to  develop  commerce  with  France  and  England,  and 
in  the  autumn  they  showed  a  lively  interest  in  the  policy  to 
be  expected  from  Canning.  Cuba,  however,  was  now  the 
chief  source  of  international  complication.  In  June,  1819, 
Rush  had  received  from  Castlereagh  the  assurance  that  his 
Government  had  no  intention  of  annexing  it.  Each  power, 
however,  was  far  from  trusting  the  other.  The  Cabinet  of 
Monroe  was  full  of  suspicion  of  Great  Britain,  and  Calhoun 
in  particular  thought  it  expedient  to  make  sacrifices  to 
bind  her  not  to  take  Cuba  or  Texas.  Their  fears  were 
heightened  by  the  belief,  indignantly  refuted  by  Spain,  that 
the  island  would  be  ceded  to  Great  Britain.  On  the  other 
hand,  Stratford  Canning  was  constantly  urged  by  the  Fo- 
reign Secretary  to  find  some  proof  that  the  United  States 
cherished  designs  against  it.  Both  joined  in  doubting 
France.  Each  had  much  at  stake.  The  possessor  of  Cuba 
would  be  the  powerful  neighbour  of  Jamaica  and  of  the 
Bahama  group.  The  interest  of  the  United  States  was  sum- 
med up  in  the  dictum  of  Jefferson  that  the  acquisition  of 
Cuba  would  complete  their  national  wellbeing.  In  spite 
of  their  professions  of  neutrality  towards  Spain,  and  in 
spite  of  their  renunciations  in  London,  the  state  of  the  is- 
land strongly  tempted  the  Administration.     Tranquillity, 


JAMES    MONROE    AND    HIS    CABINET  41 

when  it  existed,  was  maintained  only  by  the  strength  of  the 
Governor.  A  strong  government  alone  could  protect  the 
numerous  American  residents,  and  extirpate  the  pirates, 
who  were  the  pest  of  American  commerce. .  Above  all, 
there  was  in  Cuba  a  genuine  movement  for  admission  into 
the  Union.  The  British  Consul-General  at  the  Havana  had 
for  years  reported  that  the  Creoles  were  devoted  to  this 
idea.  A  section  of  them  made  definite  proposals  to  the 
United  States,  and  in  September  1822,  the  Cabinet  lorn 
discussed  the  matter.  The  sober  Calhoun  endorsed  Jeffer- 
son's opinion  that  Cuba  was  worth  an  English  war.  To  Adams, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  was  plain  that  at  that  time  such  a  war 
would  end  in  the  possession  of  the  island  by  Great  Britain. 
Eventually,  therefore,  it  was  decided  to  wait  and  watch,  in 
the  hope  that  the  Cubans  would  achieve  independence  by  ph 
themselves,  \  r^y 

In  the  summer  of  1823,  then,  the  foreign  politics  off  p^ 
the  United  States  were  chiefly  concerned  with  Cuba  and\ 
the  far  north-west.  In  the  latter  question  also  Great  Brit- 
ain had  interests  at  stake.  From  her  ambassador  at  St 
Petersburg,  as  from  other  foreign  diplomatists,  Russia 
was  compelled  to  seek  protection  for  vessels  entering  the 
regions  in  which  the  Czar  had  declared  himself  supreme. 
The  Ukase  of  1821,  moreover,  maintained  the  imperial  so- 
vereignty over  territory  which  had  formed  the  subject  of  a 
convention  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  Sta- 
tes. Both  powers,  therefore,  deemed  it  advantageous  that 
the  whole  question  should  be  settled  by  a  triangular  nego- 
tiation at  St  Petersburg,  and  it  was  accordingly  withdrawn 
from  the  list  of  subjects  discussed  in  December,  1823,  by 
Huskisson,   Stratford  Canning,  Rush  and   Gallatin,  at  the 


42  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

office  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  In  July,  however,  Adams  had 
sent  to  St  Petersburg  and  London  general  instructions 
with  regard  to  the  Pacific  boundary  of  the  United  States, 
the  principles  of  which  anticipate  that  part  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  which  treats  of  colonisation. 

Hence  at  the  time  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  study 
in  detail  the  actual  composition  of  the  President's  mes- 
sage, the  Administration  had  for  six  years  pursued  a  po- 
licy of  peace  and  patriotism.  Standing  absolutely  aloof 
from  the  quarrels  of  the  Old  World,  they  had  shown  in  the 
questions  of  Florida,  of  Cuba,  of  the  north-west,  and  of 
America  south  of  their  own  borders,  that  they  would  pur 
sue  their  own  interests  regardless  of  European  dicta 
tion.  Their  relations  with  Great  Britain,  relations 
had  improved  into  something  approaching  conce 
been  governed  by  the  same  determination.  While  their 
intercourse  with  the  individual  powers  of  the  European 
continent  had  been  friendly,  the  collective  principles  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  stood  in  marked  contrast  to  their  own.  The 
battleground  of  conflicting  opinions  was  South  America, 
and  the  cry  of  the  United  States  was  the  Message  of 
Monroe. 


" 


'i 


s  which'JL 
?rt,  had     \£L 


CHAPTER    IV. 
The  Diplomacy  of   1823. 

To  study  the  immediate  formation  of  the  Message,  we 
must  examine  transactions  in  Washington  and  in  London. 
On  one  side  of  the  Atlantic,  George  Canning  was  negotia- 
ting with  Richard  Rush,  the  Minister  of  the  United  States, 
while  on  the  other,  Monroe  and  Adams  were  preparing  for 
the  autumn  meetings  of  the  Cabinet.  The  existence  of  a 
representative  of  Oreat  Britain  at  Washington  has  usually 
been  overlooked.  Before  leaving  for  England  in  August, 
Stratford  Canning  had  presented  as  charge  d'affaires  his 
Secretary  of  Legation,  Mr  Henry  (Jriwin  Addington,  who  for 
two  years  performed  his  duties  with  such  diligence  as  to 
win  the  approbation  of  his  Government  at  the  expense  of 
his  health.  Throughout  the  time  at  which  the  Presidential 
Message  was  being  drafted,  he  was  in  constant  commu- 
nication with  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  his  despatches 
give  an  unique  picture  of  the  workings  of  the  Administra- 
tion as  seen  from  the  outside.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
Canning,  the  diplomacy  in  London  has  been  outlined  by  Mr 
A.  G.  Stapleton,  his  secretary  and  apologist.  Written  within 
six  years  of  the  Monroe  Message,  his  narrative  is  authentic 
rather  than  voluminous.    The  American  side  of  the  negotia- 


44  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

tions,  on  the  other  hand,  was  presented  later,  but  with  far 
more  detail,  by  Rush  himself.  Meanwhile  Adams  was  wri- 
ting in  his  Diary  day  by  day  the  history  of  the  interviews 
and  cabinet  councils  at  which  the  policy  of  the  United  Sta- 
tes was  discussed  and  determined,  and  at  every  stage  Ad- 
dington  was  plying  him  with  questions  and  filling  bulky 
despatches  with  the  replies.  Read  in  the  light  of  previous 
history,  the  combination  of  the  lour  accounts  seems  to 
present  a  fairly  complete  record  of  the  birth  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine. 

On  the  16th  August,  Rush,  while  still  awaiting  instruc- 
tions on  the  subject  of  the  north-western  boundary,  held 
an  interview  with  Canning  in  which  the  conversation  tur- 
ned towards  the  danger  from  France  to  the  constitutional 
cause  in  Spain.  The  American  Minister  took  the  opportu- 
nity of  recalling  the  sentiments  of  Canning's  despatch  of 
March  31st  to  Sir  Charles  Stuart,  the  Rritish  Ambassador  at 
Paris.  Great  Britain,  he  pointed  out,  had  there  disclaimed 
all  intention  of  appropriating  any  Spanish  colony,  and  had 
declared  herself  satisfied  that  France  would  exercise  simi- 
lar self-restraint.  Canning  replied  by  enquiring  what  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  would  be  likely  to  say  to 
going  hand  in  hand  with  England  in  such  a  policy.  Concert 
of  action,  he  thought,  would  not  be  called  for.  Great  Britain, 
though  she  would  never  again  attempt  to  aid  in  the  making 
up  of  the  quarrel  between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  would 
not  oppose  a  settlement  effected  in  a  spirit  of  preference 
to  the  mother-country.  She  had  as  yet  taken  no  steps 
towards  recognising  the  new  republics,  but  was  about  to 
send  a  commission  of  enquiry  to  Mexico. 

Rush  was  careful  to  express  no  opinion  either  in  favour 


THE  DIPLOMACY   OF  1823.  45 

of  or  against  the  suggestion.  Four  clays  later  he  received 
a  private  and  confidential  note  which  developed  it.  In  the 
words  of  Slapleton, 

''The  English  Government,  said  Mr  Canning,  had  nothing 
to  disguise  on  the  subject. 

1.  It  conceived  the  recovery  of  the  Colonies  by  Spain 
to  be  hopeless. 

2.  It  conceived  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  in 
to  be  one  of  time  and  circumstances. 

3.  It  was,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to  throw 
any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between  them 
and  the  mother-country  by  amicable  negotiation. 

4.  It  aimed  not  at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of 
them  for  Great  Britain. 

5.  And,  it  could  not  see  any  part  of  them  transferred 
to  any  other  power  with  indifference. 

''These  were  its  opinions  and  feelings  ;  and  if  they  were 
shared  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  '  Why, ' 
asked  Mr  Canning,  'should  they  not  be  mutually  confided 
to  each  other,  and  declared  in  the  face  of  the  world  ?  Was 
Mr  Rush  authorized  to  enter  into  any  negotiation,  and  to 
sign  any  convention  upon  the  subject?  or  would  he  exchange 
Ministerial  notes  upon  it?  A  proceeding  of  such  a  nature,' 
continued  Mr  Canning,  '  would  be  at  once  the  most  effectual 
and  the  least  offensive  mode  of  intimating  the  joint  disap- 
probation of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  of  any 
projects,  which  might  be  cherished  by  any  European  power, 
of  a  forcible  enterprize  for  reducing  the  Colonies  to  subju- 
gation on  the  behalf,   or  in  the  name  of  Spain  ;   or  of  the 
acquisition  of  any  part  of  them  to  itself  by  cession  or  by 
conquest.'  " 


46  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

•    The  confidential  answer  of  August  23rd,  which  seemed 
at  the  time  "  in  every  respect  highly  creditable   to   its 
distinguished  author,"  is  described  by  Rush  himself.    The 
United  States  he  could  safely  say,  agreed  with  Great  Britain 
in  regarding   the  recovery    of  the  Colonies  by  Spain  as 
hopeless,  in  the  determination  not  to  oppose  any  amicable 
arrangement  which  should  end  the  war,  and  in  the  denial 
of  all   intention  to  acquire  territory  in  Spanish  America. 
Having  recognised  the  Colonies  as  independent  States,  they 
desired  to  see  them  received  into  the  family  of  nations, 
especially  by  Great  Britain.    "  And  last,  "  he  maintened, 
"  we  should  regard  as  injust,  and  fruitful  of  highly  disastrous 
consequences,  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  any  European 
Power  to  take  possession  of  them  by  conquest,  by  cession, 
or  on  any  other  ground  or  pretext."    His  instructions  and 
powers,  however,  said  nothing  which  could  authorise  him 
'  to  publish  these  sentiments  in  writing.     That  he  was  able, 
from  the  general  directions  of  Adams,  to  win  the  hearty 
approval  of  Monroe  in  saying  so  much  as  this,  shows  how 
far  the   policy  of  the  Administration,  as  interpreted  by  the 
Secretary  of  State,  had  already  advanced  towards  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  To  his  own  Government  he  justified  his  caution 
by  pointing  out  the  danger  of  becoming  implicated  in  "  the 
federative  system  of  Europe,"  and  of  taking  any  step  which 
might  prove  exceptionable  in  the  eyes  of  France.    From 
Canning's  tone  of  earnestness,  none   the  less,  he  inferred 
that  the  British  Cabinet  feared  that  France,  alone  or  in 
conjunction  with  the  allied  powers,  meditated  ambitious 
enterprises  against  the  independence  of  the  new  Spanish- 
American  States. 

Three  days   later,    his   surmise  was.  confirmed  by   a 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF   1823,  47 

second  confidential  communication  from  Canning.  France, 
it  was  pointed  out,  expected  very  speedily  to  achieve  her 
military  objects  in  Spain.  "  England  had  received  notice, 
though  not  such  as  imposed  the  necessity  of  instant  action," 
that,  as  soon  as  this  was  done,  "  a  proposal  would  be 
made  for  a  congress  in  Europe,  or  some  other  concert  and 
consultation,  specifically  on  the  affairs  of  Spanish  Ame- 
rica." Rush  found  himself  warranted  by  his  instructions 
in  replying  immediately  in  words  which  still  more  clearly 
anticipate  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  His  Government,  he  said, 
"  would  regard  as  objectionable  any  interference  whatever 
in  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America,  unsolicited  by  the  late 
provinces  themselves  and  against  their  will.  It  would 
regard  the  convening  of  a  congress  to  deliberate  upon 
their  affairs,  as  a  measure  uncalled-for,  and  indicative  of  a 
policy  highly  unfriendly  to  the  tranquillity  of  the  world. 
It  could  never  look  with  insensibility  upon  such  an  exercise 
of  European  jurisdiction  over  communities  now  of  right 
exempt  from  it,  and  entitled  to  regulate  their  own  concerns 
unmolested  from  abroad.  "  Canning  again  replied  without 
delay,  though  his  letter  did  not  reach  its  destination  till 
September  7th.  While  professing  himself  grateful  for  the 
cordial  spirit  in  which  his  communication  had  been  received, 
he  regretted  that  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  could 
not  undertake  to  decide  upon  any  formal  proposition 
without  previous  reference  to  his  Government.  During  the 
time  necessary  for  communication  with  the  United  States, 
the  progress  of  events  might  rob  the  proposed  co-operation 
of  its  value,  while  Great  Britain  would  be  trammelled  in  any 
other  mode  of  expressing  her  views.  Rush  was  thereby 
confirmed  in  his  resolution  to  accede  to  the  overtures  only 


48  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

in  case  Great  Britain  would  yield  the  point  of  recognition. 
This  concession,  he  informed  his  Government,  he  would 
continue  to  urge,  though  not  in  such  fashion  as  to  alienate 
an  administration  "  as  favourably  disposed  towards  the 
United  States  as  any  that  could  be  formed." 

The  language  of  Stapleton  suggests  that  after  receiving 
the  reply  to  his  first  proposals,  Canning  "  allowed  the  matter 
to  drop,"  and  turned  at  once  to  the  French  ambassador, 
Prince  Polignac.  Rush,  however,  shows  that  a  double 
rebuff  did  not  end  the  matter.  On  returning  to  London  in 
the  middle  of  September,  Canning  sought  an  interview,  and 
renewed  his  arguments  in  favour  of  co-operation  in  a  matter 
which  he  represented  as  increasingly  urgent.  Five  weeks 
before,  lie  had  spoken  of  the  commission  to  Mexico,  and 
now  he  was  able  to  announce  that  consuls  to  the  new  states 
would  soon  be  appointed.  To  a  demonstration  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  step  proposed,  as  implicating  the  United 
States  in  European  affairs,  and  departing  from  their  tradi- 
tional policy,  he  replied  in  Avords  that  might  well  make 
Adams  "  singularly  cheerful  and  complaisant."  If  the  policy 
was  new,  he  argued,  so  also  was  the  problem,  "  and  full  as 
much  Americaaas  European,  to  say  no  more....  The  United 
States... were  the  first  power  established  on  that  continent, 
and  now  confessedly  the  leading  power....  Could  Europe 
expect  this  indifference  ?  "  The  Minister  of  the  United 
States  received  with  the  utmost  caution  this  lesson  in  the 
first  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  "There  might  be 
room  for  thinking,"  he  admitted,  "that  the  late  formation 
of  these  new  states  in  our  hemisphere  would  impose  new 
political  duties  upon  the  United  States,  not  merely  as  coupled 
with  the  great  cause  of  national  freedom,  but  as  closely 


THE    DIPLOMACY   OF   1823.  49 

connected  also  with  their  own  present  and  future  interests, 
and  even  the  very  existence,  finally,  of  their  own  institu- 
tions."   This    question,    however,   the    Government    must 
decide.     Canning  pressed  the  point  still  further.    Prevention 
was  better  than  cure,  and  delay  might  mar  all.    The  interest 
of  the  United  States  was  regarded  by  Great  Britain  as  of 
such  importance  that   she  would  reserve  to   herself  the 
option    of   refusing  to   attend    any   conference    on    South 
America  at  which  their  representative  should  not  be  present. 
Rush's  reply  was  a  bid  for  recognition.     If  Great  Britain 
would  formally  acknowledge  the  independence  which  by 
her    own    confession   the   new    states   had    substantially 
acquired,    he   would   stand   upon  his  general  powers  as 
Minister  plenipotentiary,  and  sign  the  declaration  proposed. 
That  their  internal  stability  was  uncertain,  he  could  not 
deny      Recognition,  however,  would  remedy  it.    Indepen- 
dence was  a  settled   question;  and,  in  negotiating  with 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  on  the  subject  of  the  Pacific  coast, 
the  United  States  would  be  obliged  to  assume  it.     He  saw, 
however,  that  his  arguments  could  not  prevail,  and  contented 
himself  with  a  resolution  not  to  attend  any  conference  on 
South  America.     A  week  later,  Canning  offered  a  promise 
of  the  future  recognition  of  the  young  republics,  but  only 
thereby    exposed   himself  to    a   fourth   refusal.     Early  in 
October,  he  arranged  for  a  general  negotiation  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  and  took  the  opportu- 
nity of  informing  Rush  that  the  consuls  were  very  soon  to 
set  out  for  Spanish  America.    With  the  offer  of  September 
26th,    however,    his   communications  ceased   to    directly 
influence  the  formation  of  the  President's  Message. 

Having  thus  failed  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  the 
r.  4 


50  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

United  States,  Canning  determined  to  inform  the  French 
Government  directly  that  an  attack  on  Spanish  America 
would  be  followed  by  war  with  Great  Britain.  On  the  9th 
October,  therefore,  he  met  Polignac,  with  the  object  of 
exchanging  communications  on  the  subject.  The  impor- 
tance of  their  interview  is  attested  by  the  wide  dissemination 
of  the  Memorandum  which  embodied  its  results.  Valuable 
as  formulating  the  policy  of  both  powers,  its  most  striking 
feature  is  the  renunciation  by  France  of  any  intention  to 
assist  Spain  against  the  colonies,  or  to  acquire  exclusive 
commercial  advantages  for  herself.  Had  it  been  made  known 
to  the  Cabinet  of  Monroe,  therefore,  it  could  not  have  failed 
to  exercise  an  effect  on  the  construction  and  on  the  value 
of  the  President's  Message.  The  world  which  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  defied  was,  for  purposes  of  aggression  against 
South  America,  equivalent  to  France  and  Russia.  If  then 
the  declaration  of  Polignac  were  construed  at  Washington 
as  withdrawing  France  merely  for  the  moment,  Russia  alone 
would  remain,  and  Russia,  as  Canning  held,  could  hardly 
act  alone. 

From  Rush's  account  of  his  "full  and  final  interview" 
with  Canning  on  the  24th  November,  however,  it  is  clear 
that  no  details  of  the  Polignac  conference  had  reached  him 
before  that  time.  Canning  then  read  to  him  the  Memoran- 
dum, but  allowed  him  no  copy  until  fully  a  month  later ; 
when  he  promised  to  transmit  it  to  his  Government  "  wholly 
as  a  confidential  paper."  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
Canning  would  have  so  long  refused  an  official  document 
to  the  representative  of  a  power  whose  friendship  he  was 
anxious  to  retain,  had  it  been  possible  for  him  or  for  his 
Government  to  have  obtained  it  from  some  other  source. 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF    1823.  51 

It  is  equally  difficult  to  see  what  that  source  could  have  been. 
The  other  Ministers   of  the   United  States  in  Europe  were 
wont  to  communicate  to  their  colleague  in  Loudon  any  news 
of  special  importance.     Although,  therefore,  the  Memoran- 
dum was  sent  on  October  13th   to  Sir  William  A'Gourt  at 
Madrid,  and  although  on  November  19th  he  reports  that  it 
had  been  sent  in  a  circular  despatch  to  French  diplomatic 
agents,  it  seems  at  least  improbable  that  it  could    have 
reached  Washington  in  time  to  influence  the  Cabinet  Councils 
which  ended  on  November  26th.     In  conversation  with  the 
French  premier  at  the  beginning  of  1824,  the  British  ambas- 
sador at  Paris  upheld  this  view.     Canning  himself  asserted 
that  the  French  Government  preceded  him  in  the  dissemina- 
tion of  the  paper,  and  Chateaubriand  recorded  the  fact  that 
on  the  1st  November  it  was  discussed  by  the  Council  and 
forwarded  to  the   French   ambassadors  at  Berlin,  Vienna 
and  St  Petersburg.    The  argument  is  strengthened  by  the 
silence  of  Adams's  Diary  with  regard  to  it.     From  November 
7th,  before  which  it  could  not  well  have  arrived  at  Washing- 
ton, to  November  27th,  when  the  composition  of  the  Message 
may  be  regarded  as  complete,  the  events  of  each  day  are 
described  with  exceptional  fulness.    Nothing  is  said,  how- 
ever, of  the  receipt  of  any  account  of  the  conference,  or  of 
the  use  in  the  Cabinet  of  any  arguments   based  upon  it. 
On  the  hypothesis  that  it  had   been    communicated,    the 
omission,  as  also  the  extraordinary  dejection  of  the  President 
noticed  in  the  middle  of  November,  is  not  easily  intelligible. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Memorandum  arrived  after  Novem- 
ber 27th,  the  silence  may  without  difficulty  be  accounted  for. 
WThen  once  the  decision  of  the  Administration  had  been 
arrived  at,   any  supplementary    information  whi/:h  might 

> 9 


52  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

have  assisted  in  reaching  it  would  become  of  comparatively 
small  account.  Adams,  too,  was  being  plunged  into  the 
thick  of  the  struggle  for  the  Presidency,  and  his  Diary  bears 
witness  to  the  fact.  Of  the  actual  reception  of  the  Message 
by  Congress  he  says  not  a  word,  but  records  that  during 
the  month  of  March  he  has  received  235  visitors.  The 
balance  of  probability,  therefore,  seems  to  indicate  that 
Monroe  and  Adams  shared  the  ignorance*  of  Rush  and 
Addington,  and  that  the  conference  between  Canning  and 
Polignac  exercised  no  influence  on  the  formulation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Rush's  reports  of  the  proposals  made  to  him  by  Canning 
reached  the  United  States  during  the  summer  recess.  The 
President  thought  the  occasion  of  such  importance  as  to 
warrant  him  in  consulting  Jeflerson  and  Madison;  and  at 
the  end  of  October  the  aged  statesmen  sent  him  their 
advice.  The  correspondence  which  had  taken  place  in 
England  during  the  month  of  August  is  described  by  the 
former  as  "more  important  than  anything  that  has  happened 
since  our  Revolution."  Highly  as  he  valued  the  chance  of 
obtaining  Cuba,  he  advised  the  President  to  renounce 
everything  in  order  to  pledge  Great  Britain  to  oppose  the 
Holy  Alliance.  Madison's  answer  was  less  decided  in 
tone.  Viewing  dispassionately  the  conduct  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  circumstances  under  which  the  offer  was 
made,  he  could  not  avoid  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
impelled  more  by  her  interest  than  by  a  principle  of 
general  liberty.  This  had  from  the  first  been  the  opinion  of 
Adams,  and,  in  a  less  degree,  of  Monroe.  Where  Canning  had 
claimed  that  his  plan  would  be  "  expedient  for  themselves 
and    beneilCial   to  the   world,  "    every  American   states- 


u 


THE  DIPLOMACY   OF   1823.  53 

man  read  '  expedient  for,  and  beneficial  to  Great  Britain.' 
In  the  first  days  of  November,  Addington  received  from 
the  Secretary  of  State  at  a  dinner  party  an  account  of  the 
original  interview  between  Canning  and  Rush.  "Mr  Adams," 
he  wrote,  "  seemed  extremely  gratified  and  evidently 
contemplated  his  country  as  already  placed  by  it  on  a 
much  higher  elevation  than  that  on  which  she  had  hitherto 
stood."  Shortly  before  this  time,  indeed,  he  had  held  a 
conversation  with  Adams,  which  he  had  reported  to 
Canning  in  a  despatch  dated,  it  seems  probable,  November 
3rd.  A  marginal  note  to  the  reply  affords  evidence  that 
the  subject  was  a  tkjeint  manifesto  on  Spanish  America." 
The  proceedings,  however,  were  considered  by  Canning  of 
so  confidential  a  nature  as  to  be  unfit  for  official  commu- 
nication. Early  in  December,  therefore,  he  took  the  strong 
measure  of  withdrawing  the  despatch  and  sending  it  back  to 
Addington  to  be  put  into  the  form  of  a  private  and  confi- 
dential letter.  It  may  perhaps  be  conjectured  that  towards 
the  end  of  September  Canning  had  striven  to  effect  by 
diplomacy  at  Washington  what  he  had  failed  to  accomplish 
in  London,  and  that  in  a  private  letter  he  had  instructed 
the  British  cHarg6  to  seek  an  interview  with  the  Secretary 
of  State.  The  unbroken  sequence  of  Addington's  subse- 
quent despatches  on  what  he  terms  'the  same  subject,' 
in  any  case,  renders  it  improbable  that  any  vital  point  of 
Adams's  communication  has  been  lost. 

Early  in  November,  the  President  returned  to  the  capital, 
and  summoned  the  Cabinet  to  begin  its  deliberations.  The 
illness  of  Crawford  had  removed  one  source  of  disagree- 
ment, and  for  more  than  a  fortnight  the  only  Ministers 
present  were  Adams,  Calhoun  and  Southard,  the  Secretary 


54  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

of  the  Navy.  On  November  7th,  the  propositions  of  Canning 
to  Rush  and  the  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance  upon  South 
America  forme*  the  subject  of  a  long  and  general  discussion. 
Calhoun's  opinion  was  that  of  Jefferson  ;  but  Adams  pleaded 
with  vigour  and  success  that  the  United  States  shonld 
preserve  entire  freedom  of  action.  No  voice  was  raised  in 
favour  of  sending  a  representative  to  any  conference  on 
the  affairs  of  South  America,  while  alljjagreed  that  a  Minister 
should  immediately  be  accredited  to  France.  President 
and  Secretary  of  State  were  of  one  mind  in  spurning  any 
position  subordinate  to  that  of  Great  Britain,  and,  amid 
general  acquiescnce,  the  latter  claimed  that  the  Czar's 
lecture  on  Legitimacy  should  be  met  by  a  declaration  of 
United  States  principles  addressed  to  Ptussia  and  to  France. 
After  the  meeting,  he  won  the  approval  of  the  President  to 
the  idea,  of  making  this  communication  and  the  refusal  of 
the  overtures  of  Great  Britain  "parts  of  a  combined  system 
of  policy  and  adapted  to  each  other."  Less  than  a  month 
before  its  appearance,  therefore,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had 
assumed  no  more  definite  shape. 

The  result  of  the  Cabinet  council  was  manifest  in  the 
haughtiness  with  which  Adams  next  day  addressed  the 
Ambassador  of  the  Czar,  and  in  the  profuse  cordiality  with 
which  he  received  Addington  two  days  later.  Scarcely  had 
he  caught' sight  of  the  British  charge,  before  he  had  begun 
to  read  aloud  the  whole  of  the  communications  between 
Canning  and  Rush.  To  the  condemnation  by  Great  Britain 
of  foreign  interference  in  trans-Atlantic  affairs  he  signified 
his  entire  and  cordial  assent,  and  approved  no  less  of 
Rush's  statement  that  British  recognition  of  Spanish  Ame- 
rica was  inoispensable  to  concert  with  the  United  States. 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF    1823.  55 

The  voluminous  report  of  the  conference  of  September  19th 
next  gave  him  occasion  for  self-congratulation.  "  He  spoke 
loftily, "  writes  Addington,  "of  the  announcement  which 
had  already,  on  a  former  occasion,  been  made  to  some  of 
the  European  powers,  more  especially  Russia,  of  the  United 
States  considering  the  whole  American  Continent  to  be 
composed  of  independent  nations,  and  of  the  intention  of 
this  country  to  oppose  any  future  attempts  at  colonizing 
North  or  South  America  by  European  Powers.  This 
announcement,  he  said,  was  more  especially  directed  against 
Russia  and  her  North  West  Pacific  schemes."  To  Ad- 
dington's  appeal  for  a  speedy  decision  on  the  proposal  of 
Great  Britain  "  he  replied  that  that  measure  was  of  such 
magnitude,  such  paramount  consequence  as  involving  the 
whole  future  policy  of  the  United  States,  as  far  at  least  as 
regarded  their  own  hemisphere,  that  the  President  jwas 
anxious  to  give  it  the  most  deliberate  consideration,  and  to 
take  the  sense  of  his  whole  Cabinet  upon  it.  " 

The  complacency  of  the  Administration,  however,  was 
disturbed  by  the  news  that  Cadiz  had  fallen.  Monroe  and 
Calhoun  were  plunged  into  the  depths  of  dejection,  and 
feared  that  the  Holy  Alliance  would  immediately  restore  all 
South  America  to  Spain.  Their  alarm  was  shared  by  the 
public,  and  the  tide  of  popular  feeling  turned  in  favour  of 
Great  Britain.  Adams  alone  remained  firm,  and  called  on 
the  President  either  to  accept  or  decline  Canning's  pro- 
posals. On  the  15th  of  November  the  question  was  thrashed 
out  in  the  Cabinet,  and  Calhoun's  idea  of  leaving  the  reply 
of  the  United  States  to  the  discretion  of  their  representative 
in  London  gave  rise  to  much  discussion.  At  last  Adams, 
perhaps  not  uninfluenced  by  his  belief  that  Rush  had  risen 


56  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

too  rapidly,  prevailed  on  his  colleagues  to  ';  bring  the  whole 
answer  to  a  test  of  right  and  wrong.  Considering  the 
South  Americans  as  independent  nations,"  he  argued, 
"they  themselves,  and  no  other  nation,  had  the  right  to 
dispose  of  their  condition."  No  agreement  on  the  part  of 
any  number  of  foreign  powers  could  warrant  them  in 
impairing  this  right  to  national  independence.  Next  day, 
further  dispatches  from  London  showed  j  Rush's  disap- 
pointment at  Canning's  change  of  tone,  and  on  the  17th, 
when  Adams  drafted  a  general  reply,  there  could  be  little 
doubt  as  to  its  tenour.  In  the  President's  opinion,  Canning 
had  been  offered  some  inducements  to  quiet  his  ap- 
prehensions, while  the  Secretary  of  State  was  more  than 
ever  convinced  that  he  had  feigned  alarm  in  the  hope 
of  surprising  the  United  States  into  a  guarantee  of  Cuba  to 
Spain. 

On  the  same  day,  Addington  paid  a  further  visit  to  the 
Department  of  State.  Nothing  more,  Adams  informed  him, 
had  passed  in  London,  and  the  President's  final  decision 
would  probably  be  taken  as  soon  as  Crawford  should  be 
well  enough  to  attend  the  Cabinet.  Before  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  could  act  in  common,  he  went  on 
to  explain,  it  was  indispensable  that  the  latter  should  admit 
the  principle  of  colonial  independence  by  recognizing  one 
or  more  of  the  new  states.  His  words  show  what  he 
regarded  as  the  result  of  the  test  of  right  and  wrong,  and 
explain  the  principle  on  which  the  second  part  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  based.  "  The  United  States,  having 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  trans-Atlantic 
territories,  had  a  right  to  object  to  the  interference  of 
foreign  poweits  in  the  affairs  of  those  territories.    To  Great 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF    1823.  57 

Britain  it  might  be  objected  that,  although  possessing  the 
option,  she  had  no  distinct  right  so  to  do.  She  regarded 
those  territories  as  still  dependencies  of  Spain,  and  in  that 
character  she  might  allow  not  only  Spain,  but  pro  re  nata 
other  powers,  as  allies  of  Spain,  to  interpose  in  reducing 
them  by  force  to  obedience.  Such  a  proceeding  was  impos- 
sible to  the  United  States,  from  the  mere  fact  of  their  recog- 
nition of  the  independence  of  the  territories  in  question. 
"Their  action  with  regard  to  insular  Spain,  if  it  should  exer- 
cise its  inherent  right  to  independence,  would  be  governed 
by  the  same  principles.  They  would  never  admit  a  right  on 
the  part  of  any  third  power  to  interfere  in  subjugating  the 
colonies  for  Spain,  or  on  the  part  of  Spain,  to  cede  them  to 
another  power. 

The  assured  spirit  of  which  these  words  were  full 
contrasted  strongly  with  the  dejection  of  the  President  and 
the  apprehensions  of  the  people.  The  journals  feared  for 
the  liberties  even  of  their  own  portion  of  the  western  world, 
and  the  public  was  inclined  to  build  too  great  hopes  on  the 
appointment  of  British  consuls  to  South  America.  The 
authoritative  National  Intelligencer,m  particular, announced 
that  England's  best  and  most  influential  statesmen  were 
well  aware  that  English  freedom  and  American  indepen- 
dence Avere  equally  hateful  to  those  who  would  enslave 
Europe.  At  the  end  of  the  month  a  general  impression 
seemed  prevalent  that  the  moment  would  arrive  and  would 
be  welcome  when  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  as 
chiefs  of  the  constitutional  cause  in  either  hemisphere, 
would  join  hands  in  support  of  it.  All  were  resolved  that 
in  the  United  States,  at  least,  the  arm  of  despotism  should 
not  be  raised. 


58  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

On  the  19th  of  November,  Addington  once  more  received 
from  Adams  a  greeting  of  "  unusual  affability.  "  The 
instructions  to  Rush,  he  was  informed,  were  delayed  by 
the  deliberation  of  the  President  on  what  was  characterised 
for  the  second  time  as  "  the  most  delicate  and  important 
measure  of  his  whole  Administration.  "  The  necessity  of 
a  common  basis  of  principle  was  still  further  demonstrated, 
and  the  peculiar  views  of  the  United  States  once  more 
explained.  '  Having  acknowledged  the  new  states  as 
independent,  they  had  become  incapable  of  admitting  that 
other  powers  could  acquire  the  right  to  interfere.  Though 
it  was  difficult  to  see  how  Great  Britain  could  break  off  her 
former  strict  relations  with  the  other  allies  of  Spain,  the 
United  States  would  probably  decline  to  attend  any 
conference  on  South  America,  unless,  as  they  intended  to 
suggest,  the  new  republics  were  also  invited  to  be  present. 
No  congress  could  give  Europe  a  right  "  to  stretch  the  arm 
of  power  across  the  Atlantic  for  the  purpose  of  subjugating 
independent  states. ..The  very  atmosphere  of  such  an 
assembly  must  be  considered  by  this  Government  as 
infected,  and  unfit  for  their  plenipotentiary  to  breathe  in.  " 

One  week  before  the  language  of  the  President  was 
finally  decided,  therefore,  the  Administration  may  be 
regarded  as  having  settled  its  policy  from  the  negative, 
but  not  from  the  positive  point  of  view.  All  its  members 
understood  that  they  had  recognised  the  South  American 
republics  as  independent  states.  They  would  impugn  their 
own  good  faith  by  countenancing  any  attempt  to  destroy 
that  independence  on  the  ground  that  it  had  not  been  fully 
achieved.  This,  however,  must  be  the  ground  taken  by 
Spain,  should  srle  find  means  to  renew  the  war,  or  by  the 


THE  DIPLOMACY    OF   1823.  59 

Holy  Allies,  should  they  decide  to  interfere.  Such  interfe- 
rence, therefore,  must  be  repugnant  to  the  United  States, 
and  no  envoy  of  theirs  should  be  suspected  of  lending  it 
sanction.  Nor  could  they  connive  at  the  denial  of  the  rights 
of  the  new  states  involved  in  any  attempt  to  found  colonial 
establishments  within  their  borders.  They  were  resolved 
to  uphold  their  own  claim  to  the  north-west  against  the 
Ukase  of  the  Czar.  As  to  Cuba,  all  were  of  opinion  that  it 
would  be  greatly  to  the  detriment  of  the  United  States  if 
the  island  should  pass  into  the  hands  of  France  or  of  Great 
Britain.  There,  however,  the  question  of  principle — of  the 
right  of  every  people  to  choose  its  own  government— had 
not  yet  been  raised.  Its  present  condition  was  tranquil, 
and  Great  Britain,  which  had  solemnly  disclaimed  all 
intention  of  acquiring  it  for  herself,  would  not  be  likely  to 
permit  France  to  profit  by  her  abstinence.  It  remained, 
therefore,  for  Monroe  and  his  Cabinet  to  decide  what 
active  measures  should  be  taken  to  ward  off  the  danger  of 
European  aggression  which  threatened  the  new  republics, 
and  which  might  eventually  affect  the  United  States  also. 
The  means  readiest  to  hand  lay  in  an  acceptance  of 
the  proposals  made  by  Canning.  Washington,  however, 
had  forbidden  his  successors  to  commit  their  country  to 
entangling  alliances  with  Europe.  It  was  suspected, 
moreover,  that  a  common  declaration  against  deriving 
advantages  from  the  struggle,  or  against  allowing  other 
powers  to  take  part  in  it,  would  commit  the  United  States 
too  far,  and  Great  Britain  not  far  enough.  The  former 
would  renounce  their  chance  of  ultimately  acceding  to  the 
petition  of  Cuba  and  Texas  to  be  admitted  into  the  Union, 
and  would  divide  their  claim  to  the  gratitude  of  the  states 


60  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

which  they  had  been  the  first  to  recognise.  Above  all, 
they  feared  to  humiliate  themselves  by  conforming  to  the 
wishes  of  Great  Britain,  the  power  which  the  Cabinet,  as 
Democrats,  viewed  with  most  jealousy,  and  with  which, 
since  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  their  country  had 
passed  one-fifth  of  its  existence  at  war.  Although,  therefore, 
Monroe  was  inclined  to  empower  Rush  to  act  in  concert 
with  the  British  Government  in  case  of  any  sudden  danger, 
Adams  stoutly  maintained  that  nothing  should  be  left  to  his 
discretion.  In  tlje  Cabinet  of  November  the  21st  he  gained 
his  point.  7He  also  defeated  the  Presidents's  amendment 
in  favour  of  accepting  an  arrangement  by  which  special 
privileges,  or  even  a  restoration  of  authority,  might  be 
conceded  by  the  revolted  colonies  to  Spain.  The  final  draft 
of  the  instructions  to  Rush  claimed  that  the  United  States 
should  be  treated  by  the  South  Americans  upon  the  footing 
of  equality  with  the  most  favoured  nation,  and  was,  Adams 
states,  conformable  to  his  own  views.  He  next  secured 
more  explicit  approval  for  the  project  of  the  manifesto  to 
Russia,  which  had  been  generally  acquiesced  in  a  fortnight 
before.  He  desired  moderately  but  firmly  to  declare  the 
dissent  of  the  United  States  from  the  principles  championed 
by  the  Czar,  and  to  assert  those  upon  which  their  own 
government  was  founded.  The  lineaments  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  seem  to  be  discernible  in  his  proposal  "  while 
disclaiming  all  intention  of  attempting  to  propagate  them 
by  force,  and  all  interference  with  the  political  affairs  of 
Europe,  to  declare  our  expectation  and  hope  that  the  Eu- 
ropean powers  will  equally  abstain  from  the  attempt  to 
spread  their  principles  in  the  American  hemisphere,  or  to 
subjugate  by  force  any  part  of  these  continents  to  their  will." 


THE    DIPLOMACY   OF    1823.  61 

The  President,  having  approved  of  the  idea,  proceeded 
to  read  to  the  Cabinet  the  portions  of  his  message  already 
drafted.  In  the  tone  of  "deep  solemnity  and  high  alarm'' 
with  which  it  began,  traces  of  his  previous  dejection  might 
be  perceived.  The  country,  he  declared,  was  menaced  by 
foreign  powers.  He  censured  both  the  principles  and  the 
practice  of  the  French  invasion  of  Spain,  and  recommended 
an  appropriation  for  a  Minister  to  be  sent  to  the  Greeks. 
Calhoun,  regarding  the  attack  on  popular  principles  as  un- 
precedented, approved  the  whole.  Adams,  on  the  other 
hand,  impugned  both  the  policy  of  alarm  and  the  facts  on 
which  it  was  based  ;  and,  next  day,  implored  the  President 
to  avoid  anything  like  aggression.  The  United  States,  he 
argued,  might  have  been  hasty  in  recognising  the  Spanish 
colonics  as  independent.  By  the  consequences  of  that 
action,  indeed,  they  must  abide,  but  why  defy  the  Allies  in 
the  heart  of  Europe?  "The  ground  that  I  wish  to  take,"  he 
writes  in  his  Diary, "is  that  of  earnest  remonstrance  against 
the  interference  of  the  European  powers  by  force  with 
South  America,  but  to  disclaim  all  interference  on  our  part 
With  Europe;  to  make  up  an  American  cause,  and  adhere 
inflexibly  to  that." 

Sunday  passed,  and  on  Monday  he  was  gratified  to  find 
that  the  President  had  accepted  his  advice.  Next  day,  the 
Cabinet  met  again,  this  time  with  the  addition  of  Wirt,  the 
Attormy-Cenera],  a  friend  of  Madison  and  Monroe,  and  a 
man  of  the  strongest  common  sense.  The  subject  of  dis- 
cussion was  the  manifesto  to  Russia  and  to  the  world, 
Which  Adams  claimed  to  hawe  drawn  to  correspond 
exactly  with  the  paragraph  in  which  the  President  had 
embodied  his  recommendations.     He  describes  it  in  words 


62  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

which  seem  to  depict  the  Monroe  Doctrine  when  full  grown. 
Besides  answering  the  exhortations  of  Alexander  and  the 
proposals  of  Canning,  it  was,  according  to  itsauthor,  "meant 
to  be  eventually  an  exposition  of  the  principles  of  this 
Government,  and  a  brief  development  of  its  political  system 
as  henceforth  to  be  maintained  ;  -essentially  republican,... 
essentially  pacific,...  but  declaring  that,  having  recognised 
the  independence  of  the  South  American  states,  we  could 
not  see  with  indifference  any  attempt  by  European  powers, 
by  forcible  interposition,  either  to  restore  the  Spanish 
dominion  on  the  American  continents,  or  to  introduce 
monarchical  principles  into  those  countries,  or  to  transfer 
any  portion  of  the  ancient  or  present  possessions  of  Spain 
toany  other  European  power." 

The  manifesto  thus  drawn   up  was   defended   by  its 
author  against  a  running  fire  of  criticism.     Calhoun  doub- 
ted the  need  for  it,  and  Monroe  feared  lest  its  republicanism 
should  so  shock  Great  Britain  that  the  Holy  Alliance  might 
be  enabled  to  buy  back  her  support.     Wirt  raised  the  most 
important  point  of  all  by  enquiring  "if  the  Holy  Allies  should 
act  in  direct  hostility  against  South  America,  whether  this 
country  would  oppose  them  by  war  ? "    In  reply,  Adams 
urged  that  his  declaration  did  not  pledge  the  United  States 
to  "  absolute  war,"  and  that  Great  Britain  was  already  more 
committed  than  themselves.    The  interest  of  each  of  the 
Allies,  again,  would  be  injured  by  the  restoration  of  South 
America  to  Spain.     Even  if  they  could  agree  on  a  treaty  of 
partition,  they  could  only  offer  Cuba  to  Great  Britain,  and 
this  neither  they  nor  Spain  would  consent  to  give  her.    His 
reliance  upon  the  co-operation  of  Great  Britain  rested,  not 
upon  her  principles  but  her  interest.  Her  principles,  how- 


THE    DIPLOMACY    OF    1823.  03 

ever,  would  not  be  outraged,  and  his  "whole  paper  was 
drawn  up  to  come  in  conclusion  precisely  to  the  identical 
declaration  of  Mr  Canning  himself,  and  to  express  our  con- 
currence with  it." 

Next  day  the  battle  was  renewed,  and  for  four  hours 
raged  round  the  President's  draft  and  the  corresponding 
manifesto  proposed  by  Adams.  The  gist  of  the  whole 
question,  according  to  the  latter,  was  how  far  the  United 
States  ought  to  take  their  stand  against  the  Holy  Alliance 
in  defence  of  South  America.  Wirt  declared  that  the  feeling 
in  favour  of  the  revolutionists  was  not  general,  and  that  it 
was  inexpedient  to  be  perhaps  ensnared  by  Canning  into 
declarations  against  the  Holy  Alliance  without  first  con- 
sulting Congress.  Calhoun  maintained  his  opinion  that,  for 
their  own  sake,  the  United  States  must  detach  Great  Britain 
from  the  Allies.  He  therefore  favoured  the  Message  as 
proclaiming  United  States  principles  in  the  sanctuary  of 
their  own  fire-side,  but  thought  that  the  manifesto  would 
be  deeply  offensive  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  also  to  the 
monarchical  government  of  Great  Britain.  In  reply  to  these 
strictures  ,  Adams  poured  forth  his  wonted  wealth  of 
argument.  On  the  previous  day  he  had  shown  that  the 
Holy  Alliance  was  not  likely  to  reconquer  South  America. 
Now,  however,  he  drew  a  vivid  picture  of  the  new  states 
partitioned  out  among  the  powers.  "What  would  be  our 
situation,"  he  asked,  "  England  holding  Cuba ;  France, 
Mexico  ?  "  The  French  might  even  recover  Louisiana,  and 
the  United  States  could  not  too  soon  take  steps  to  repel 
the  danger.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  should  shrink  from 
action,  Great  Britain,  by  her  command  of  the  sea,  might 
triumph  over  the  Holy  Alliance  single-handed,  and  so  make 


04  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

South  America  a  protectorate  of  her  own.  By  sanctioning 
his  manifesto,  moreover,  the  Executive  did  not— as,  indeed, 
by  law  it  could  not— commit  the  nation  to  war.  Canning 
himself  had  stated  from  the  first  that  his  ohject  was  merely 
a  concerted  expression  of  sentiment,  which,  he  supposed, 
would  render  it  unnecessary  to  appeal  to  arms.  From  his 
personal  knowledge  of  Alexander,  again,  Adams  did  not 
believe  that  his  draft  would  give  him  offence.  "  As  the 
Holy  Alliance  had  come  to  edify  and  instruct  us  with  their 
principles,"  he  maintained,  "  it  was  due  in  candor  to  them 
and  injustice  to  ourselves, to  return  them  the  compliment." 

Having  thus  borne  down  the  opposition  to  his  plan,  he 
proceeded  to  defend  its  details.  The  President,  however, 
by  insisting  that  Rush  should  not  finally  refuse  co-operation 
without  recognition,  showed  that  his  principles  were  less 
extreme.  With  regard  to  the  manifesto,  he  reserved 
judgment  till  next  day.  He  then  advised  the  omission  of 
the  paragraphs  to  which  the  Cabinet  had  raised  objections. 
All  Adams's  powers  of  logic  and  of  entreaty  had  to  be 
called  into  play  before  he  would  consent  to  re-examine 
the  exposition  of  the  principles  of  the  United  States — the 
foundation  of  the  whole.  Later  in  the  day,  the  victory 
was  won.  Thwarted  at  every  point  by  his  more  vigorous 
lieutenant,  the  President  sent  a  note  "  expressing,"  accor- 
ding to  Adams,  "  the  apprehension  that  the  paragraph  of 
principles  contained  a  direct  attack  upon  the  Holy  Allies, 
by  a  statement  of  principles  which  they  had  violated,  but 
yet  consenting  that  I  should  re-insert  the  paragraph,  on 
account  of  the  importance  that  I  attached  to  it." 

In  this  way,  Adams  secured  the  adoption  of  the  system 
of  policy  of  which  tbe  presidential  Message  was   a  single 


THE  DIPLOMACY   OF    1823.  65 

expression.  The  story  of  its  evolution  illustrates  the  evo- 
lution of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Adams  alone  held  firmly  to 
principles  which,  perhaps,  no  other  member  of  the  Admi- 
nistration fully  understood.  He  was  able  to  predict  to  the 
representative  of  Columbia  that  his  countrymen  would  soon 
see  the  deep  interest  taken  by  the  United  States  in  the 
maintenance  of  their  independence.  On  the  eve  of  the 
Message  itself,  Addington  received  his  assurances  that ;'  the 
United  States  would  show  by  facts  how  cordially  they 
concurred  in  the  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued  by  Great 
Britain."  The  instructions  to  Rush  and  Middleton  would 
soon  be  drawn  up  and  despatched.  "  He  concluded,"  says 
the  British  representative,  "by  expressing  in  terms  of 
warmth  and  apparent  sincerity,  his  earnest  hope  that  the 
relations  which  existed  between  our  two  Governments 
would  become  daily  of  a  closer  and  a  more  confidential 
nature." 


R, 


CHAPTER    V. 
The  Authorship  of  the  MOx\roe  Doctrine. 

Experience  of  the  first  four  years  of  Monroe's  presidency 
had  enabled  his  Secretary  of  State  to  write  in  1820,  "  The 
composition 'of  these  messages  is  upon  a  uniform  plan. 
They  begin  with  general  remarks  upon  the  condition  of  the 
country,  noticing  recent  occurrences  of  material  importance, 
passing  encomiums  upon  our  form  of  government,  paying 
due  homage  to  the  sovereign  power  of  the  people,  and 
turning  to  account  every  topic  which  can  afford  a  paragraph 
of  public  gratulation  ;  then  pass  in  review  foreign  affairs ; 
the  circumstances  of  our  relations  with  the  principal  powers 
of  Europe ;  then,  looking  inwards,  adverting  to  the  state  of 
the  finances,  the  revenues,  public  expenditures,  debts  and 
land  sales,  the  progress  of  fortifications  and  naval  armaments, 
with  a  few  words  about  the  Indians,  and  a  few  about  the 
s  lade-trade." 

With  a  detail  which  the  President  excused  as  necessary 
to  the  opening  of  a  new  Congress,  almost  all  these  subjects 
find  a  place  in  the  Message  of  December  2nd,  1823.  Two 
passages,  however,  collectively  termed  the  M  onroe  Doctrine, 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  07 

have  won  wider  fame  than  the  rest.     In  the  review  of  foreign 
affairs  it  is  stated  that  : 

"  At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Government, 
made  through  the  minister  of  the  Emperor  residing  here,  a 
full  power  and  instructions  have  been  transmitted  to  the 
minister  of  the  United  States  at  St  Petersburg,  to  arrange, 
by  amicable  negotiation,  the  respective  rights  and  interests 
of  the  two  nations  on  the  north-west  coast  of  this  continent 
A  similar  proposal  had  been  made  by  his  Imperial  Majesty 
to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  which  has  likewise 
been  acceded  to.  Tl^e  Government  of  the  United  Skates  has 
been  desirous,  by  this  friendly  proceeding,  of  manifesting 
the  great  valne  which  they  have  Invariably  attached  to  the 
friendship  of  the  Emperor,  and  their  solicitude  to  cultivate 
the  best  understanding  with  his  government.  In  the 
discussions  to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and  in 
the  arrangements  by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  occasion 
has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle,  in 
which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and 
maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects 
for  future  colonization  by  any  European  powers." 

The  Message  then  treats  of  other  foreign  relations,  of 
finance,  of  the  army  and  navy,  of  posts  and  tariffs,  ami  of 
the  vexed  question  of  internal  improvements.  It  expresses 
the  warm  sympathy  of  the  United  States  with  the  Greeks 
in  their  struggle  to  "  resume  their  equal  station  among  the 
nations  of  the  earth."  The  remainder,  with  the  exception 
of  a  peroration  on  the  progress  of  the  United  States  and  on 
their  Constitution,  reads  as  follows  : 

5—2 


68  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

i» 

It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the  last  session 

that  a  great  effort  was  then  making  in  Spain  and  Portugal 
to  improve  the  condition  of  the  people  of  those  countries, 
and  that  it  appeared  to  be  conducted  with  extraordinary 
moderation.  It  need  scarcely  be  remarked  that  the  result 
lias  been  so  far  very  different  from  what  was  then  antici- 
pated. Of  events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  with  which 
we  have  so  much  intercourse  and  from  which  we  derive  our 
origin,  we  have  always  been  anxious  and  interested  spec- 
tators. The  citizens  of  the  United  States  cherish  sentiments 
the  most  friendly  in  favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of 
their  fellow  men  on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  wars\J»^ 
of  the  European  powers,  in  matters  relating  to  themselves, 
we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor  doe^i^omportwitli  our*^J 
policy  to  do  so.  '  It  is  only  wnen  our  rights  are  invaded  oiiv£* 
se/iously  menaced,  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make  ^ 
^/preparation  for  our  defence.  With  the  movements  in  this 
hemisphere  we  are,  of  necessity,  more  immediately  connec- 
ted, and  by  causes  which  must  be  obvious  to  all  enlightened 
and  impartial  observers.  The- political  system  of  the  allied 
powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that  of 
America.  This  difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists 
in  their  respective  governments.  And  to  the  defence  of 
our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much 
blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of  their 
most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which  we  have  enjoyed 
unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation  is  devoted.  We  owe 
it,  therefore,  to__cando_r_and  to  the  amicable^  relations 
existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  powers,  fo 
declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  (heir  part 
ffo"  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  isti  this  hpmiupbftire.asi  „a 


THE  AUTHORSHIP    OF  THE  MONROE    DOCTRINE  69 

dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  Cc>l*>  / 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power  we  have  f&r* 
not  interfered,  and  shnll  notinterfere.  But  with  the  Govern- 
in  en tsjWiohave  declared  their  independence  and  mamtai- 
ned  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,on  great,  considera- 
>^tion  and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them? 
or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power,  in  any  other  lightlthan  as  the  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United  States.  In 
the  war  between  those  new  Governments  and  Spain  we 
declared  our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their  recognition, 
and  to  this  we  have  adhered  and  shall  continue  to  adhere, 
provided  no  change  shall  occur  which,  in  the  judgment  of 
the  competent  authorities  of  this  Government,  shall  make 
a  corresponding  change  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
indispensable  to  their  security. 

"The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that 
Europe  is  still  unsettled .  Of  this  important  fact  no  stronger 
proof  can  be  adduced  than  that  the  allied  powers  should 
have  thought  it  proper,  on  a  principle  satisfactory  to 
themselves,  to  have  interposed  by  force  in  the  internal 
concerns  of  Spain.  To  what  extent  such  interposition  may 
be  carried  on  the  same  principle,  is  a  question  to  which 
all  independent  powers,  whose  Governments  differ  from 
theirs,  are  interested  ;  even  those  most  remote,  and  surely 
none  more  so  than  the  United  States.  Our  policy  in  regard 
to  Europe,  which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
wars  which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe, 
nevertheless  remains  the  same,  which  is,  not  to  interfere 
in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  powers ;  to  consider 


70  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

the  Government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate  Government  for 
ns;  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it,  and  to  preserve 
those  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy;  meeting, 
in  all  instances,  the  just  claims  of  every  power,  submitting 
to  injuries  from  none.  But  in  regard  to  these  continents, 
Circumstances  are  eminently  and  conspicuously  different. 
It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their 
political  system  to  any  portion  of  either  continent  without 
endangering  our  peace  and  happiness;  nor  can  anyone 
believe  that  our  southern  brethren,  if  left  to  themselves, 
would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is  equally  impos- 
sible, therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interposition, 
in  any  form,  with  indifference.  If  we  look  to  the  compa- 
rative strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new 
Governments,  and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must 
be  obvious  that  she  can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still  the 
true  policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  parties  to 
themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other  powers  will  pursue  the 
same  course." 

The  process  by  which  it  was  decided  that  the  policy 
which  these  passages  express  should  be  adopted  by  the 
United  States  and  declared  by  the  President  has  been 
examined  in  the  preceding  chapter.  The  examination  has 
at  least  sufficed  to  show  that,  from  whatever  quarter  may 
have  come  the  impulse  to  pronounce  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
its  formulation  cannot  be  sought  outside  the  Cabinet.  The 
connection  of  Canning  with  the  Doctrine  of  which  he  has 
often  been  termed  the  author  has  been  exposed.  The  part 
played  by  Jefferson,  on  whose  behalf  also  a  claim  has  been 
put  forward,  seems  to  be  defined  in  the  fact  that  his  advice 
was  sought  and  was  not  followed.    It  remains  to  discover, 


! 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.   71 

if  possible,  to  whose  hand  were  due  the  phrases  actually 
employed.  The  Cabinet  which  considered  the  presidential 
Message  consisted  of  five  members,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
suppose  that  Calhoun,  Southard,  or  Wirt  shaped  its  foreign 
policy  or  drafted  its  conclusions.  Tbe  problem,  therefore, 
reduces  itself  to  a  decision  between  the  claims  of  the  Pre- 
sident and  of  the  Secretary  of  State 

This  special  question  of  authorship,  indeed,  is  of  more 
than  speculative  importance.  The  whole  history  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  its  recent  history  most  of  all,  shows 
that  its  literal  interpretation  is  far  from  clear.     Phrases 

liich  in  the  mouth  of  one  man  might  be  the  obsrinv 
expression  of  confused  thought,  would  not  be  uttered  by 
another  without  a  deep  political  meaning.  Once  at  least, 
Monroe  had  to  enquire  of  Adams  the  meaning  of  a  paragraph 
drawn  by  himself  in  his  own  words,  and  it  is  desirable  to 
spare  a  new  generation  the  toil  of  reading  into  the  Message 
Of  1823  ideas  which  it  was  never  intended  to  convey.  The 
historical  estimate  of  the  succeeding  Administration  and  of 
its  head,  moreover,  must  depend  in  great  measure  on  the 
verdict.  If  the  words  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  the 
vehicle  chosen  by  Adams  to  convey  his  political  ideas,  new 
light  is  thrown  on  his  Panama  Messages,  and  new  judgment 
must  be  pronounced  on  their  author.  The  Doctrine,  again, 
it  may  safely  be  conjectured,  derives  much  claim  to  popu- 
lar veneration  from  its  supposed  parentage  by  Monroe. 
Even  while  he  continued  to  hold  the  reins  of  state,  men 
felt  that  the  halcyon  days  of  the  Republic  had  arrived. 
History  has  proved  their  instinct  true,  and  after  seventy 
years  the  centre  of  the  whole  is  the  mild  and  venerable 
patriarch  of  whom  little  but  good  is  known,  and  who  may 


72  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

the  more  easily  be  reputed  a  hero.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  proved  to  be  the  oftspring  of 
Adams,  much  of  the  glamour  encircling  it  might  fade  away, 
and  its  interpretation  might  pass  more  completely  from  the 
sphere  of  sentiment  into  that  of  reason.  Direct  documen- 
tary evidence  is  unhappily  wanting.  Adams  made  his 
claim,  if  anywhere,  between  the  lines  of  his  Diary,  which 
described  the  deliberations  by  which  the  Message  was 
preceded.  The  title  of  Monroe,  on  the  other  hand,  seems 
to  rest  on  the  fact  that  he  penned  the  words  despatched  by 
him  to  Congress.  "  Very  little  has  come  under  my  eye,  " 
says  his  biographer,  in  speaking  of  the  Doctrine,  "to  illus- 
trate the  workings  of  Monroe's  mind.  "  "  If  memoranda  of 
Monroe's  upon  this  subject  are  still  extant  they  have 
eluded  me.  "  The  remaining  members  of  the  Cabinet,  with 
the  doubtful  exception  of  Calhoun,  have  forborne  to  lift  the 
veil.  It  is  necessary  therefore,  for  the  most  part,  to  supp- 
lement the  evidence  of  the  Diary  with  arguments  based  on 
probability,— on  the  power  of  the  two  men  to  produce  the 
Doctrine,  and  on  the  extent  to  which  its  principles  agree 
with  theirs. 

Though  the  denunciations  against  Enropean  colonisation 
and  European  interference  have  been  confounded  by 
patriots  into  a  single  dogma  that  America  is  for  the 
Americans,  or,  as  some  would  say,  for  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States^ a  glance  at  the  Message  itself  will  suffice  to 
show  that  the  two  are  not  at  first  sight  connected.  Histo- 
rical enquiry  proves  that  their  origin  was  likewise  separate. 
The  former— the  quotation  by  the  President  of  a  principle 
assumed  by  the  United  States  in  their  recent  territorial 
negotiations  with  Russia,  "that  the  American  continents,  by 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.   73 

the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  as- 
sumed and  maintained,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subjects  for  future  colonisation  by  any  European 
powers  "—had  not  been  the  subject  of  the  recent  Cabinet 
deliberations.  The  silence  of  the  Diary  is  on  this  point 
confirmed  by  the  statement  of  Calhoun,  made  in  combating 
the  principle  after  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  elapsed,  of 
his  impression  that  this  portion  of  the  Message  originated 
with  Adams.  The  gist  of  it  had  for  months,  indeed,  been 
familiar  to  the  Ministers  ot  the  United  States  in  foreign 
courts.  In  the  middle  of  July,  Adams  had  informed  the 
Russian  Ambassador  that  throughout  the  forthcoming 
negotiations  on  the  Ukase  of  1821  the  United  States  would 
"  contest  the  right  of  lUissia  to  any  territorial  establishment 
on  this  continent, "  and  "  assume  distinctly  the  principle 
that  the  American  continents  are  no  longer  subjects  for 
any  new  European  colonial  establishments."  A  few  days 
later,  he  instructed  Rush  on  the  same  subject.  After 
insisting  that  "  the  present  condition  of  the  north-west 
coast  of  this  continent "  was  of  manifold  importance  to  the 
United  States,  he  contended  that  all  treaty  recognition  of 
"  the  exclusive  colonial  rights  of  Spain  on  these  continents... 
has  been  extinguished  by  the  fact  of  the  independence  of 
the  South  American  nations  and  of  Mexico.  Those  inde- 
pendent nations  will  possess  the  rights  incident  to  that 
condition,  and  their  territories  will,  of  course,  be  subject 
to  no  exclusive  right  of  navigation  in  their  vicinity,  or  of 
access  to  them  by  any  foreign  nation.  A  necessary 
consequence  of  this  state  of  things  will  be  that  the  American 
continents,  henceforth,  will  no  longer  be  subject  to  coloni- 
sation.    Occupied  by  civilised,  independent  nations,  they 


74-  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

will  be  accessible  to  Europeans,  and  each  other,  on  that 
footing  alone;  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  in  every  part  of  it, 
will  remain  open  to  the  navigation  of  all  nations,  in  like 
manner  with  the  Atlantic." 

Corresponding  instructions  had  been  sent  to  Middleton 
at  the  Court  of  St  Petersburg,  and  in  each  case  the 
initiative  may  be  attributed  to  Adams.  Though  questions 
of  foreign  policy  were  discussed  by  the  Cabinet,  and  a  right 
of  supervision  exercised  by  the  President,  the  instructions 
to  diplomatic  agents  formed  the  portion  of  the  labours  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  in  which  he  had  the  freest  scope.  In 
the  present  instance,  it  may  reasonably  be  assumed  that 
the  share  of  the  President  in  the  instructions  to  Rush  and 
Middleton  was  confined  to  an  approval  of  the  resistance  to 
all  the  pretensions  of  Russia,  and  a  glance  through  the 
phrases  in  which  this  policy  was  maintained.  Monroe,  more- 
over, was  wont  to  turn  to  his  Ministers  for  drafts  of  the 
paragraphs  of  his  Message  which  treated  of  the  subjects 
with  which  their  several  departments  were  concerned.  It 
is  not  improbable,  therefore,  —  and  the  recollections  of 
Calhoun  support  the  hypothesis— that  Adams  deduced  from 
his  peculiar  theories  of  national  independence  the  principle 
that  the  future  colonisation  of  America  by  Europeans  was 
inadmissible,  and  saw  it  escape  the  challenge  of  the  Cabinet 
and  of  the  Russian  Ambassador,  both  concerned  less  with 
generalisations  than  whit  their  application  to  the  subjects 
in  dispute.  The  assent  of  the  President  to  the  draft 
despatches  would  readily  follow.  This  gained,  the  recapi- 
tulation of  what  had  been  assumed  in  the  negotiations 
found  its  natural  expression  in  the  President's  Message, 
and   at  the  same  time  completed  for  this  portion  of  the 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  75 

United  States  policy  that  manifesto  to  Russia,  Great  Britain 
and  the  whorld  in  general  which  Adams  so  strongly- 
advocated.  Such  a  genesis  seems  the  more  credible  from 
the  difficulty  of  the  argument  against  colonisation,  and  from 
its  known  accordance  with  the  logic  of  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

The  Law  of  Nature,  he  seems  to  have  believed,  dictated 
that  whenever  a  body  of  men  in  occupation  of  a  determinable 
territory  desired  to  rule  themselves,  they  hud  an  inherent 
right  to  carry  their  desire  into  effect  In  the  New  World, 
this  right  had  been  confirmed  by  facts;  in  the  Old,  it  was 
still  defied  by  the  Holy  Alliance. 

With  the  politics  of  Europe,  the  United  States  had 
othing  to  d".  In  whatever  touched  the  western  hemis- 
phere, their  rights  and  interests  were  concerned.  They 
themselves  had  struck  a  vital  blow  ;it  the  old  system  of 
governing  dependencies,  and  the  work  was  being  completed 
by  the  South  Americans.  ww  It  was  impossible, "  he  said  in 
conversation,  "that  the  old  exclusive  and  excluding  colonial 

system  should  much  longer  endure  anywhere The  whole 

system  ofmodern  colonisation  was  an  abuse  of  government, 
and  it  was  time  that  it  should  come  to  an  end."  "If  the 
Holy  Allies  should  subdue  America/'  he  told  the  Cabinet  a 
year  later,  "  the  ultimate  result  of  their  undertaking  would 
be  to  recolonise  them,  partitioned  out  among  themselves." 
Any  revival  of  the  colonial  system,  then,  was  an  intolerable 
retrogression.  It  only  remained  to  prove  that  it  affected 
the  interests  of  the  United  States.  Having  done  this,  to  his 
own  satisfaction,  by  showing  that  it  would  impair  the  right 
of  free  intercourse  with  all  America,  he  arrived  at  the  dogma 
that  the  American  continents  were  henceforth  not  to  be 


76  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

considered   as    subjects    for    future    colonisation    by    any 
European  powers. 

In  determining  upon  the  authorship  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  the  argument  from  personal  probability  seems  to 
be  specially  powerful.  Which  of  the  two  men,  it  may  be 
asked,  was  the  more  likely  to  formulate  new  canons  of  public 
law?  Monroe,  with  little  or  "  no  relish  for  literature  and 
philosophy,"  and  as  President,  prone  to  indecision  even  on 
particular  questions  of  action,  had  reached  the  evening  of 
life,  and  the  failing  health  which  often  attends  it.  His  great 
wish  was  for  peace,  and  he  looked  forward  to  release  from 
the  service  of  a  lifetime.  His  leisure  was  to  be  spent  in 
literary  labours  Avhich  have  added  little  to  his  fame,  and 
which  may  perhaps  be  described  as  well-meaning  but  com- 
monplace. Adams,  on  the  other  hand,  was  in  the  prime  both 
of  physical  and  mental  vigour.  Student  enough  to  have 
"  the  air  rather  of  a  scholar  than  of  a  statesman,"  he 
combined  New  England  powers  of  abstract  thought  with  a 
political  insight  which  saved  him  from  being  a  mere 
doctrinaire.  He  was  a  born  individualist,  and  his  social 
asperity  helped  him  to  play  the  part  in  international  affairs. 
He  possessed  rare  power  of  governing  his  emotions  by  his 
reason.  Having  thought  out  the  separation  of  American 
principles  from  European,  his  wrath  was  roused  by  the 
slightest  invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  Americans,  while  he 
could  calmly  tolerate  far  more  flagrant  oppression  of 
Enropeans.  The  key-note  of  his  policy  was  the  perfect 
equality  of  America  with  Europe,  and  of  the  United  States 
with  the  older  powers.  He  proved  that  the  Holy  Alliance 
had  no  claim  to  pronounce  upon  the  formation  of  an 
American  system  by  pointing  to  the  indisputable  fact  that 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.   77 

its  members  had  not  asked  America  to  pronounce  upon 
their  European  system.  The  Czar  had  lectured  the  United 
States,  and  it  was  "  due  in  candor  "  that  the  United  States 
should  lecture  the  Czar. 

The  occasion  and  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
therefore,  point  to  the  authorship  of  Adams.  The  lack  of 
correspondence  between  Monroe  and  the  Doctrine  which 
bears  his  name  becomes  evident,  on  the  other  hand,to  those 
who  study  both.  His  biographer,  admitting  that  "  as  a 
rule,  he  was  not  veryskiful  with  his  pen,"  and  that  probably 
he  "  had  but  little  conception  of  the  lasting  effect  which  his 
words  would  produce, "  is  compelled  to  attribute  the  force 
of  his  dicta  to  the  fact  that  they  express  "  not  only  the 
opinion  then  prevalent,  but  a  tradition  of  other  days  which 
had  gradually  been  expanded."  From  external  evidence, 
however,  it  seems  clear  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  in 
truth  Monroe's,  must  have  been  the  result  of  an  inspira- 
tion which  swept  away  some  of  his  former  opinions.  In 
his  Message  of  the  previous  year,  he  had  expressed  strong 
sympathy  with  the  cause  of  the  Creeks,  and  in  the  original 
drafts  in  1823  he  had  proposed,  in  effect,  to  recognise  their 
independence.  He  had  there  also  strongly  censured  the 
invasion  ol  Spain  by  France,  and  the  principles  professed 
by  the  king  of  France  in  justification.  The  actual  Message, 
however,  insists  on  the  position  of  the  United  States  as 
merely  "  anxious  and  interested  spectators"  of  European 
affairs  ;  desiring  to  see  liberty  and  happiness  established 
there,  but  disclaiming  all  idea  of  interfering  save  when 
their  own  rights  were  invaded  or  seriously  menaced.  The 
principle  on  which  the  allied  powers  had  thought  it  proper 
to  interpose  by  force  in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain  is 


78  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

tolerated  as  "  satisfactory  to  themselves  ";  and  only  to  be 
resented  by  the  United  States  if  extended  to  their  own 
hemisphere.  In  declaring  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
"to  consider  the  Government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate 
Government  for  us/'  all  idea  of  assisting  the  Greeks  is 
tacitly  abandoned. 

With   regard  to    revolution    in   the   New  World  also  a 
similar  change  of  tone  may  be  perceived.    While  every  day 
of  actual  independence  strengthened  the  claim  of  the  Spa- 
nish colonies  as  against  the  mother-country,  the  absolute 
neutrality  of  the  United  States  is  insisted  on  more  strongly 
than  for  years  before.    In  1818,  Adams  himself  had  furnis- 
hed the  paragraph  on  South  America,  and  next  year  he  had 
endeavoured   to   avoid   offence    to    Spain  by  securing  the 
expurgation  of  the  President's  draft.    The  Message  of  1820, 
however,  had  drawn  a  favourable  picture  of  the  success  of 
the  revolutions,  and  had  inferred  "that  an  adjustment  will 
finally  take  place  on  the  basis  proposed  by  the  colonies." 
"To  promote  that  result  by  friendly  counsels  with  other 
powers,  including  Spain  herself,"  the  President  declared 
to   have  been  "the    uniform   policy  of  this  Government." 
Next  year,'  the  same   sentiments   were   repeated.    In   his 
second  inaugural  address,   Monroe  defended  the  neutral 
policy  of  the  United  States,  and  predicted  the  success  of 
the  colonies..-  The  December  Message  announced  that  it 
might  be  presumed,  and  was   earnestly   hoped,   that   the 
Government  of  Spain,  encouraged  by  the  friendly  counsel 
of  the  United  States,  would  be  so  wise  and  magnanimous 
as  to  terminate  the  exhausting  controversy  on  the  basis  of 
colonial  independence.    In  the  special  Message  of  March 
8th,  1822,  which  advocated  the  recognition  of  the  colonies, 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.   79 

Monroe  did  not  hesitate  to  acknowledge  the  sympathy  with 
which  their  cause  had  always  been  regarded  by  the  United 
States,  and  at  the  close  of  the  year,  he  repeated  his 
expressions  of  hope  that  Spain  would  soon  end  the  contest. 
Now,  however,  the  world  is  informed  that  it  is  obvious  that 
she  can  never  subdue  the  new  Governments,  and  "  that  it 
is  still  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  parties 
to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other  powers  will  pursue 
the  same  course." 

In  respect  to  the  revolutionists  of  both  hemispheres, 
then,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  in  perfect  harmony  with 
the  views  of  the  President  as  previously  expressed  in 
public .  It  coincides,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  consistent 
achings  of  Adams.  Its  keynote  is  the  sharp  political 
everance  of  America  from  Europe.  In  the  mouth  of 
Monroe,  who  had  been  wont  to  sound  the  praise  of  liberty 
in  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece,  this  rings  false.  With  the 
strains  of  Adams  it  is  in  perfect  accord. 

Stratford  Canning,  the  moment  he  set  foot  on  American 
soil,  had  hastened  to  engage  the  Secretary  of  State  on  the 
subject  of  the  slave-trade.  "  Europe  and  America,"  he 
reports  Adams  as  saying  in  a  private  conversation,  "  had 
each  a  sphere  of  its  own,  in  either  of  whose  limits  the  joint 
interference  of  both  parties  would,  in  all  probability,  prove 
generally  useless,  and  frequently  embarrassing.  The 
distance  which  separates  those  quarters  of  the  world^ 
and  the  difference  of  prevailing  opinions  in  each,  appear 
in  his  judgment  to  mark  out  for  the  United  States  a  separate 
and  independent  course. "  How  these  views  were  impres- 
sed upon  the  Cabinet,  has  already  been  described.  The 
political  system  of  the  United  States,  as  henceforth  to  be 


80  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

maintained,  was  to  be  essentially  republican,  and  essentially 
pacific,  —  "studiously  avoinding  all  involvement  in  the 
combinations  of  European  politics,  cultivating  peace  and 
friendship  with  the  most  absolute  monarchies."  By  accep- 
ting his  policy,  Adams  claimed,  "  we  avowed  republicanism, 
but  we  disclaimed  propagandism.  We  asserted  national 
independence. ..we  disavowed  all  interference  with  European 
affairs."  Just  so  far  as  he  desired,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
declares  the  separation  of  America  from  Europe. 

On  its  second  great  principle — the  equality  between  the 
continents — his  opinions  had  been,  if  possible,  even  more 
strongly  pronounced.  "  This  amicable  march  on  parallel 
-lines,"  he  had  told  Stratford  Canning,  "  might  be  conside- 
red as  not  only  prescribed  by  Nature,  but  also  as  having 
received  the  sanction  of  the  European  powers  ;  who,  in 
their  transactions  for  the  general  settlement  of  affairs,  have 
never  recurred  to  the  United  States  for  their  assistance  or 
participation."  He  was  always  in  favour  of  asserting 
international  individualism— of  acting  in  American  matters 
without  reference  to  the  opinion  of  the  Old  World.  He 
demanded  of  the  British  Minister  who  questioned  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  make  settlements  in  a  district 
claimed  by  Great  Britain,  "What  would  be  thought  in 
England  if  Mr  Rush  were  to  address  the  Secretary  of  State 
on  the  occasion  of  a  regiment  being  destined  for  New 
South  Wales  or  the  Shetland  Islands?"  He  at  first  retorded 
on  Alexander  by  telling  his  representative  that  the  United 
States  regretted  that  the  Emperor's  political  principles  had 
not  yet  led  him  to  the  same  conclusion  with  themselves  as 
to  the  South  American  question.  Early  in  the  following 
year,  he  startled  the  French  Minister  by  declaring  that  he 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  81 

presumed  that  France  would  not  interfere  between  the 
colonies  and  Spain  without  consulting  the  United  States  as 
well  as  her  European  Allies.  In  the  Cabinet,  he  developed 
and  defended  the  same  policy  with  regard  to  the  Holy 
Alliance,  and  the  words  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  seem  to 
have  been  the  result. 

In  the  third  great  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
—that  the  United  States  possess  an  interest  in  everything 
that  touches  the  Western  hemisphere,— Adams  had,  up  to 
a  certain  point,  been  equally  consistent.    Four  years  ear- 
lier, he  had  maintained  that  the  world  was  to  be  familiari- 
sed with  "the  idea  of  considering  our  dominion  to  be  the 
continent   of  North  America.    From   the  time   when   we 
became  an  independent  people,  it  was  as  much  a  law  of 
nature  that  this  should  become  our  pretension  as  that  the 
Mississippi  should  flow  to  the  sea."    He  had  really  thought, 
he   exclaimed   in  anger,    that  the  United  States  were  at 
least  to  be  left  unmolested  on  their  continent  of  North 
America.    "As  to  an  American  system,"  he  notes,  before 
Florida  had  passed  into  United  States  hands,  "we  have  it, 
we  constitute  the  whole  of  it."^  Being  careful  to   speak 
only  as  a  private  individual,  he  had  told  the  British  Am- 
bassador, months  before  the  presidential  Message  of  1823 
was  thought  of,  that  "the  policy  of  their  Government,  as 
well  as  the  course  of  circumstances,  had  hitherto  excluded 
the  United  States  from  any  immediate  connection  with  the 
general  system  of  European  affairs.    With  respect  to  the 
vast  continent  of  the  West,  the  United  States  must  neces- 
sarily take  a  warm  and  decided  interest  in  whatever  deter- 
mined the  fate,  or  affected  the  welfare,  of  its  component 
members."    This  view  of  the  interests  of  the  Republic  in 
R.  6 


82  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

"  this  hemisphere  "  or  "  these  continents  "  is  expressed  in 
his  instructions  to  Rush  and  Middleton,  and  maintained 
throughout  the  course  of  his  propositions  to  the  Cabinet. 

During  several  years,  then,  Adams  had  steadily  treated 
the  supremacy  of  the  United  States  on  the  continent  of 
North  America  as  an  established  fact,  and  the  progress  of 
events  had  caused  him   to  declare    their  interest  in  the 
whole  of  the  New  World.    The  Monroe  Doctrine,  however, 
though  it  announces  only  that  they  cannot  ;'  behold  with 
indifference  "  the  extension  of  the  political  system  of  the 
Allies  to  any  portion  of  the  continent,  speaks  with  warmth 
of  those  whom  it  terms  "  our  southern  brethren."    In  this 
respect  it  savours  more  of  Monroe  than  of  Adams.     The 
latter  was  no  lover  of  the  South  Americans.     He  saw  that 
the  enthusiasm  of  his  countrymen  for  the  cause  of  those  who 
at  first  sight  seemed  to  be  following  in  their  own  footsteps 
was  based  on  unsubstantial  sentiment.    His  disagreement 
with  their  conclusions  was  embittered  by  the  fact  that  Clay, 
at  this    time  one  of  his   great  political  rivals,  was   the 
champion  of  the  insurgents.     Hence  he  sneers  at  fanatics 
and  idols  alike.    "  Although  we  have  done  more  than  any 
other  nation  for  the  South  Americans,"  he  had  discovered 
early  in  1820,  "  they  are  discontented  because  we  have  not 
espoused  their  cause  in  arms.    With  empty  professions  of 
friendship,  they  have  no  real  sympathy  with  us."    Vague 
offers  of  commercial  advantages  in  the  future,  coupled  with 
prayers  for  secret  favours  in  the  present,  had  compelled 
him  to  "  distrust  these  South  American  gentlemen."    The 
President's  expressions  of  sympathy  for  them  approached, 
in  his  view,  to  breaches  of  neutrality.     He  had  little  expec- 
tation, he  imformed    Clay,  of  any  beneficial  result  to  the 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  83 

United  States   from   connection,  political    or  commercial, 
with   the  South.     There  was  no  community  of  principles 
between  them.     Dislike   of  individuals,  however,  was  no 
reason  for  political  opposition  to  their  cause.     The  object 
attributed  by  Calhoun  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  "  to  counte- 
nance and  encourage  these  young  republics  as  far  as  we 
could  with  propriety,"  was  the  object  also  of  Adams.    While 
denying  their  claim  to  kinship,  he  agreed  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  asserting  their   right  to  independence.     The 
opinions  that  Spain  could  not  hope  to  subdue  the  colonies, 
that  the  United  States  should  continue  to  observe  perfect 
neutrality,  and  that  nothing  should  be  actually  risked  for 
the  sake  of  South  America,  are  likewise  common  to  both. 
A  single   phrase,  inserted  perhaps  by  the  President,  or 
adopted  by  Adams  as  a  harmless  concession  to  the  views 
of  his  colleagues,  cannot  of  itself  disprove  his  authorship. 
There  is  reason,  then,  for  regarding  it  as  improbable 
that   Monroe   either   could    or   would    have    evolved    the 
Doctrine  which  bears  his  name.    There  is  equal  reason  for 
affirming  that,  with  the  exception  of  the  expression  of 
affection   for  the  South,  the  Doctrine  states  exactly  the 
principles  of  Adams.     Kis  own  account  of  the  transactions 
which   preceded  it  shows   that   he  desired  to  announce 
those  principles  to  the  world,  that  he  embodied  them  in 
a  document  for  the  President's  inspection,  and  that  the 
President  substituted  for  the  original  draft  "  paragraphs 
respecting  the  Greeks,  Spain,  Portugal  and  South  America  " 
which  seemed  to  him  "  quite  unexceptionable."    The  logical 
conclusion  seems  to  be  that  the  conception  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  much  of  its  phraseology  came  from  Adams, 
and  that  the  share  of  Monroe  did  not  extend  beyond  revision. 

6-2 


84  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

This  hypothesis  receives  sonic  support  from  the 
scanty  evidence  of  contemporaries.  Clay  recognised  in 
the  words  of  the  President  the  work  of  several  hands ;  and 
Adams,  by  creed  and  habit  an  egoist,  notes  his  opinion 
that  "  the  part  relating  to  foreign  affairs  was  the  best  part 
of  the  Message."  William  Plumer,  a  Congressman  from 
New  Hampshire,  whose  vote  for  Adams  had  been  the  only 
one  cast  against  the  reelection  of  Monroe,  and  who  was 
about  this  time  a  constant  visitor  at  the  Department  of 
State,  asserts  in  his  diary  for  1824  that  it  was  only  the 
firmness  of  the  Secretary  of  State  that  determined  the 
President  to  retain  the  paragraphs  relating  to  the  interfe- 
rence of  the  Holy  Alliance  with  Spanish  America.  A 
negative  argument  may  also  be  of  value.  Adams  himself, 
in  his  Eulogy  on  the  Life  and  Character  of  James  Monroe, 
discusses  specifically  the  public  acts  which  had  been 
indisputably  those  of  the  deceased  statesman.  The  evi- 
dence of  Addington  has  made  it  clear  that  in  1823  the 
Secretary  did  not  dissent  from  the  President's  view  of  the 
diplomacy  then  proceeding  as  "  the  most  delicate  and  im- 
portant measure  of  his  whole  administration."  In  1831, 
however,  the  only  allusion  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a 
rhetorical  flourish,  praising  the  late  President  for  "  control- 
ling by  a  firm  though  peaceful  policy  the  hostile  spirit  of 
the  European  alliance  against  republican  South  America." 

Coming  from  Adams,  the  Doctrine  was  a  masterstroke, 
worthy  of  one  who,  according  to  a  veteran  diplomatist, 
knew  the  politics  of  all  Europe.  Great  Britain  could  not 
but  applaud  the  declaration  of  a  policy  which  she  had 
herself  suggested.  At  the  same  time  she  lost  the  glory  of 
its  initiation,  while  the  people  of  the  United  States  were 


THE  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  85 

flattered  by  the  appearance  of  leadership.  This  gain, 
moreover,  was  effected  without  loss  in  the  force  of  the  blow. 
The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  severally  declaring  a 
similar  policy  were  no  less  formidable  than  Great  Britain 
associating  the  United  States  with  herself  in  a  public  mani- 
festo. At  no  cost  to  themselves,  the  United  States  had 
received  from  Great  Britain  an  acknowledgment  of  their 
eminence  in  the  New  World,  and  a  demonstration  of  their 
right  to  take  a  principal  part  in  whatever  arrangements 
were  imposed  upon  South  America.  Europe  was  handled 
with  equal  skill.  While  tolerating  the  principles  of  France 
so  far  as  they  affected  the  Old  World,  the  Message  check- 
mated her  designs  on  Spanish  America.  Adams's  insight 
into  the  political  situation  had  never  allowed  him  to  share 
in  the  prevailing  dread  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  Doctrine, 
however,  quieted  the  apprehensions  of  the  public,  and,  at 
little  risk,  gained  for  the  United  States  the  credit  of  inter- 
national fearlessness.  Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  being 
harmless,  was  treated  more  gently  than  before.  It  is  in 
dealing  with  the  Spanish  Americans,  however,  that  the 
Message  appears  cleverest.  By  speaking  of  interference 
with  them  as  "  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposi- 
tion towards  the  United  States,"  which  it  was  impossible 
for  the  latter  to  "behold  with  indifference,"  the  new  repu- 
blics were  invited  to  believe  that  they  had  gained  a  pro- 
tector. The  words,  on  the  other  hand,  apart  from  their 
spirit,  did  not  absolutely  commit  the  Executive,  and  the 
Executive  had  the  Constitution  in  reserve.  At  small 
expense,  therefore,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  foiled  Europe 
and  delighted  America. 
From  a  personal  point  of  view,  Adams  might  regard  it 


86  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

with  equal  satisfaction.  Many  months  earlier,  it  had  be- 
come evident  that  all  public  measures  were  likely  to  Lbe 
affected  by  the  struggle  for  the  Presidency  which  would 
be  determined  in  1824.  The  Secretary  of  State,  by  his  own 
confession,  felt  that  if  he  were  not  elected,  it  would  be  the 
equivalent  of  a  vote  of  censure  on  his  conduct  in  office. 
Every  successor  to  Washington  had  been  either  Vice- 
president  or  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  Vice-presidents 
were  no  longer  competitors.  True  to  his  sense  of  duty, 
he  would  do  nothing  to  secure  the  prize,  but  the  strongest 
convictions  could  not  require  him  to  damage  his  own 
prospects,  or  to  obscure  his  rightful  claims.  He  had 
begged  Monroe  not  to  irritate  the  Holy  Alliance,  but  to 
hand  over  the  Administration  to  his  successor  in  peace. 
His  ideal  of  policy  was  "  to  make  up  an  American  cause  and 
adhere  inflexibly  to  that,"  and  to  embody  it  in  a  declaration 
which  might  serve  "as  a  scheme  of  policy  for  the  future. 
In  the  Monroe  doctrine  his  ends  were  archieved,  and  at  the 
same  time  that  he  outbade  Great  Britain,  he  had  the  sa- 
tisfaction of  outbidding  Clay.  The  policy,  though  states- 
manlike, was  popular ;  and  in  the  verdict  of  the  people  on 
the  Administration  its  author  was  deeply  concerned. 


CHAPTER    VI. 
The  Reception  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Of  the  statecraft  that  attended  the  birth  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  saw  little  or 
nothing.  Congress  itself,  like  the  British  Parliament,  was 
ignorant  of  the  communications  between  Canning  and 
Rush.  What  appeared  was  that  the  Holy  Alliance  had 
threatened  the  liberties  of  America,  and  that  Monroe  had 
come  forward  as  their  champion.  At  the  same  time,  he 
had  voiced  the  spirit  of  the  nation,  elated  with  forty  years 
of  unprecedented  progress.  It  was  only  natural,  therefore, 
that  men  should  rally  to  the  Administration  with  one  ac- 
cord. Addington  was  impressed  by  the  perfect  unanimity 
with  which  the  whole  republic  echoed  "the  explicit  and 
manly  tone  with  which  the  President  has  treated  the  subject 
of  European  interference  in  the  affairs  of  this  hemisphere 
with  a  view  to  the  re-subjugation  of  those  territories  which 
have  emancipated  themselves  from  European  domination." 
The  flame  of  enthusiasm  melted  all  reserve.  The  seeming 
divergence  of  the  new  policy  from  Monroe's  habitual 
caution,  and  the  apparent  assumption  by  the  Executive  of 


88  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  right  to  determine  the  course  of  the  United  States, 
passed  unnoticed.  Even  that  part  of  the  Doctrine  which 
dealt  with  colonisation  was  hardly  remarked.  Addington 
says  not  a  word  about  it,  and  the  National  Intelligencer 
and  the  provincial  press  treat  it  with  equal  silence. 

In  fastening  thus  upon  what  was  construed  as  the 
determination  of  the  United  States  to  resist  hostile 
interference  with  the  new  republics,  the  people  found  a 
twofold  gratification.  Their  fears  were  banished  by  the 
firm  attitude  of  the  Executive.  At  the  same  time  they  felt 
that,  as  Monroe's  friends  could  assure  him,  the  Message 
would  be  esteemed  to  have  given  to  their  national  character 
new  claims  upon  the  civilised  world.  Whether  Democrats 
or  Federalists,  all  were  sincere  republicans,  and  all  were 
proud  that  the  Republic  should  have  bearded  the  monarchs 
who  had  bidden  it  apologise  for  its  very  existence.  Europe, 
they  felt,  must  respect,  if  it  did  not  love  them.  The  spirit 
of  nationality,  therefore,  was  roused,  and  in  conjunction 
with  the  visit  of  Lafayette,  made  the  year  1824  remarkable 
for  a  general  military  mania. 

While  the  Administration  gained  fresh  lustre,  feeling 
ran  high  in  favour  of  Great  Britain.  Outside  the  Cabinet, 
no  one  dreamed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  could  give  her 
anything  but  satisfaction.  The  press  and  society  alike, 
according  to  her  representative  at  Washington,  called  for 
union  with  her  to  preserve  the  liberties  of  the  Western 
hemisphere.  The  Administration,  whatever  the  sentiments 
of  its  members,  took  some  steps  in  the  same  direction. 
The  words  in  which  the  Secretary  of  State  strove  to  impress 
Addington  with  a  sense  of  his  goodwill  have  already  been 
quoted.    Six    months    after    the    communication    of    the 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    89 

Messsage,  when  the  rage  of  the  people  against  the  Holy 
Alliance  was  becoming  less  fevered,  the  President  publicly 
remarked  that  the  policy  of  the  two  countries  was 
essentially  the  same,  and  that  his  personal  knowledge  of 
some  of  the  chief  members  of  the  English  Cabinet  gave  him 
entire  confidence  in  their  judgment  and  integrity. 

With  the  American  people,  moreover,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  lost  nothing  in  esteem  through  its  vagueness. 
Three  weeks  after  its  delivery,  indeed,  the  House  of 
Representatives  requested  the  President  to  communicate, 
if  possible,  information  relative  to  the  threatened  inter- 
ference of  European  powers  in  the  affairs  of  South  America. 
"  I  have  to  state"  he  replied,  k'  that  I  possess  no  informa- 
tion on  that  subject,  not  known  to  Congress,  which  can  be 
disclosed  without  injury  to  the  public  good."  The  House 
accepted  the  refusal,  and  proceeded  to  endorse  the 
principles  of  the  Administration,  in  so  far  as  they  related 
to  non-interference  with  Europe.  It  was  felt  that  by  a 
motion  of  Webster's,  then  before  the  House,  in  favour  of 
sending  a  commissioner  to  Greece,  "Europe  and  America 
were  injudiciously  blended  together";  and  although  the 
flame  of  universal  liberty  burnt  high,  a  general  expression 
of  sympathy  wiih  the  Greeks  was  carried  in  its  place. 
The  voice  of  the  Administration,  it  was  clear,  was  the  voice 
of  Congress  and  of  the  people. 

In  Great  Britain  also,  public  opinion  approved  the 
Message.  From  sentiment  or  from  interest,  many  were 
enthusiastic  in  the  cause  of  the  revolted  colonies,  and  none 
could  fail  to  see  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  told  in  their 
favour.  The  Opposition,  at  least,  regarded  the  South 
American  question  as  solved  ;  and  a  rise  in  the  price  of 


90  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Spanish-American  securities  showed  that  the  commercial 
world  did  not  ignore  the  policy  of  the  United  States.  Mi- 
nisters, too,  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  United 
States  take  a  course  which  they  themselves  had  suggested. 
Canning  has  even  been  regarded  as  the  author  of  a  Doctrine 
which  might  not  have  been  enunciated  without  the  impulse 
of  his  proposals.  While  insisting  that  his  communications 
to  Rush  had  constituted  a  sounding,  not  an  overture,  he 
frankly  acknowledged  that  the  President  had  materially 
helped  the  British  Government.  The  Message,  it  was 
evident,  had  come  opportunely  to  assist  Great  Britain  in 
repelling  the  invitation  urged  upon  her  from  all  quarters  of 
the  Continent  to  take  part  in  the  proposed  conference  on 
the  affairs  of  Spanish-America.  Spain,  it  was  true,  had  not 
directly  included  her  among  the  powers  to  which  she  had 
appealed,  but  Ofalia  spared  no  effort  to  induce  her  to  delay 
the  recognition  which,  he  hoped,  this  congress  would 
avert.  France,  Austria  and  Russia  argued  unceasingly 
that  their  views  were  kthe  same  as  her  own,  and  that  by 
frowning  upon  the  conference,  she  would  be  simply 
delaying  the  restoration  of  order  which  all  desired.  Can- 
ning, however,  held  firmly  to  the  views  expressed  in  his 
conference  with  Polignac,  and  the  arrival  of  the  Monroe 
Message  gave  him  the  moral  support  of  the  United  States. 
The  Congress,  he  informed  A'Court,  had  been  broken  in  all 
its  limbs  before,  and  the  speech  of  the  President  had  given 
it  the  coup  de  grace.  Though  Chateaubriand  might  laugh  at 
the  naval  strength  of  the  United  States,  his  congress  would 
have  been  an  attempt  ol  the  nations  which  had  little  power 
or  interest  in  South  America  to  settle  its  affairs  against  the 
will  of  those  which  had  much.    By  itself,  it  is  true,  the 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.     91 

Monroe  Doctrine  might  have  done  little  to  check  the  Allies. 
The  mere  declaration  by  the  United  States  of  their  attitude 
towards  any  European  power  which  should  interpose  for 
the  purpose  of  controlling  the  destiny  of  the  new  republics 
did  not  deter  the  powers  from  continuing  to  urge  Great 
Britain  to  take  part  in  a  conference  with  this  end  in  view. 
It  was  of  great  use,  however,  in  strengthening  the  hands  of 
Canning.  The  refusal  of  Great  Britain  became  conclusive, 
and  the  despatch  to  A'Court  at  the  end  of  January  put  an 
end  to  the  project. 

So  unexpected  and  so  opportune,  indeed,  was  the 
declaration,  that  the  powers  of  Europe  and  the  English 
Opposition  interred  that  it  had  been  made  in  consequence 
of  communications  from  Great  Britain.  This  must  have 
made  Cannings  failure  to  win  over  Rush  more  unpalatable 
than  before.  He  claimed  credit,  it  is  true,  for  the  actual 
share  which  he  hade  taken  in  inspiring  a  measure  on  the 
whole  advantageous  to  Great  Britain.  But  he  could  not  be 
blind  to  the  triumph  of  "  that  scoundrel  Adams  "  in  thus 
taking  the  reins  out  of  his  hands,  and  in  trumpeting  the 
praises  of  republicanism  in  the  face  of  the  British  monar- 
chy. In  refuting  diplomatically  the  suggestion  of  Chateau- 
briand that  Great  Britain  had  dictated  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
therefore,  he  insists  on  every  point  of  difference  between 
the  South  American  policy  of  the  two  nations.  The  one,  he 
says,  has  recognised  the  indepeneence  of  the  colonies,  the 
ether  has  not.  The  declaration  of  Monroe  may  be  interpre- 
ted as  condemning  the  interference  of  Spain  herself  with 
Spanish-America.  This,  says  Canning,  would  constitute 
fas  important  a  difference  between  his  view  of  the  subject 
and  ours,  as  perhaps  it  is  possible  to  conceive." 


92  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

While  thus  able  to  qualify,  though  slightly,  the 
agreement  of  Great  Britain  with  the  second  portion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  he  fell  with  the  more  vigour  upon  the 
first.  Twenty-five  years  later,  Calhoun  denounced  this 
portion  of  the  Message  as  inaccurate,  since  the  continents 
as  a  whole  had  not  assumed  and  maintained  a  free  and 
independent  condition,  and  as  also  improper,  since  the 
United  States  were  professing  to  act  in  concert  with  Great 
Britain.  British  statesmen,  it  was  clear,  could  not  share 
the  calm  conviction  of  Adams  that  their  colonies  must  fall 
naturally  into  the  lap  of  the  United  States.  On  the  2nd 
January,  Rush  was  made  to  feel  the  difference  between 
natural  law  and  common  sense.  The  Secretary  of  State 
had  formulated,  and  the  President  had  announced,  the 
principle  that  no  future  European  colonisation  could  be 
permitted  in  continents  of  whose  geographical  limits  they 
themselves  were  ignorant.  "Suppose,"  argued  the  British 
Foreign  Secretary,  "that  any  new  British  expedition  were 
to  end  in  the  discovery  of  land  proximate  to  either  part  of 
the  American  continent,  North  or  South,  would  the  United 
States  object  to  Great  Britain  planting  a  colony  there?" 
The  question,  it  may  be  presumed,  was  unanswerable. 
Canning  followed  it  by  rejecting  the  idea  of  a  triple  nego- 
tiation at  St  Petersburg  for  the  settlement  of  the  north- 
west boundary  question.  The  reason,  he  admitted,  was 
the  President's  edict  commanding  the  cessation  throughout 
"the  continents  of  America"  of  a  susceptibility  of  being 
colonised  from  Europe.  Great  Britain  could  not,  he 
maintained,  "acknowledge  the  right  of  any  power  to 
proclaim  such  a  principle,  much  less  to  bind  other 
countries   to   the   observance  of  it.      If  we  were   to   be 


THE  RECEPTION   OF  THE  MONROE   DOCTRINE    93 

repelled  from  the  shores  of  America,  it  would  not  matter 
to  us  whether  that  repulsion  were  effected  by  the  Ukase 
of  Russia  excluding  us  from  the  sea ;  or  by  the  new 
Doctrine  of  the  President  prohibiting  us  from  the  land. 
But  we  cannot  yield  obedience  to  either."  At  the  same 
time  he  was  careful  to  inform  the  French  Government  of 
his  inability  to  understand  the  President's  prohibition. 
His  instructions  to  the  British  commissioners,  five  months 
later,  were  equally  explicit.  Describing  the  declaration  of 
the  President  as  "very  extraordinary,"  he  announced  that 
"  the  principle  was  one  which  His  Majesty's  Ministers  were 
prepared  to  combat  in  the  most  unequivocal  manner, 
maintaining  that  whatever  right  of  colonising  the  unappro- 
priated portions  of  America  has  been  hitherto  enjoyed  by 
Great  Britain  in  common  with  the  other  powers  of  Europe 
may  still  be  exercised  in  perfect  freedom,  without  affording 
the  slightest  cause  of  umbrage  to  the  United  States." 

In  France,  where  the  presidential  Message  attracted 
much  attention,  both  parts  of  the  Doctrine  were  condemned 
alike.  At  a  dinner  at  Prince  Polignac's,  Rush  complained 
that  in  upholding  the  principle  of  noncolonisation  he  had 
to  face  the  whole  British  Cabinet  with  the  probable 
influence  of  Russia  superadded.  He  only  learned,  how- 
ever, that  the  weight  of  France  was  likely  to  be  thrown  into 
the  same  scale.  The  men  of  Brazil  and  Chili  heard  with 
unprecedented  rapidity  that  the  extreme  Royalists  could 
not  contain  their  indignation,  and  that  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador in  Paris,  who  had  boasted  that  in  any  event  the  Czar 
could  keep  North  America  neutral,  was  thunderstruck  by 
the  declaration  of  Monroe.  Ministers  and  people  saw 
Canning  behind  the   scenes.      The    British   Ambassador 


94  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

could  not  at  first  succeed,  even  by  pressing  chronolo 
into    the    service,  in  convincing  Chateaubriand    that  the 
Doctrines  were  not  set  forth  in  virtue  of  an  understanding 
with  Great  Britain.      "  A  declaration  of   the  principles,^ 
urged  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  "  upon  which  the 
President  affects  to  pronounce  that  the  New  World  shall  hi 
future  be  governed,  made  at  a  time  when   the  American) 
Government  is  wholly  unable  to  enforce  such  pretensions,, 
ought  to  be  resisted  by  all  the  powers  possessing  eitheM 
territory  or  commercial  interests  in  that  hemisphere.      1 
week  later,  the  British  Ambassador  forced  him  to  disclainf  I 
his   suspicions  by  reading   the  explanatory   despatch   of 
Canning.     The  suggestion  that  the  prohibition   of  futurej 
colonisation  on  the  continents  of  America  had  been  brought' 
forward  by  the    President    to   meet  "the    unwarrantable! 
pretensions  "  of  the  Russian  Ukase,  he  accepted  as  satisfatf 
tory.    The  sole  official  inference  which  France  professed  tqi 
draw  from  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  therefore,  was  that  it  would 
be  improper  to  invite  the  United  States  to  the  conferenc 
on  South  America. 

The  other  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance  came  to  t 
same  conclusion.  Metternich,  admitting  that  the  Mess 
was  in  exact  conformity  with  the  republican  principl 
avowed  and  constantly  acted  upon  by  the  Government 
the  United  States,  prophesied  once  more  the  calamiti 
which  the  New  World  would  bring  upon  the  Old.  The  Cz 
was  at  this  time  ill,  and  the  labours  of  his  ministers  we 
divided  between  urging  Great  Britain  to  attend  the  propos 
conference  at  Paris,  and  upholding  the  Russian  claims 
the  north-west  territory  of  America.  In  Prussia,  t 
Message  gave  great  offence ;  but  the  attitude  of  the  co 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  95 

on  the  Spanish-American  question  was  described  by  the 
British  Ambassador  as  passive.  The  newlyestablished 
commercial  relations  with  Spanish-America  were  cherished, 
and  the  only  retaliation  deemed  expedient  was  a  slight  delay 
in  filling  the  place  vacated  by  the  death  of  the  Prussian 
Minister  at  Washington 

The  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the 
remaining  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  then,  received  the 
Message  with  keen  interest.  Even  the  smaller  powers  of 
Europe  showed  themselves  alive  to  its  importance.  The 
official  Gazette  of  Lisbon  described  the  cordial  relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  and  the 
satisfaction  with  which  the  former  regarded  the  opposition 
to  the  pretensions  of  Russia.  The  king  of  the  Netherlands 
pointed  out  to  the  British  Ambassador  the  danger  lest  a 
trans-Atlantic  confederation  should  be  formed  under  the 
influence  and  protection  of  the  northern  republic.  Spain 
alone,  where  the  king  listened  only  to  what  pleased  him, 
while  "  the  infatuated  adherence  of  His  Catholic  Majesty's 
advisers  to  the  errors  of  all  their  predecessors  without 
exception  "  alienated  the  most  Bourbon  of  foreign  stat- 
esmen, pursued  her  course  without  the  slightest  sign  of 
attention. 

The  immediate  political  influence  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  on  America  south  of  the  United  States,  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  estimate.  The  people,  if  they  noticed  the 
presidential  Message  at  all,  would  read,  weeks  or  months 
after  its  delivery,  a  transcript  of  some  European  journal 
which  discussed  it,  or  would  hear  a  rumour  that  the  head 
of  a  nation  which  they  could  not  appreciate  had  pronounced 
in  their  favour  against  an  enemy  whose  power  they  could 


96  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

not  measure.  The  declaration,  it  is  safe  to  say,  aroused 
among  the  mass  of  their  "  southern  brethren  "  no  wave  of 
affection  for  the  people  of  the  United  States.  The  rulers 
of  Spanish-America,  however,  must  have  been  better  in- 
formed both  as  to  the  words  of  the  President  and  their 
value.  A  month  after  the  opening  of  Congress,  the  Colum- 
bian diplomatists  at  Washington  apperead  to  the  British 
Minister  "  to  entertain  much  apprehension  of  the  threatened 
interference  of  the  European  powers  in  the  affairs  of  their 
country,"  and  to  "  evidently  look  to  Great  Britain  as  the 
main  anchor  on  which  they  rest  their  hopes  for  the  preven- 
tion of  that  interference."  Measured  by  Spanish  standards 
of  expression,  indeed,  the  words  of  the  President  seem  but 
lukewarm,  and  though  the  officials  of  South  America  made 
the  most  of  them,  they  were  not  the  equivalent  of  Bolivar's 
foreign  legion.  In  April  1824,  the  Vice-president  of  Colum- 
bia opened  the  Assembly  by  describing  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  "an  act  eminently  just  and  worthy  of  the  classic 
land  of  liberty— a  policy  consolatory  to  human  nature." 
He  informed  the  people,  however,  that  the  Executive  was 
sedulously  occupied  in  reducing  the  question  to  decisive 
and  conclusive  points. 

The  President  of  Buenos  Ayres,  likewise,  placed  in  the 
forefront  of  his  message  a  statement  of  relations  with  the 
United  States.  Significantly  enough,  he  ignored  the  second 
portion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  altogether.  The  Minister 
to  Washington,  he  said,  had  been  instructed  to  inform  the 
Government  of  the  approbation  with  which  Buenos  Ayres 
regarded  "  the  two  great  principles  of  the  abolition  of 
privateering  and  of  the  cessation  of  European  colonisation 
in  the  territory  of  America."    The  representative  of  Brazil, 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    97 

even  in  the  first  flush  of  gratitude  for  recognition,  sugges- 
ted that  action  was  expedient. 

Mexico  alone  showed  a  disposition  to  over-estimate 
the  immediate  political  effect  of  the  Doctrine.  The 
language  in  which  the  President  congratulates  his  fellow- 
citizens  on  their  recognition  by  the  United  States,  is  not, 
indeed,  as  glowing  as  that  in  which  he  describes  how 
Britain  interposed  her  trident  to  save  them  from  the  Holy 
Alliance.  Benefits,  however,  though  secondary  ones,  were 
anticipated  from  the  United  States,  and  the  disappointment 
was  acute  enough  to  provoke  the  charge  of  ill-faith.  By 
the  Message  of  May  1826,  the  Mexican  Congress  was  infor- 
med that  "the  memorable  promise  of  President  Monroe,  is 
not  sustained  by  the  present  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  the  North,  and  the  compact  made  on  this  subject 
has  been  broken." 

In  general,  therefore,  if  it  be  possible  to  generalise 
from  such  materials,  it  would  seem  that  the  Governments 
of  South  America  were  grateful  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as 
an  expression  of  sympathy  wilh  their  cause.  They  could 
not,  however,  perceive  that  it  removed  their  difficulties. 
They  did  not  view  it  as  profoundly  affecting  either  their 
international  status  or  their  prospects.  What  they  desired 
was  specific  agreement  to  promote  the  objects  which  the 
Doctrine  had  in  view.  For  this  end,  among  others,  they 
had  for  some  time  been  striving  to  bring  about  a  general 
Congress  at  Panama.  The  Monroe  Message  was  followed 
by  an  invitation  to  the  United  States  to  attend  it. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

The  Relation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to 
International  Law. 

Thus  far  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  treated  from  a 
historical  or  political  point  of  view.  The  general  aspect 
of  affairs  which  preceded  it  has  been  sketched,  and  more 
minute  attention  devoted  to  the  negotiations  and  discus- 
sions from  which  it  directly  emerged.  An  attempt  has 
been  made  to  determine  its  authorship,  and  to  indicate  its 
immediate  political  effects  upon  both  America  and  Europe. 
The  Doctrine  has  commonly  been  credited,  however,  with 
an  authority  greater  than  that  which  its  history  or  reputed 
parentage  could  bestow.  In  defiance  of  the  opinion  of 
American  publicists,  many  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  have  regarded  it  as  a  part  of  International  Law— 
the  body  of  rules  prevailing  between  States.  To  violate 
its  principles,  therefore,  has  been  to  attack  not  only  inte- 
rests, but  also  rights.  Hence  it  has  been  involved  in  fresh 
confusion.  Its  interpretation— its  very  nature— have  never 
been  placed  beyond  dispute.  A  keen  English  observer  of 
trans-Atlantic  institutions  has  termed  it  a  fixed  and  per- 


RELATION  TO  INTERNATIONAL  LAW.  99 

manent  state  of  American  opinion.  The  grandson  and 
literary  executor  of  Monroe  has  explained  it  as  meaning 
that  the  People  were  the  originators  and  supporters  of  all 
governments,  and  the  sovereigns  in  the  exercise  of  the 
powers  of  government.  To  German  thinkers,  it  has  seemed 
a  law  laid  down  by  America  for  Europe,  and  by  the  United 
States  for  their  neighbours.  At  every  stage  of  its  history, 
in  fact,  new  translations  have  been  added.  The  claim  that 
an  act  'violates  the  Monroe  Doctrine,'  therefore,  cannot 
readily  be  refuted;  and  the  alleged  violation  is  regarded  as 
synonymous  with  a  breach  of  International  Law.  Both 
points  are  open  to  dispute,  and  the  confusion  may  extend 
both  to  International  Law  and  international  relations. 
Such  a  stream  of  error  can  only  be  checked  at  its  source. 
If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  become  by  enunciation 
a  part  of  the  body  of  rules  prevailing  between  the  States, 
it  is  clear  that  repetition  by  the  power  which  enunciated 
it  cannot  force  it  into  the  international  code.  To  estimate 
its  legal  value,  as  well  as  to  understand  its  specific 
meaning,  it  must  be  examined  line  by  line. 

The  declaration  of  Monroe  with  regard  to  colonisation 
has  been  defined  as  a  foreclosure  of  the  whole  continent 
against  all  future  European  dominion,  however  derived. 
Standing  alone,  it  is  inexplicable.  An  eminent  commen- 
tator on  the  writings  of  the  chief  publicist  of  the  United 
States  has  maintained  that  the  question  was  one  of  political' 
geography.  Applying  to  the  condition  of  the  continents  a 
recognised  principle  of  public  law,  Monroe,  he  explains, 
laid  down  that  in  fact  the  whole  of  them  was  within  the 
the  territory  of  some  responsible  state.  Hence  they  were 
not  ferae  naturae  and  open   to   appropriation.     A   recent 

7-2 


100  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

American  writer,  on  the  other  hand,  in  discussing  the 
corresponding  instructions  to  Rush,  contends  that  "if  Mi- 
Adams  intended  to. .  .announce  that  territory  already 
occupied  by  civilised  powers  was  not  subject  to  future 
colonisation,  he  merely  stated  a  truism.  But  in  its  appli- 
cation to  the  American  continents  at  that  time,  the 
announcement  was  far  from  being  a  truism."  The  truth 
was  that  the  United  States  were  one  among  four  chief 
powers  dominant  on  the  continent  of  North  America,  while 
south  of  Mexico  they  had  no  possessions  whatever.  The 
northern  continent ,  at  least,  was  not  fully  explored.  Up 
to  the  time  of  this  declaration,  any  portion  of  it  to  the  north- 
ward, exclusive  of  the  districts  claimed  by  Russia,  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  had  been  alegitimate  subject 
for  colonisation  by  any  civilised  state.  Could  any  single 
power,  then,  claim  the  sanction  of  international  law  for 
the  principle  that  this  part  of  the  American  continent  was 
no  longer  subject  to  the  colonisation  of  others?  The 
answer  is  a  simple  statement  of  the  law  of  occupation  as 
it  existed  in  1823.  Every  civilised  state,  then  as  now,  had 
the  right  of  extending  its  dominions  by  fresh  appropriations 
of  land,  so  long  as  it  refrained  from  encroaching  on  the 
dominions  of  another.  The  rest,  however,  since  their  own 
opportunities  for  extension  were  diminished,  might  demand 
that  the  appropriation  should  be  real.  No  Bull  or  Ukase 
could  of  itself  give  valid  title.  The  claim  must  have  been 
preceded  by  the  discovery  of  the  lands  in  question— disco- 
very implying  the  definite  visit  of  a  commissioned  person 
— and  by  some  overt  act  of  annexation  to  N  the  state. 
Though  the  ultimate  testof  sovereignty  would  be  government, 
such  official  discovery  and  annexation  would  suffice,  for 


RELATION   TO    INTERNATIONAL  LAW.  101 

the  time  being,  to  secure  the  territory  against  appropriation 
by  friendly  powers.  The  declaration  of  Monroe,  however, 
comprised  two  continents.  It  applied,  therefore,  in  part 
to  territory  discovered  and  claimed  by  Great  Britain  and 
Russia;  in  part,  to  territory  presumed  to  be  in  the  posses- 
sion of  insurgents  whom  the  United  States  alone  had  recog- 
nised as  independent;  and  in  part,  to  any  additional 
territory  which  the  progress  of  exploration  might  reveal. 
In  the  view  of  public  law,  then,  it  was  worthless.  The 
United  States  could  not  by  a  declaration  affect  the  interna- 
tional status  of  lands  claimed,  ruled,  or  discovered  by  other 
powers.  They  might  proclaim  in  advance  the  policy  which 
they  would  adopt  when  such  questions  should  arise,  but  no 
unilateral  act  could  change  the  Law  of  Nations. 

The  explanations  furnished  by  Adams  himself  invested 
the  Doctrine  with  no  juridical  value.  His  instructions  to 
Rush  were  embodied  in  the  protocol  of  the  20th  conference 
between  the  British  and  American  commissioners  of  1824. 
The  principle  that  no  part  of  the  American  continent  is 
henceforward  to  be  open  to  colonisation  from  Europe  was 
there  defended  on  the  grounds  "  that  the  independence  of 
the  late  Spanish  provinces  precluded  any  new  settlement 
within  the  limits  of  their  respective  jurisdictions;  that  the 
United  States  claimed  the  exclusive  right  of  sovereignty  of 
all  the  territory  within  the  parallels  of  latitude  which  include 
as  well  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  as  the  heads  of  that 
river  and  of  all  its  tributary  streams;  and  that  with  respect 
to  the  whole  of  the  remainder  of  that  continent  not  natur- 
ally occupied,  the  powers  of  Europe  were  debarred  from 
making  new  settlements  by  the  claim  of  the  United  States 
as  derived  under  their  title  from  Spain." 


102  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

An  adequate  explanation  of  the  principle  thus  formula- 
ted, and  of  the  manner  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  were  involved  in  it,  can  only  be  found  in 
the  political  views  of  Adams.  Holding  as  he  did  that  the 
Union  must  soon  include  all  North  America,  that  the 
Colonial  System  was  doomed,  and  that  the  continent  was 
accessible  to  Europeans  and  to  the  civilised  nations  oc- 
cupying it  only  on  the  footing  of  national  independence,  he 
might  if  he  thought  fit  direct  his  diplomatic  subordinates  to 
assume  that  such  views  were  incontestable.  In  so  doing, 
however,  he  quoted  postulates  of  his  own  ;  not  portions  of 
the  body  of  rules  prevailing  between  states.  The  Law  of 
Nations  could  be  changed  only  by  the  renunciation,  made 
tacitly  or  expressly  by  every  civilised  power  of  its  right  to 
colonise  any  unoccupied  part  of  the  western  hemisphere. 
In  the  words  of  on  American  jurist  of  repute,  "the 
principle, ...if  intended  to  prevent  Russia  from  stretching 
her  borders  on  the  Pacific  further  to  the  south,  went  far 
beyond  any  limit  of  interference  that  had  hitherto  been  set 
up.  What  right  had  the  United  States  to  control  Russia  in 
gaining  territory  on  the  Pacific,  or  planting  colonies  there, 
when  they  themselves  had  neither  territory  nor  colony  to 
be  endangered  within  thousands  of  miles  ?  "  The  protest  of 
the  powers  that  believed  their  interests  to  be  most  affected 
showed  that  the  declaration  against  European  colonisation 
was  in  no  way  International  Law. 

The  second  portion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 
variously  treated  by  publicists.  Some  have  cited  it  as  an 
example  of  intervention  ;  others,  as  an  illustration  of  the 
principle  of  non-intervention.  Wheaton,  Bluntschli, 
Andres  Bello,  Travers  Twiss,  and  Heffter  may  be  instanced 


RELATION   TO    INTERNATIONAL   LAW.  103 

as  representing  a  cosmopolitan  body  of  specialists  who, 
by  ignoring  the  doctrine  in  their  general  treatises,  tacitly 
deny  its  claim  to  be  numbered  among  the  laws  of  nations. 
Such  a  claim,  indeed,  must  be  founded  on  the  belief  that 
Monroe,  like  Jefferson  in  discussing  the  duties  of  neutrals 
in  1793,  laid  down  principles  based  on  reason  and  confirmed 
by  practice.  A  declaration  of  opinion  or  of  policy,  however 
valuable  to  the  family  of  nations,  could  not,  save  by  their 
own  adoption,  affect  their  code.  The  words  of  the  Message 
themselves,  none  the  less,  bear  out  the  story  of  its 
construction  as  a  formulation  of  political  principle.  The 
attitude  assumed  by  the  United  States  as  benevolent 
spectators  of  the  internal  relations  of  Europe  is  in  the 
opening  sentences  founded  on  policy  and  not  on  law. 
Their  position  in  defending  their  own  rights,  and  in  taking 
a  more  active  part  in  the  affairs  of  their  own  hemisphere, 
is  next  defined  as  the  converse  of  the  first.  It  is  nowhere 
suggested  that  their  duty  compels  them  to  be  passive  in 
Europe  and  active  in  America.  Similarly  the  succeeding 
paragraph  does  not  allege  it  as  a  breach  of  law  that  "  the 
political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different 
in  this  respect  from  that  of  America."  It  is  hinted,  how- 
ever, that  the  difference  which  exists  in  their  respective 
governments  would  impel  the  states  of  the  Old  World  to 
interfere  in  the  New.  They  are  informed,  therefore,  that 
the  whole  nation  is  devoted  to  its  own  form  of  government. 
"  We  should,"  says  the  President,  "  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety."  In 
this  definition  of  the  eventual  opinions  of  the  United  States, 
there  is  no  suggestion  of  a  law.    The  words,  at  first  sight 


104  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

inconclusive,  admit  of  the  explanation  that  any  action 
against  the  new  republics,  if  based  on  the  principle  of 
Legitimacy,  would  by  implication  condemn  the  United 
States,  and  cause  them  to  fear  that  they  themselves  would 
be  the  next  to  suffer.  Further  commentary  is  supplied  by 
what  follows.  With  the  existing  American  -jolonies  of 
Europe,  the  United  States  will  not  interfere.  "But  with 
the  Governments  who  have  declared  their  independence 
and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have, 
on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles,  acknow- 
ledged, we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the 
purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other 
manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other 
light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition 
towards  the  United  States."  This  is  the  kernel  of  the  Doc- 
trine. Its  very  obscurity  suggests  that  it  is  not  part  of 
1  the  rough  jurisprudence  of  nations.'  Its  spirit,  indeed, 
seems  rather  to  transcend  the  bounds  of  law.  Recognition 
of  independence,  as  all  admit,  should  be  the  mere 
acknowledgment  of  an  indisputable  fact.  The  United  States, 
however,  seem  to  claim  that  by  recognising  Spanish 
America  they  have  identified  its  interests  with  their  own. 
"  The  essence  of  intervention,"  it  is  true  "is  illegality";  and 
the  United  States,  like  England  in  1826,  might  profitably 
declare  their  intention  of  opposing  it  in  certain  specified 
cases.  Such  a  declaration  at  this,  however,  though  perhaps 
justifiable  by  legal  principles,  belongs  to  policy,  and  not 
to  law.  It  could  not  be  held  to  bind  the  United  States  to 
interfere  in  the  cases  which  they  had  indicated,  nor  could 
it  justify  them  in  interfering  if  any  of  those  cases  should  be 
proved   inconsistent   with    the   Law  of  Nations.     From  a 


RELATION    TO    INTERNATIONAL    LAW.  105 

legal  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  has  as  little  value  as  the 
paragraph  which  follows,  and  which  declares  that  the 
United  States  will  preserve  their  neutrality  in  the  war 
between  the  new  governments  and  Spain,  unless  in  the 
interests  of  their  security  it  becomes  indispensable  for 
them  to  abandon  it. 

The  remainder  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  seems  to  repeat 
in  other  words  the  declarations  which  have  gone  before. 
The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  principles  on  which 
the  Allies  have  interposed  in  Spain  is  more  explicitly  asser- 
ted, and  their  policy  of  non-interference  with  Europe  more 
tersely  expressed.  "But  in  regard  to  these  continents,"  it 
is  reiterated,  "circumstances  are  eminently  and  conspi- 
cuously different.  It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers 
should  extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of 
either  continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and  hap- 
piness; nor  can  anyone  believe  that  our  southern  brethren, 
if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord. 
It  is  equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold 
such  interposition,  in  any  form,  with  indifference."  The 
United  States,  in  short,  declare  that  they  will  take  cogni- 
sance of  action  which  endangers  their  peace  and  happiness. 
In  so  doing,  they  will  be  exercising  a  right  which  no  power 
can  contest.  They  do  not,  however,  bind  themselves,  or 
declare  themselves  legally  bound,  to  follow  any  given 
course  as  the  result  of  such  cognisance.  Nor  do  they 
define  the  '  political  system '  of  the  Allies.  If  the  latter 
endeavoured  to  conquer  the  new  Republics,  for  Spain  or 
for  themselves,  without  just  cause  of  war,  the  United 
States  would  need  no  Monroe  Doctrine  to  justify  them  in 
stepping  in.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  their  belief  as  to  the 


106  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

desires  of  their  southern  brethren  proved  erroneous,  and 
the  extension  of  the  political  system  we,re  effected  by 
diplomatic  means,  or  in  consequence  of  appeals  to  reason, 
the  United  States  could  not  derive  from  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine any  right  to  interfere  by  force.  They  might  meet 
diplomacy  by  diplomacy,  and  reason  by  reason,  but  the 
allegation  that  their  political  peace  or  sentimental  happin- 
ess was  disturbed  by  the  sight  of  a  monarch  on  the  throne 
of  Mexico,  or  by  the  accession  of  Columbia  to  the  Holy 
Alliance,  could  not  warrant  them  in  a  resort  to  arms. 
Such  action,  indeed,  would  be  an  intervention  against  ideas, 
and  parallel  to  the  invasion  of  Naples  by  Austria,  or  of 
Spain  by  France.  In  insisting  upon  the  right  of  every 
people  to  choose  its  own  form  of  government  without 
external  interference,  also,  the  declaration  is  affirming, 
but  not  creating,  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  kernel  of  this 
part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  then,  in  its  second  form  as 
in  its  first,  is  a  vague  declaration  of  policy,  and  in  no  way 
a  formulation  of  rules  prevailing  between  states.  The 
concluding  paragraph,  predicting  the  success  of  the  colo- 
nies, and  once  more  insisting  on  neutrality  as  "still  the 
true  policy  of  the  United  States,"  expresses  the  hope,  and 
not  the  assurance  based  on  law,  that  "  other  powers  will 
pursue  the  same  course  " 

No  line  or  paragraph  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  therefore, 
represents  an  addition  to  the  body  of  rules  prevailing  bet- 
ween states.  From  the  first  word  to  the  last,  it  is  a  decla- 
ration of  the  policy  of  a  single  power.  To  derive  from  the 
whole  principles  which  are  essentially  absent  from  all  the 
parts,  would  be  contrary  to  reason.  The  spirit  which 
breathes  through  the  Message,  none  the  less,  seems  to 


RELATION    TO    INTERNATIONAL   LAW.  107 

threaten  a  revolution  in  the  Law  of  Nations.  North  Ame- 
ricans at  this  time  loved  to  contrast  the  liberty  which  was 
the  fundamental  principle  of  the  New  World,  with  the 
allegiance  which  fettered  the  Old.  and  to  insist  upon  the 
severance  of  the  two.  Canning  appreciated  their  desires? 
and  expressed  his  longing  to  "prevent  the  drawing  of  the 
line  of  demarcation  which  I  most  dread—  America  versus 
Europe."  In  the  antithesis  between  "these  continents"  and 
Europe,  five  times  insisted  on,  lurks  the  germ  of  a  principle 
that  instead  of  one  family  of  nations  there  should  be  two. 
It  recalls  the  idea  of  Jefferson  of  "a  meridian  of  partition 
through  the  ocean  which  separates  the  two  hemispheres, 
on  the  hither  side  of  which  no  European  gun  shall  ever  be 
heard,  nor  an  American  on  the  other,"  Carried  to  its 
logical  conclusion,  however  the  conception  of  a  separate 
law  for  America  would  split  the  planet  into  halves.  The 
assertion  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of  a  right  to 
secede  from  the  family  of  nations  must  have  been  met 
as  they  themselves  met  a  similar  claim  at  home.  The 
obligations  of  International  Law,  it  would  have  been  shown, 
are  imposed  upon  a  member  of  that  family  at  its  birth, 
and  are  not  contracted  into  at  will.  Common  interests 
must  give  rise  to  international  disputes,  and  disputes 
postulate  at  least  the  possibility  of  war.  To  deny  an 
appeal  to  force  in  the  last  resort,  therefore,  is  to  shut  the 
door  to  friendly  intercourse.  By  the  admission  that  Spain 
has  the  right  to  continue  her  war,  by  the  fervid  expression 
of  sympathy  with  the  Greeks,  and  by  the  declaration  that  no 
interference  with  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies 
of  any  European  power  is  contemplated,  the  idea  of  the 
severance  of  the  hemispheres  is,   however,  for  the  time 


108  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

being  disclaimed.  It  has  been  insisted  upon  in  this  place 
because  its  corollary  that  the  United  States  are  in  some 
way  free  to  lay  down  the  law  of  nations  for  America  is 
perhaps  the  second  great  source  of  error  with  regard  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  the  Doctrine  itself  is  part  of 
International  Law,  is  the  first. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  as  interpreted  by  its 
Author. 

A  complete  chapter  in  the  biography  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  extends  from  its  enunciation  to  the  close  of  the 
Presidency  of  Adarns  in  1829.  During  these  five  years,  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  was  shaped  by  the  sponsors  of 
the  Message  of  1823.  Their  words  and  conduct,  therefore, 
may  be  expected  to  explain  and  illustrate  the  principles  of 
policy  which  it  had  declared. 

The  prohibition  of  future  European  colonisation  led  at 
once  to  a  deadlock  with  England.  The  commissioners  of 
1824  to  whom  Rush  tendered  his  explanation,  together 
with  the  proposal  to  prolong  for  another  decade  the 
temporising  convention  of  1818,  scouted  explanation  and 
proposal  alike.  Neither  side  could  give  way,  and  for 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  the  northwestern  boundary 
question  remained  unsettled.  At  the  close  of  the  year,  the 
House  of  Representatives  passed  a  bill  for  carrying  into 
effect  the  President's  recommendation  of  a  settlement  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Columbia.     Addington,  fettered  by  the 


110  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

instructions  to  Stratford  Canning,  could  only  "use  every 
unostensible  effort  "  to  procure  its  rejection  by  the  Senate. 
In  March  it  was  thrown  out  by  a  substantial  majority,  its 
chief  opponent  urging  that  it  contravened  the  claims  of 
Great  Britain. 

A  convention  with  Russia  had  for  the  time  being- 
constituted  latitude  54*40  the  dividing  line.  No  European 
colonisation  being  attempted,  there  was  no  need  for  the 
United  States  to  put  their  declared  principles  of  policy  into 
practice.  Public  attention,  therefore,  centred  on  that  part 
of  the  Doctrine  which  condemned  extension  to  the  New 
World  of  the  political  system  of  the  Old.  In  January  Clay 
proposed  that  Congress  should  declare  by  resolution 
"that  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  not  see, 
without  serious  inquietude,  any  forcible  interposition  by 
the  allied  powers  of  Europe  "  in  the  quarrel  between  Spain 
and  the  new  republics.  Four  months  later,  however,  he 
withdrew  his  motion,  on  the  ground  that  recent  evidence 
showed  that  any  intention  of  such  interference  had  been 
relinquished.  Resolutions  of  the  Legislatures  of  several 
states  approving  the  action  of  the  President  were  simply 
laid  on  the  table. 

Meanwhile  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  Brazil 
had  thrown  fresh  light  on  the  meaning  of  the  Message.  In 
the  Cabinet  Wirt  had  questioned  the  expediency  of  receiving 
a  diplomatic  representative  from  a  Government  which, 
though  American  and  revolutionary,  was  not  republican. 
Calhoun,  however,  with  the  support  of  Adams,  warmly 
opposed  any  such  intervention  in  the  internal  government 
of  a  foreign  nation,  and  his  interpretation  of  the  principles 
of  the  United  States  prevailed.    Delayed  only  for  further 


AS  INTERPRETED    BY    ITS   AUTHOR.  Ill 

information  as  to  the  fitness  of  Brazil  to  be  acknowledged 
as  independent,  on  May  26th,  1824,  the  recognition  was 
consummated.  The  Brazilian  charge  d'affaires,  however, 
made  his  official  reception  the  occasion  for  suggesting  the 
expediency  of  translating  principle  into  action.  With 
expressions  of  gratitude  on  his  lips,  he  glanced  at  "  the 
concert  of  American  powers  to  sustain  the  general  system 
of  American  independence.  To  this,v  says  Adams,  "  the 
President  did  not  particularly  allude  in  his  answer." 

Early  in  July  the  Diary,  reduced  to  mere  jottings  in  the 
ferment  of  the  struggle  for  the  Presidency,  outlines  a  more 
specific  case  of  appeal  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The 
diplomatic  representative  of  Columbia,  it  appears,  had 
come  to  Adams  with  the  news  that  Chasserioux,  a  former 
Columbian  captain  who  had  entered  the  service  of  France, 
was  going  to  Bogota ;  that  France  had  offered  to  recognise 
Columbia  if  she  would  establish  monarchy,  even  that  o 
the  house  of  Bolivar ;  and  that  the  offer  had  proved 
unacceptable.  What  action,  he  asked,  were  the  United 
States  prepared  to  take?  The  Secretary  of  State  had,  as 
usual,  requested  a  statement  in  writing:  and  the  reply  was 
determined  by  a  Cabinet  consisting  of  himself,  the 
President  and  Calhoun.  The  notes  of  the  decision  are  a 
commentary  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Columbian 
Republic,  it  was  resolved,  must  maintain  its  own  in- 
dependence, but  the  United  States  hoped  that  France  and 
the  Holy  Allies  would  not  resort  to  force  against  it/ 
Should  they  be  disappointed,  their  resistance  must  be 
determined  by  Congress.  "  The  movements  of  the 
Executive  will  be  as  heretofore  expressed." 

At  the  same  moment  the  veil  of  secrecy  which  had 


112  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

concealed  the  negotiation  between  Canning  and  Rush  had 
in  part  been  lifted.  A  confidential  Message  sent  by  the 
President  to  the  Senate  had  been  published,  and  the  world 
could  read  that  "the  whole  system  of  South  American 
concerns,  connected  with  a  general  recognition  of  South 
American  independence,  may  again,  from  hour  to  hour, 
become,  as  it  has  already  been,  an  object  of  concerted 
operation  of  the  highest  interest  to  both  nations  and  to  the 
peace  of  the  world." 

At  the  end  of  the  year  Monroe  repeated  and  explained 
the  principles  of  the  Doctrine  which  wears  his  name. 
Spain  as  a  power,  he  stated,  was  barely  perceptible  in  her 
wars  with  the  nations  of  the  South.  The  United  States,  in 
spite  of  the  deep  interest  which  they  took  "  in  their  inde- 
pendence. .  .and  in  their  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights  incident 
thereto,  especially  in  the  very  important  one  of  instituting 
their  own  governments,"  would  not  violate  these  rights  by 
any  interference.  Of  the  vibrations  of  the  European  balance 
of  power,  also,  they  remained  benevolent  spectators. 
"  But  in  regard  to  our  neighbours,"  he  maintained,  "  the 
situation  is  different.  It  is  impossible  for  the  European 
Governments  to  interfere  in  their  concerns,  especially  in 
those  alluded  to,  which  are  vital,  without  affecting  us  ; 
indeed,  the  motive  which  might  induce  such  interference 

in  the  present  state  of  the  war  between  the  parties,  if  a 

t 
war  it  may  be  called,  is  equally  applicable  to  us."  «  In  these 

principles,  he  is  glad  to  note,  some  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  have  appeared  to  acquiesce.  The  Message  takes 
its  wonted  cognisance  of  European  affairs,  and  in  no  way 
indicates  an  advance  on  that  of  last  year  towards  the  seve- 
rance of  the  two  hemispheres. 


AS   INTERPRETED    BY    ITS   AUTHOR.  113 

Two  months  later  the  long  internal  struggle  came  to 
an  end.  To  the  disgust  of  Jackson  and  his  party,  Clay 
conferred  the  Presidency  upon  Adams,  and  himself 
received  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State.  Deeming  him  more 
anxious  than  his  predecessor  with  respect  to  the  fate  of 
the  new  republics,  Addington  took  an  early  opportunity  of 
ascertaining  his  views.  These  were  what  might  have  been 
looked  for  from  the  sanguine  champion  of  South  American 
independence.  Where  Adams  had  been  passive  and 
cautious,  Clay  "  owned  that  the  object  nearest  his  heart 
was  the  definitive  pacification  and  settlement  of  the 
American  states."  x\bove  all,  he  desired  the  arrangement 
of  a  general  association  for  resisting  foreign  aggression. 
With  Addington's  assent,  moreover,  he  invited  Great 
Britain  to  join  the  United  States  in  pressing  each  of  the 
remaining  Great  Powers  to  admit  the  principle  of  recogni- 
tion. All  might  then,  he  hoped,  unite  in  urging  Spain  to 
do  the  same.  He  had  already  sent  instructions  to  the 
ambassadors  at  Paris  and  St  Petersburg  to  work  for  such 
an  end.  The  Ministers  accredited  to  the  American  republics 
were  "to  neglect  no  opportunity  of  inculcating  on  the 
minds  of  the  rulers  of  those  states  the  necessity  of  infusing 
temper  and  moderation  into  their  proceedings  and  feelings 
with  regard  to  Spain,"  and  to  incline  them  to  sacrifice 
national  pride  for  the  sake  of  peace  with  Europe.  The  new 
Secretary  of  State,  it  was  clear,  did  not  aim  at  severing 
America  from  Europe,  or  at  subjugating  the  South  to  the 
North.  Declaring  himself  quite  in  love  with  Canning,  he 
hoped  to  join  him  in  guaranteeing  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  and  would  even  look  with  equanimity  on  its  junction 
with  the  Columbian  or  Mexican  Federation. 

».  8 


114  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  how  ill  such  views  as 
these  accorded  with  the  deductions  of  Adams.  Clay  was 
always  the  apostle  of  compromise,  and  Adams  found 
compromise  unintelligible.  Both  agreed,  however,  in 
endorsing  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  same  month  of 
May,  1825,  Clay  instructed  Poinsett  that  the  United  States 
could  not  allow  the  enterprise  and  commerce  of  all 
Americans  to  be  arbitrarily  limited  and  circumscribed  by 
fresh  colonisation  on  the  part  of  distant  foreign  powers. 
u  Europe,"  he  maintained,  "  would  be  indignant  at  an 
attempt  to  plant  a  colony  on  any  part  of  her  shores ;  and 
her  justice  must  perceive,  in  the  rule  contended  for,  only 
perfect  reciprocity." 

In  November  circumstances  arose  which  kept  the  whole 
of  the  Doctrine  for  six  months  in  the  forefront  of  politics. 
At  the  instigation  of  Columbia  a  general  congress  of 
Spanish-American  States  had  for  years  been  debated  and 
desired.  A  meeting  at  Panama  had  at  last  been  arranged 
for  the  following  spring,  and  the  presence  of  deputies  from 
the  United  States  was  requested.  Early  in  November, 
Columbia,  Mexico  and  Central  America  sent  invitations  to 
the  Department  of  State,  mentioning  among  the  subjects  of 
discussion  k'  the  manner  in  which  all  colonisation  of 
European  powers  on  the  American  continent  shall  be 
resisted,  and  their  interference  in  the  present  contest 
between  Spain  and  her  former  colonies  prevented."  Even 
the  formation  of  a  continental  system  for  the  New  World 
was  hinted,  and  a  general  desire  shown  to  join  with  the 
United  States  in  putting  the  Mohroe  Doctrine  into  practice. 
Clay  replied  that  his  government  could  not  share  in  or 
discuss  the  war  with  Spain,  and  suggested  that  the  topics 


AS   INTERPRETED    BY  ITS   AUTHOR.  115 

of  the  conferences  should  be  defined.    Though  the  answers 
were  not  considered  sufficiently  precise,  Adams  declared 
in  his  opening  Message  to  Congress   that  the  invitation  to 
send  Ministers  to  Panama  had  been  accepted.     In  the  terms 
of  commercial  treaties  with  South  America  he  had  striven 
for  "the  effectual  emancipation  of  the  American  hemi- 
sphere   from   the  thraldom  of  colonising  monopolies   and 
exclusions,"  and  at  the  end  of  December  he  explained  his 
wishes   in  a   confidential   Message  lo    the  Senate.      The 
Congress   at   Panama,  he    suggested,    might    discuss    an 
agreement  that  each  of  the  powers  represented  there  would 
"  guard,  by  its  own  means,   against  the  establishment  of 
any  future    European   colony    within    its   borders."      The 
advice  and  documents  which  he  tendered  were  referred  to 
the  Committee  of  the  Senate  on  Foreign  Relations.     Its 
report,  issued  after  three  weeks'  deliberation,  condemned 
the  mission,  and  at  the  same  time  severely  handled  the 
Monroe    Doctrine.      It   was    inexpedient,    the    Committee 
argued,  for  the  United  States  to  join  in  an  American  congress 
to  prevent  further  colonisation  on  their  continent.      Their 
people  needed  no  help   in  guarding  their  own  territories 
against  violation ;  and  they  would  refuse  to  guarantee  the 
dominions  of  foreigners.     They  would  not    deviate  from 
neutrality,  nor  engage  in  war  to  check  the  interference  of 
any  other  power  in  the  conflict  between  Spain  and  the  new 
states.      Wider  issues  they  condemned   without   mercy. 
The    Government    of    the    United    States    could    neither 
take  part  in  forming  a  continental   system    nor  in  nego- 
tiating for  the  settlement  of  "either  principles  of  internal 
policy,  or  mere   abstract    propositions,  as    parts  of    the 
public    law."      Europe,  they   feared,   would    resent    any 

8—2 


116  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

such  attempt  to  benefit   America  at  her   own   expense. 

In  March  1826,  however,  a  small  majority  of  the  Senate 
negatived  the  report  of  its  Committee,  and  upheld  the  action 
of  the  President.  His  next  step  was  to  send  a  Message  in 
which  he  argued  that  the  conference  would  be  a  harmless 
and  useful  meeting  of  diplomatists.  The  ''course  of  reaso- 
ning equally  simple  and  conclusive"  which  condemned 
future  European  colonisation  in  America  had  never,  he  as- 
serted, been  contested  by  Russia,  and  had  received  the 
entire  assent  of  most  of  the  new  republics.  The  latter  now- 
proposed  to  consider  "  the  means  of  making  effectual  the 
assertion  of  that  principle,  as  well  as  the  means  of  resisting 
interference  from  abroad,  with  the  domestic  concerns  of 
the  American  Governments."  What  follows  affords  valuable 
evidence  of  the  interpretation  which  the  author  of  the 
Doctrine  placed  upon  it.  As  to  any  conventional  engage- 
ment, he  repeats,  "our  views  would  extend  no  further  than 
to  a  mutual  pledge  of  the  parties  to  the  compact,  to  main- 
tain the  principle  in  application  to  its  own  territory,  and  to 
permit  no  colonial  lodgements,  or  establishments  of  Euro- 
pean jurisdiction,  upon  its  own  soil."  The  United  States, 
in  effect,  while  refusing  to  guarantee  the  territories  of 
their  neighbours,  would  in  no  degree  abandon  their  freedom 
to  defend  their  own  '  rights  and  interests,'  when  impugned 
by  colonisation  elsewhere. 

The  second  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine— that  the 
United  States  could  not  behold  with  indifference  any  exten- 
sion to  America  of  the  political  system  of  the  Allies— was 
also  translated  into  action.  "  With  respect  to  the  obtrusive 
interference  from  abroad,"  the  President  continued,  'if  its 
future  c'  aracter  may  be  inferred  from  that  which  has  been, 


AS    INTERPRETED    BY    ITS  AUTHOR.  117 

and  perhaps  still  is,  exercised  in  more  than  one  of  the  new 
states,  a  joint  declaration  of  its  character  and  exposure  of 
it  to  the  world,  may  be  probably  all  that  the  occasion 
would  require.  Whether  the  United  States  should  or 
should  not  be  parties  to  such  a  declaration,  may  justly  form 
a  part  of  the  deliberation."  In  Adams's  opinion,  then,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  while  tolerant  of  monarchy  in  America, 
declared  that  the  United  States  were  interested  in  oppo- 
sing any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Europe  to  introduce  it  by 
force  or  by  intrigue.  This  interpretation,  while  it  broadens 
the  political  horizon  of  the  Doctrine,  shows  still  more  cle- 
arly its  lack  of  legal  form  or  nature.  No  one  could  suppose 
that  the  United  States  were  bound  to  interfere,  if  an  Euro- 
pean power  should  violate  the  independence  of  a  southern 
republic. 

The  remaining  paragraphs  of  the  Message  labour  to 
show  that,  since  the  establishment  of  the  Constitution, 
America  had  acquired  a  set  of  primary  interests  of  her 
own,  with  which,  on  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  Europe 
must  not  interfere.  The  acceptance  of  the  invitation, 
therefore,  while  it  could  give  no  just  cause  of  umbrage  to 
the  Holy  Alliance  or  to  Spain,  Avas  in  harmony  with  the 
Farewel  Address  of  Washington  and  with  the  Message  of 
Monroe. 

The  policy  thus  defended  was  long  and  earnestly 
debated  by  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  Opposition 
showed  a  strong  desire  to  strip  the  Monroe  Doctrine  of  its 
mystery.  Loose  notions  of  it,  they  urged,  were  misleading 
the  representatives  of  the  United  States  abroad,  and  must 
not  be  allowed  to  confuse  the  discussions  at  Panama. 
Did  the  United  States  intend,  or  did  they  not,  to  oppose 


118  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

European  colonisation  on  the  American  continent?  Were 
they  prepared,  or  were  they  not,  to  resist  any  power  but 
Spain  which  should  interfere  with  the  South  Americans? 
They  should  not  pledge  themselves  to  the  new  Republics 
to  do  either  the  one  or  the  other.  Even  a  declaration  that 
each  power  would  maintain  the  principle  of  noncolonisation 
in  application  to  its  own  territory  would  be  inconvenient, 
since  it  would  pledge  the  United  States  to  make  good  their 
title  to  all  the  territory  which  they  claimed.  Any  pretence 
to  a  kind  of  political  supremacy  over  the  whole  continent 
might  be  dismissed  as  absurd. 

Arguments  like  these  stirred  Daniel  Webster  to  take 
up  arms  for  the  Doctrine  as  Adams  had  set  it  forth.  The 
declaration  against  colonisation  he  justified  by  the  com- 
mercial interest  which  rendered  it  highly  desirable  that  the 
new  states  should  adopt  the  principle  of  forbidding  it 
within  their  respective  territories.  That  against  "a  combi- 
nation of  the  Allied  Powers,  to  effect  objects  in  America," 
he  regarded  as  designed  to  preserve  the  rights  of  the  Uni- 
ted States.  It  neither  pledged  them  to  remonstrate  against 
a  European  interdict,  of  trade  with  the  new  states,  nor  to 
fight  against  the  Allies  on  behalf  of  provinces  so  distant  as 
Chili  or  Buenos  Ayres.  An  invasion  of  the  shores  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  on  the  other  hand,  would  present  a  real 
danger,  and  would  call  for  their  decided  and  immediate 
interference.  To  him,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  decla- 
ration of  policy  which  a  special  crisis  had  evoked.  It  had 
done  its  work,  and  no  fear  of  armed  intervention  remained. 
It  would  be  expedient  for  the  United  States,  he  argued,  to 
similarly  announce  in  advance  their  intention,  based  on 
the  right  of  selfpreservation,  to  resist  the  transference  of 


AS    INTERPRETED    BY   ITS   AUTHOR.  110 

Cuba  to  any  other  power.  After  long  debate,  the  House 
resolved  that  the  people  should  be  "  left  free  to  act,  in  any 

crisis,  in  such  manner as  their  own  honour  and  policy 

might  at  the  time  dictate."  Clay's  instructions  to  the 
envoys  destined  for  Panama,  therefore,  were  negative  in 
tone.  Any  joint  declaration  on  the  subject  of  colonisation 
was  not  to  bind  the  powers  to  maintain  the  particular 
boundai'ies  which  might  be  claimed  by  any  one  of  them;  nor 
were  they  to  be  committed  to  resist  in  common  any  future 
attempt  to  plant  a  new  colony. 

Such  was  the  part  played  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
discussions  which  might  seem  to  the  Spanish-Americans 
part  of  a  policy  designed  to  frustrate  their  effective  union. 
The  envoys  of  the  United  States  reached  Panama  only  to 
find  that  the  Congress,  after  effecting  little,  had  adjourned. 
It  had  been  shown,  however,  that  the  principles  of  1823, 
successful  in  attaining  the  political  end  for  which  they  were 
announced,  had  gained  credit  with  a  large  portion  of  the 
nation.  There  was  no  sign,  on  the  other  hand,  of  general 
veneration  for  the  Doctrine  as  an  entity.  Monroe  himself 
was  spending  his  last  days  in  urging  the  Government  to 
satisfy  his  pecuniary  claims.  The  citizens  of  the  United 
States  might  or  might  not  share  the  antipathy  of  the 
Administration  to  European  colonisation  and  political  ideas. 
They  showed  clearly,  however,  that  they  were  determined 
to  avoid  entangling  alliances,  and  to  plunge  into  the 
whirlpool  of  South  American  affairs  only  when  and  how 
they  pleased.  "No  heated  question,"  wrote  a  contem- 
porary, "  ever  cooled  off  and  died  out  so  suddenly  and 
completely." 


CHAPTER  IX. 
Later  Appeals  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Three  years  later,  in  1829,  Adams  was  thrust  from 
office  by  Andrew  Jackson,  and  the  generation  of  statesmen 
which  had  given  birth  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  passed  from 
power.  Problems  of  finance  threatened  to  cleave  the 
Union  asunder,  and  all  domestic  questions  began  to  be 
confused  with  that  of  slavery.  After  forty  years  of  debate, 
the  gigantic  convulsion  of  the  Civil  War  brought  about 
Abolition.  The  nation  was  reconstructed,  and  a  new  era 
of  industrial  development  began.  Throughout  the  last 
seventy  years  of  United  States  history,  however,  as  in  the 
half-century  which  has  already  been  reviewed,  the  power 
and  population  of  the  Republic  have  increased  without  a 
check.  They  have  been  accompanied  by  a  substantial 
extension  of  its  territorial  boundaries.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine was  addressed  to  less  than  eleven  million  citizens. 
Twenty  years  later  the  total  had  well-nigh  doubled.  Fede- 
rals and  Confederates  together  numbered  some  32,000,000; 
and  in  the  three  decades  which  have  elapsed  since  the 
War,  the   population  has   swelled   to  at  least  70,000,000. 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.     121 

Monroe  spoke  to  twenty-four  States ;  Cleveland  to  forty-four. 
Much  of  this  growth  has  been  due  to  the  advance  of 
civilisation  towards  the  West.  The  steady  policy  of  the 
Administration,  however,  has  been  to  expand  the  territory 
of  the  Union.  Disputes  as  to  its  northern  limits  have 
resulted  in  the  addition  of  a  substantial  area  to  its  acknow- 
ledged dominions.  By  war  and  by  purchase,  Mexico  has 
been  induced  to  cede  vast  provinces  on  the  south  and  west; 
and  the  acquisition  of  Alaska  from  Russia  has  enlarged  the 
dominion  on  the  Pacific.  Development  in  the  New  World 
has  been  accompanied  by  peace  with  the  Old.  Save  for 
an  occasional  deviation,  such  as  that  which  resembled 
intervention  in  favour  of  the  revolted  Hungarians,  the 
Republic  has  steered  its  course  by  the  chart  which  Was- 
hington and  J.  Q.  Adams  marked  out.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  Civil  War,  Lord  Russel  acknowledged  the  existence  of 
a  kind  of  understanding  by  which  the  United  States 
abstained  from  European  alliances,  so  long  as  European 
powers  abstained  from  interference  in  American  affairs. 
At  the  same  time,  the  increase  of  population  and  the 
development  of  the  means  of  transport  have  consolidated 
America,  and  lessened  by  four-fifths  its  distance  from 
Europe.  The  people,  ever  mightier  in  numbers,  can  com- 
municate in  a  few  hours  with  the  Administration,  and, 
through  the  Administration,  with  the  Cabinets  of  Europe. 
Throughout  this  period  of  progress  and  development 
the  popular  will  has  remained  supreme.  On  a  continent 
doomed  to  geographical  isolation,  the  United  States  are 
immeasurably  the  strongest  power.  Right  or  wrong,  they 
can  bear  down  the  opposition  of  all  the  nations  of  America. 
The  people  know,  too,  that  within  their  vast  possessions 


122  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

their  own  will  is  law.  In  dealing  with  Europe,  owing  to 
the  policy  of  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  perpetuates  the 
tradition,  they  stand  steadily  on  the  defensive.  Thus, 
while  invincible  in  their  own  hemisphere,  they  escape  the 
mutual  concession  of  European  diplomacy.  As  against 
their  own  Government,  their  neighbours  and  Europe,  they 
are  wont,  therefore,  to  gain  every  point  upon  which  they 
insist.  Hence  they  must  inevitably  tend  to  exalt  their  own 
authority,  and  to  believe  that  their  will  has  only  to  manifest 
itself  to  be  obeyed.  Such  a  people,  it  is  clear,  cannot  be 
fettered  by  ancestral  maxims  which  do  not  commend  them- 
selves to  their  present  judgment.  If  the  course  recom- 
mended by  a  particular  Executive  officer  falls  into  disfavour, 
none  are  more  able  or  more  ready  to  point  out  his  lack  of 
authority  to  bind  his  successor.  Political  creeds,  again, 
can  seldom  be  applied  literally  for  many  years.  In  the 
United  States,  even  political  parties  become  distinguishable 
by  persons  rather  than  by  principles.  The  words  of  a 
declaration  devised  to  meet  Russia  and  the  Holy  Alliance, 
therefore,  will  be  of  small  use  when  the  Ukase  has  been 
withdrawn  and  the  Alliance  dissolved.  From  the  time  when 
its  promulgators  went  out  of  office,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  if 
heeded  at  all  as  a  canon  of  policy,  must  from  the  nature  of 
the  case  have  been  applied  with  progressive  meaning.  It 
is  an  error  to  cite  it  as  law,  or  to  suppose  that  the  collec- 
tive will  of  the  United  States  can  impose  rules  upon  the 
family  of  nations.  To  apply  the  formula  of  1823  to  the 
problems  of  a  later  age  will  probably  be  an  error  also. 
Whatever  conclusions  successive  generations  may  draw 
from  it,  however,  they  possess  increasing  power  to  enforce. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine   becomes  the  more  dangerous,  the 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    123 

less  it  is  understood.  The  remainder  of  the  essay,  there- 
fore, will  be  an  endeavour,  without  ignoring  the  larger 
questions  involved,  to  discover  and  to  illustrate  the  politi- 
cal principles  which  Americans  have  regarded  at  its 
applications. 

For  two  decades  after  the  Panama  Congress,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  slept.  The  attention  of  the  United  States  was  not 
distracted  from  domestic  finance  by  any  attempts  to  plant 
new  colonies  in  America,  or  to  extend  to  the  New  World 
the  Apolitical  system  of  the  Old.  The  confederations  of 
South  America  fell  asunder,  and  many  of  the  new  govern- 
ments were  recognised  by  Spain.  Their  revolutions,  how- 
ever, disillusionised  their  northern  admirers,  and  blighted 
the  idea  of  a  definite  continental  system  under  the  hegemony 
of  the  United  States.  Their  own  rights  being  secure,  the 
lat'.er  looked  on  unmoved  while  England  and  France 
mediated  between  southern  powers,  sent  squadrons  to 
enforce  their  claims,  and  exercised  to  the  full  the  lights  of 
their  colonial  empires.  Meanwhile,  in  the  case  of  Texas, 
the  principle  that  the  inhabitants  of  every  territorial  area 
may  choose  their  own  government  was  being  strained  in 
favour  of  the  Union.  In  spite  of  the  strenuous  opposition 
of  Adams,  the  drama  of  West  Florida  was  being  repeated 
on  a  grander  scale.  The  President  was  arguing  that  Texas 
was  practically  a  part  of  the  United  States;  and  that  it  must 
be  annexed  to  prevent  the  intervention  of  foreign  powers. 
Then,  if  ever,  there  was  need  of  some  pretext  of  destiny  or 
natural  law  to  help  out  a  doubtful  case.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  it  might  have  been  thought,  lay  ready  to  hand. 
Yet  in  the  Message  of  April  22nd,  1844,  it  is  ignored,  if  not 
violated  by  the  President.     "  The  Executive,"  he  says,  "  saw 


124  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Texas  in  a  state  of  almost  hopeless  exhaustion,  and  the 
question  was  narrowed  down  to  the  simple  proposition 
whether  the  United  States  should  accept  the  boon  of 
annexation  on  fair  and  liberal  terms,  or,  by  refusing  to  do 
so,  force  Texas  to  seek  refuge  in  the  arms  of  some  other 
Power,  either  through  a  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive  and 
defensive,  or  the  adoption  of  some  other  expedient  which 
might  virtually  make  her  tributary  to  such  Power,  and 
dependent  upon  it  for  all  future  time." 

His  successor,  however,  hawing  been  elected  to  acquire 
the  province,  turned  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  good  account. 
M.  Guizot  had  used  expressions  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
implying  that  the  annexation  would  disturb  a  balance  of 
power  on  the  continent  of  America.  At  the  same  moment, 
Great  Britain  was  preferring  her  claim  to  the  north-western 
—  or  Oregon— territory.  In  December,  1845,  therefore, 
President  Polk  joined  battle  on  both  issues.  The  Former 
he  denounced  as  an  European  interference  on  the  North 
American  continent,  such  as  the  United  States  could  not 
in  silence  permit,  and  such  as  they  would  be  ready  to 
resist  at  any  and  all  hazards.  "  We  must  ever  maintain 
the  principle/'  he  declared,  "that  the  people  of  this 
continent  alone  have  the  right  to  decide  their  own  destiny." 
Against  the  latter,  since  he  assumed  that  the  title  of  the 
United  States  to  all  the  disputed  territory  was  "  clear  and 
unquestionable,"  he  quoted  the  principle  of  Monroe 
condemning  European  colonisation.  "  This  principle,"  he 
stated,  "will  apply  with  greatly  increased  force,  should  any 
European  power  attempt  to  establish  any  new  colony  in 
North  America.... It  should  be  distinctly  announced  to  the 
world  as  our  settled  policy  that  no  future  European  colony 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    125 

or  dominion,  shall,  with  our  consent,  be  planted  or 
established  on  any  part  of  the  North  American  continent." 
The  Message  forms  a  landmark  in  the  history  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  As  a  young  opponent  of  Adams,  Polk  had 
regarded  the  paragraphs  of  1823  as  the  mere  expression  of 
the  opinion  of  the  Executive,  which  had  influenced  the  Holy 
Alliance,  and  thereby  performed  their  office.  He  now, 
though  ready  to  avail  himself  of  the  veneration  due  to  the 
public  opinion  of  the  past,  clothes  its  principles  in  a 
modern  dress.  He  limits  the  Doctrine  to  North  America, 
and  pledges  the  United  States  to  resistits  violation.  Above 
all,  he  extends  the  prohibition  from  colonisation  to 
1  dominion.'  The  United  States,  if  their  President  might 
speak  for  them,  would  never  acknowledge  any  transfer  of 
territory,  whether  made  by  the  desire  of  the  inhabitants,  by 
purchase,  or  by  force,  from  any  nation  of  North  America  to 
any  nation  of  Europe. 

Polk  thus  began  in  1845  the  practice  of  claiming  the 
authority  of  Monroe  for  whatever  might  be  laid  down  as 
the  current  application  of  his  principles.  As  tending  to 
promote  historical  modes  of  thought  and  a  coherent  foreign 
policy,  this  might  be  advantageous.  It  was  evil,  however, 
in  so  far  as  it  invited  the  people  to  believe  that  in  their 
international  relations  they  possessed  rights  greater  than 
those  to  which,  by  International  Law,  they  were  entitled. 
In  imitating  Monroe,  succeeding  Presidents  might  consult 
the  best  interests  of  the  Union.  In  using  his  name  to  cut 
knots  which  without  it  baffled  them,  they  were  far  from 
being  his  imitators. 

Six  weeks  later,  a  motion  was  made  in  the  Senate  to 
endorse  Polk's  principles  by  resolution.    Any  attempt  to 


126  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

make  an  English  colony  of  California   was    indicated   as 
falling  under  the  ban.    Like  all   other  endeavours  of  Con- 
gress to  formulate  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  however,  that  of 
4846  was   never  completed.     The   Oregon   question   was 
compromised;   and,    after  a  series  of  military  successes 
against  their  neighbours,  the  United  States  retained  Texas, 
and   purchased   New   Mexico   and   Upper   California.     In 
1848,  the  President  further  illustrated  his  Doctrine  against 
colonisation.    Yucatan,  which  had  been  regarded  as  a  pro- 
vince of  Mexico,  was  driven  by  an  Indian  rebellion  to  offer 
its  sovereignty  to   the  United   States,  Great  Britain    and 
Spain  in  turn.    Polk  thereupon  recommended  its  occupation 
by  the  United  States,  since  they  "  could  not  consent  to  a 
transfer  of  this  '  dominion  and  sovereignty'  to  either  Spain, 
Great  Britain  or  any  other   European  power."    States  in 
North  America,  \n  effect,  were  free  to  determine  their  des- 
tiny so  long  as  it  led  them  to   join  the  Union.     Events 
forbade   the   occupation,   but    the   Monroe    Doctrine  had 
received  an  interpretation  which  could  never  have  been 
put  upon  it  by  its  author. 

JThe  great  problem  of  the  control  of  the  communication 
between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  by  way  of  Central 
America  now  came  into  prominence.  Its  connection  with 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  perhaps  the  least  obvious 
and  the  most  important  of  the  applications  of  the  Message 
of  1823  to  subsequent  affairs.  Immediately  after  the  United 
States  had  acquired  California,  they  heard  with  indignation 
that  Great  Britain  had  seized  territory  in  Central  America 
which  would  give  her  the  control  of  the  proposed  canal 
across  the  isthmus.  The  wrath  of  the  people  was  heigh- 
tened by  the  charge  that  she  had  absorbed  the  whole  of 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    127 

Spanish  Guiana.  The  Administration,  however,  when 
called  upon  to  vindicate  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  disclaimed 
any  pretension  "to  regulate  all  the  affairs  of  this  continent, 
so  far  as  respects  Europeans."  With  the  sovereign  rights 
of  other  nations  over  their  existing  colonies,  said  the 
Secretary  of  State,  Monroe  and  Polk  had  assumed  no  right 
to  interfere.  "  Such  an  assumption  would  have  been 
equally  obtrusive  and  ineffectual."  Two  years  later,  the 
question  of  interoceanic  communication  was  settled  for  the 
time  being  by  a  convention  known  as  the  Clayton- Buhver 
Treaty.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  agreed  to  re- 
nounce any  exclusive  control  over  any  route  of  transit  that 
might  be  constructed  from  sea  to  sea,  and  solemnly  debarred 
themselves  from  all  fortification  or  dominion  in  Central 
America. 

Meanwhile,  the  problem  of  insular  Spanish-America 
had  once  more  become  prominent,  and  was  now  closely 
connected  with  the  question  of  slavery.  Great  Britain  and 
France  had  taken  strong  measures  to  check  the  American 
freebooters  in  Cuba,  and  in  4851  and  1852  they  endeavoured 
to  induce  the  United  States  to  join  them  in  guaranteeing 
the  island  to  Spain.  The  answers  of  Daniel  Webster  and 
of  his  successor  in  the  Department  of  State,  without  appea- 
ling to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  held  firmly  to  the  principle 
which  it  expressed.  The  United  States,  they  declared,  had 
no  designs  on  Cuba,  and  would  even  support  the  Spanish 
dominion  in  the  island.  They  were  resolved,  however,  to 
avoid  European  alliances.  The  question  was  American, 
and  of  immense  importance  to  the  United  States.  They 
would  continue,  therefore,  to  oppose  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  Spain  to  transfer  the  island  to  any  European  power. 


128  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

It  wste  doubtful  whether  the  Constitution  would  permit  any 
Administration  to  renounce  for  all  time  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  acquire  Cuba  by  purchase,  by  war  with 
Spain,  or  by  the  demand  of  its  inhabitants  acting  as  an 
independent  nation.  The  European  powers  replied  by  an 
assertion  of  their  own  interest  in  the  question,  and  of  their 
entire  freedom  of  action.  They  thus  prevented  any  sha- 
dow of  International  Law  from  gathering  round  the  extension 
to  islands  of  dicta  dealing  with  the  mainland.  The  United 
States,  however,  had  declared  to  the  world  that  Cuba  was 
as  important  to  them  as  an  island  in  the  Thames  or  the 
Seine  to  England  or  France,  and  that  their  policy  would 
attest  the  fact. 

A  new  attempt,  on  the  other  hand,  to  formulate  and 
endorse  the  principle  on  which  their  action  would  be  based 
had  proved  a  failure.  In  January  1853,  Senator  Cass  had 
moved  a  resolution  condemning  in  tho  language  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  extended  by  Polk  the  establishment  of 
any  future  European  colony  or  dominion  on  the  North  Ame- 
rican continent.  The  United  States,  according  to  his  motion, 
regarded  it  as  due  to  the  vast  importance  of  Cuba  to  declare 
"  all  efforts  of  other  powers  to  procure  possession,  whet- 
her peaceably  or  forcibly,  of  that  island,  as  unfriendly  acts, 
directed  against  them,  to  be  resisted  by  all  the  means  in 
their  power."  The  debate  that  followed  led  to  no  result. 
The  question  of  Cuba,  however,  interwoven  as  it  was  with 
the  question  of  slavery,  continued  to  occupy  the  attention 
of  the  United  States.  The  succeeding  President,  aiming 
at  preventing  Emancipation  by  annexing  the  island,  endor- 
sed the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  his  Message  of  1853.  Next 
year,  the  Ambassadors  of  the  United   States  to  London, 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    129 

Paris  and  Madrid  met  at  Ostend,  and  astounded  Europe  by 
a  manifesto.    If  Spain  refused  to  sell  Cuba  to  the  Republic, 
they  declared,  all  laws  divine  and  human  would  justify  the 
Republic  in  taking  it  by  force.    In  4856,  Cass  argued  that 
while    Monroe's    denunciation   of    interference   with    the 
Spanish    colonies   was  obsolete,   his    declaration  against 
colonisation  was  addressed  to  all  nations  and  intended  to 
operate  during  all  time.     It  was   founded  on  the  situation 
of  the    United    States,    which    demanded    the    system    of 
separation  advised  by  Jefferson.     "  This  great  Cis-Atlantic 
principle,"  he    summed  up,  in  words  which  may  well  be 
quoted,  "  does  not  derive  its  strength  from  its  origin  or  its 
author ;  it  rests  upon  a  surer  foundation,  upon  the  cordial  ' 
concurrence  of  the  American  people,  and  is  destined  to  be 
a  broad  line  upon  the  chart  of  their  policy."    Two  years 
later,  as  Secretary  of  State  under  the  feeblest  of  Presidents, 
it  fell  to  his  lot  to  broaden  this  line  in  checking  Spanish 
intervention  in  Mexico.     The  United  States,  he  instructed 
the  Minister  at  Madrid,  would  not  permit  the  subjugation 
by  European  powers  of  any  of  the  independent  states  of 
that  continent,  nor  would  they  suffer  Europe  to  exercise  a 
protectorate  over  those  states,  nor  even  to  employ  any 
direct  political  influence  to  control  their  policy  or  their 
institutions. 

The  adherents  of  slavery,  then,  used  the  growing 
strength  of  the  Republic  to  thunder  forth  Polk's  version  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Enlarging  the  principle  of  non- 
colonisation,  they  strove  to  turn  the  balance  of  parties  in 
their  own  favour  by  forbidding  Europe  to  bring  freedom 
to  territories  which  might  be  annexed  to  the  South.  The 
prestige  of  a  glorious  past  and  the  patriotism  of  a  vigorous 
R.  9 


130  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

present  were  thus  identified  with  the  policy  which  Adams 
had    combated    to    his  grave.      With    the    Northerners, 
therefore,  the  Doctrine  was  in  bad  repute ;  and  when  in 
power,  they  were  reluctant  to  appeal  to  it.     Hence  it  came 
about  that  in  the  only  set  of  circumstances  which  represents 
a  distinct  attempt  on  the  part  of  Europe  to  extend  its  poli- 
tical system  across  the  Atlantic,  the  Federal  Government 
and  its  supporters  refused  to  point  their  weapons  with  the 
phrases  of  Monroe.     It   becomes  unnecessary,  therefore, 
to  trace  in  detail  the  opposition  of  Secretary  Seward  to  the 
French  intervention  in  Mexico  during  the  Civil  War.     The 
proceedings  by  which  Louis  Napoleon  set  up  the  throne  of 
Maximilian,    if    not    "  interposition    for    the    purpose    of 
oppressing  "  a  government  acknowledged  by  the  United 
States,  aimed  without  doubt  at  controlling  the  destiny  of  a 
Spanish-American  nation.      His  letter  to  the    general  in 
command,  indeed,  proved  that  the  Emperor  was  aiming  at 
the  establishment  of  French   influence    in  the   heart   of 
America.    France  would  be  the  loser,  he  showed,  if  the 
United  States  should  acquire  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  dominate 
the  West  Indies  and  South  America,  and  gain  a  monopoly 
of  the  products  of  the  New  World.    His  supporters  might 
argue  that  it  was  the  general  interest  of  Europe  to  oppose 
a  barrier  to  the  imminent  invasion  of  the  whole  American 
continent    by  the  United  States.    In  England,    some  re- 
joicing over  the  extinction  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  found 
public  expression.     Texas,  the  Confederates  believed,  was 
to  be  torn  from  them  by  France. 

The  establishment  upon  their  borders  of  a  govern- 
ment with  objects  such  as  these  rendered  it  superfluous 
for  the  United  States  to  justify  opposition  by  any  formula 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.     131 

of  policy.  It  may  be  maintained,  indeed,  that  Seward's 
despatches  when  his  country  seemed  on  the  verge  of  ruin 
were  written  in  a  different  spirit  from  those  which  were 
dictated  by  an  enormous  and  highspirited  army.  It  may 
be  equally  true  that  by  continuing  to  regard  Mexico  as  a 
republic  when  all  Europe  recognised  it  as  a  monarchy,  by 
refusing  to  acknowledge  a  blockade  in  actual  operation, 
and  by  secretly  supplying  the  opponents  of  Maximilian  with 
arms,  the  United  States  departed  from  neutrality.  The 
words  in  which  the  American  Secretary  of  State  developed 
his  views  ,  moreover,  hinting  as  they  do  at  a  republican 
intervention  against  monarchical  ideas,  may  be  condemned 
as  contrary  to  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  fact  none  the  less 
remains  that,  in  driving  the  French  from  Mexico,  Seward 
relied  on  the  principle  of  national  independence  alone. 
From  lawfully  prosecuting  her  claims,  he  told  Napoleon, 
France  had  diverged  into  a  war  of  intervention.  She  was 
maintaining  by  force  a  government  contrary  to  the  true 
desires  of  the  Mexican  people.  Every  power,  as  a  member 
of  the  international  police,  has  the  right  to  interfere  in 
behalf  of  any  nation  which  it  may  deem  to  be  oppressed. 
To  gain  a  right  of  counter-intervention,  therefore,  the 
United  States,  if  sincere  and  well-informed,  had  no  need  to 
allege,  as  their  official  friendship  for  France  prompted  them 
to  do,  that  the  new  government  in  Mexico  was  by  nature 
antagonistic  to  themselves. 

Their  citizens,  however,  had  not  been  equally  philo- 
sophic. All  the  skill  of  the  Secretary  of  State  had  been 
taxed  to  avert  a  war.  Public  opinion  was  expressed  in 
April,  1864,  when  the  House  of  Representatives  unanimously 
declared  that  it  was  not  fitting  for  the  people  of  the  United 

9-2 


132  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

States  to  acknowledge  any  monarchical  government, 
erected  on  the  ruins  of  any  republican  government  in 
America,  under  the  auspices  of  any  European  power. 

This  disposition  to  champion  republicanism,  repressed 
in  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine,  discernible  in  the 
despatches  of  Seward,  and  shouted  aloud  by  Congress, 
was  strengthened  by  the  victory  of  the  North.  The  United 
States,  though  devoted  to  the  institutions  which  they  have 
devised,  seem  always  to  have  been  sensitive  to  the  opinion 
of  their  European  critics.  At  the  close  of  the  Civil  War, 
they  were  still  the  only  great  nation  of  modern  times  which 
had  created  a  permanent  republic.  France  had  twice 
abandoned  monarchy,  and  as  often  resumed  it.  It  was 
impossible  even  for  a  parent  to  look  with  pride  on  the 
governments  of  Spanish-America.  Republicanism,  though 
acquiesced  in,  remained  on  its  trial,  and  there  was  still  a 
note  of  defiance  in  the  tone  of  its  pioneers.  The  authors 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  was  true,  had  decidet  that  they 
could  not  frown  officially  on  monarchy  in  Brazil.  As  the 
Old  World  became  more  tolerant  of  republicanism,  how- 
ever, the  New  World  became  more  intolerant  of  monarchy. 
Men  strove  to  base  their  instinct  on  principle,  and  turned 
to  the  vague  phrases  of  1823.  It  has  not  been  the  least  of 
the  errors  surrounding  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine,  to 
term  it  an  anathema  against  kingship  in  America. 

These  feelings  found  utterance  when,  in  1866,  the 
House  of  Representatives  considered  a  bill  for  the  eventual 
annexation  of  the  continent  north  of  their  own  borders. 
They  were  answered  by  the  British  North  American  Act, 
which  united  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  New  Brunswick 
into  a  single  Dominion.      This  constituted   the  sharpest 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    133 

check  which  the  development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had 
received.  Though  it  violated  no  formula  of  the  American 
people,  it  was  in  conflict  with  their  belief  that  Canada  was 
destined  speedily  to  become  their  own,  and  showed  the 
impotence  of  such  statements  as  Seward's  declaration  that 
"  British  Columbia,  by  whomsoever  possessed,  must  be 
governed  in  conformity  with  the  interests  of  her  people, 
and  of  society  upon  the  American  continent."  The  measure, 
none  the  less,  was  too  clearly  within  the  rights  of  Great 
Britain  to  form  a  legitimate  grievance  against  her.  The 
House  of  Representatives  could  only  declare  the  uneasiness 
of  the  United  States  at  witnessing  such  a  vast  monarchical 
conglomeration  of  states  on  their  frontiers,  in  contravention 
of  their  traditionary  and  constantly  declared  principles. 

The  fourteen  years  which  followed  were  for  America 
years  almost  without  a  history.  With  the  accession  of 
Garfield  to  power,  however,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  again 
brought  into  prominence.  Blaine,  the  new  Secretary  of 
State,  vetoed  as  inadmissible  the  guarantee  by  European 
powers  of  the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Canal.  The  new 
waterway,  he  argued,  would  be  the  great  highway  between 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  States  of  the  Union,  and  would 
thus  substantially  form  a  part  of  its  coast-line.  Its  control, 
therefore,  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  Such 
a  claim,  it  wasevident,  came  into  conflict  with  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  concluded  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  in  1850.  The  gist  of  that  agreement  had  been 
that,  in  order  to  remove  international  difficulties,  both  parties 
adjured  dominion  in  Central  America.  To  comply  with  it, 
Great  Britain  had  made  sacrifices  which  had  caused  the 
President,   ki  I860,  to  congratulate   Congress  on  "  a  final 


134  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this  Government."  To 
this  settlement  she  now  adhered,  in  spite  of  Blaine's 
suggestions  that  the  treaty  should  be  modified  in  favour  of 
the  United  States.  To  decide  the  case,  the  American  public 
appealed  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  declaration  against 
colonisation  was  interpreted  as  forbidding  any  European 
power  to  gain  a  footing  on  the  American  continents,  either 
by  colonisation,  intrigue^  or  commercial  autocracy.  The 
denunciation  of  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  tthe  Old  World 
to  extend  its  political  system  to  the  New,  was  made  to 
condemn  the  influence  in  Central  America  which  the  canal 
would  give  to  its  possessors.  All  the  words  of  Monroe,  it 
was  maintained,  justified  the  United  States  in  declaring  the 
agreement  void. 

During  the  first  sixty  years  of  its  existence,  then,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  cited  in  cases  which  varied 
much,  but  which  possessed  one  feature  in  common.  In  all 
of  them,  the  interests  or  security  of  the  United  States  were 
at  stake.  Their  people  had  increased  in  power,  and  in 
feelings  of  hostility  to  American  monarchy;  while  there  had 
always  been  an  undercurrent  of  sentiment  in  favour  of  a 
loose  protectorate  over  the  republics  of  the  South.  Such 
a  political  relation,  however,  had  never  been  asserted  or 
assumed.  The  action  of  Great  Britain,  alone,  had  constant- 
ly disproved  it.  With  Adams  in  power,  she  had  estab- 
lished the  Republic  of  Uruguay.  .  Despite  the  outcry  of 
the  Argentine,  she  had  occupied  and  retained  the  Falkland 
Islands.  Andrew  Jackson  had  refused  to  check  her  territo- 
rial aggression,  though  Central  America  implored  him  to 
interfere.  She  had  at  different  times  enforced  her  claims 
against  Southern  States  by  intervention,  embargo,  reprisals 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    135 

and  blockade,  withoutarousing  the  protest  of  the  Executive 
at  Washington.  France,  Spain,  and  the  United  States 
themselves  had  followed  her  example.  South  Americans, 
indeed,  have  bitterly  complained  that  their  northern 
brethren  forget  their  mission  to  protect  them,  and  that  the 
gun-boats  of  Europe  exact  from  them  indemnities  at  will. 
Recently,  however,  what  may  prove  to  be  a  new 
chapter  in  the  history  of  the  Doctrine  seems  to  have  been 
begun.  For  the  first  time,  the  Administration  has  shown 
some  readiness  to  adopt  the  popular  view  which  sees  a 
violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  every  British  movement 
in  the  New  World.  In  1895,  Great  Britain  exacted  a  fine 
from  Nicaragua  for  outrages  upon  her  subjects.  A  section 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  once  cried  out  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  violated,  but  President 
Cleveland,  in  his  annual  Message  to  Congress,  approved  the 
act.  A  fortnight  later,  however,  he  roused  the  whole 
Union  to  fury  by  alleging  that  Lord  Salisbury's  refusal  to 
submit  to  arbitration  a  boundary  dispute  with  Venezuela 
had  violated  the  principles  of  Monroe.  The  facts  upon 
which  this  allegation  was  based,  as  presented  in  Mr  Olney's 
despatch  of  July  20th,  involve  an  elaborate  treatment  of  the 
Doctrine  as  applied  to  South  America.  Venezuela,  says 
the  Secretary  of  State,  in  the  course  of  a  long-standing 
boundary  dispute  with  Great  Britain,  had  frequently 
appealed  to  the  Government  at  Washington  to  take 
cognisance  of  the  injury  of  which  she  complained.  So 
early  as  1881,  his  predecessor  had  assured  her  of  the  deep 
interest  felt  by  the  Administration  "  in  all  transactions 
tending  to  attempted  encroachments  of  foreign  powers 
upon  the  territory  of  any  of  the  republics  of  this  continent." 


136  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

Continuing  to  watch  the  progress  of  events  with  friendly 
interest,  and  at  times  with  grave  concern,  the  United 
States  had  vainly  offered  their  mediation,  and  had  pressed 
Great  Britain  to  appoint  an  arbitrator.  Her  determination 
to  adhere  at  all  costs  to  a  portion  of  the  territory  which  she 
claimed,  however,  caused  them  now  to  declare  the 
controversy  one  in  which  their  honour  and  interest  were 
iuvolved,  and  the  continuance  of  which  they  could  not  regard 
with  indifference. 

To  prove  this  proposition,  Mr  Olney  took  the  unusual 
course  of  appealing  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  name  in 
negotiating  with  a  foreign  power.  Almost  one  half  of  his 
voluminous  despatch  consists  of  an  account  of  the  origin 
and  history  of  the  Message  of  1823,  and  of  an  argument  that 
its  principles  extend  to  the  existing  dispute.  The  Doctrine 
itself  he  regards  as  a  form  peculiarly  and  distinctively 
American  of  the  admitted  canon  of  International  Law  that 
a  nation  may  intervene  between  two  parties,  when  the  act 
of  either  is  a  serious  and  direct  menace  to  its  own  integrity, 
tranquillity  or  welfare.  Its  formulation  by  Monroe  sup- 
plemented the  Farewell  Address  of  Washington  "  by 
declaring  in  effect  that  American  non-intervention  in 
European  affairs  necessarily  implied  and  meant  European 
non-intervention  in  American  affairs."  Such  a  rule  the 
United  States  alone  were  competent  to  enforce.  Monroe, 
therefore,  courageously  declared  that  any  European  power 
so  interfering  would  be  regarded  as  antagonising  their 
interests  and  inviting  their  opposition. 

The  rule  itself,  in  no  way  establishing  a  protectorate, 
has,  he  contends,  but  a  single  object.  "It  is  that  no  Euro- 
pean power  or  combination  of  European  powers  shall  for- 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    137 

cibly  deprive  an  American  state  of  the  right  and  power  of 
self-government,  and  of  shaping  for  itself  its  own  political 
fortunes  and  destinies."  "  That  the  rule  thus  defined  has 
been  the  accepted  public  law  of  this  country  ever  since  its 
promulgation,"  he  quotes  history  to  show.  He  seems  to 
approve  the  declaration  of  Secretary  Bayard  that  the  United 
States  are  "  the  peculiar  guardians  "  of  the  rights  of  the 
New  World.  From  the  facts  cited,  he  concludes  "that  the 
Venezuelan  boundary  controversy  is  in  any  view  far  within 
the  scope  and  spirit  of  the  rule  as  uniformly  accepted  and 
acted  upon."  The  material  and  moral  interests  of  Europe, 
he  urges,  are  "  irreconcilably  diverse  from  those  of  America; 
and  any  European  control  of  the  latter  is  necessarily  both 
incongruous  and  injurious."  Resistance  to  it  must  come 
from  the  United  States,  whose  safety  and  welfare  are  ".so 
concerned  with  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  of 
every  American  state  as  against  any  European  power  as  to 
justify  and  require1'  their  interposition  whenever  that  inde- 
pendence is  endangered.  To  reject  this  proposition  would 
be  to  sacrifice  the  advantages  resulting  to  themselves  from 
the  proximity,  sympathy,  and  republicanism  of  the  remai- 
ning nations  of  America.  Their  resources  and  isolated 
position,  again,  have  made  them  "practically  sovereign" 
on  that  continent,  and  their  fiat  law  upon  the  subjects  to 
which  they  confine  their  interposition.  This  superiority 
would  vanish  if  the  principle  were  admitted  that  European 
powers  might  convert  American  states  into  colonies  or 
provinces  of  their  own.  Europe  might  then  partition  out 
the  countries  of  the  South,  and  militarism  would  be  thrust 
upon  the  New  World.  To  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
therefore,  would  be  to  renounce  a  policy  which  has  proved 


138  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

both  an  easy  defence  against  foreign  aggression,  and  a  pro- 
lific source  of  international  progress  and  prosperity.  Its 
application  to  the  boundary  dispute  between  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela,  he  maintains,  presents  no  real  difficulty. 
Important  political  control  is  in  dispute — to  be  lost  by  one 
party  and  gained  by  the  other.  Great  Britain  cannot  be 
deemed  a  South  American  state  within  the  purview  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Hence  the  case  falls  under  the  inhibition 
of  1823,  and  the  United  States  are  entitled  and  required  to 
interfere.  Much  more,  then,  have  they  the  right  to  demand 
that  the  facts  on  which  their  interference  must  be  based, 
should  be  determined. 

The  argument  of  this  despatch,  endorsed  by  the  Presi- 
dent in  his  special  Message  of  December  17th,  pledges  the 
Administration  to  a  view  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  is 
in  reality  new.  In  his  opinion,  said  Mr  Cleveland,  it  would 
be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist  by  every  means 
in  their  power,  as  a  wilful  aggression  upon  their  rights  and 
interests,  the  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands, 
or  the  exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  terri- 
tory, which,  after  investigation,  they  had  determined  of 
right  to  belong  to  Venezuela.  This  conclusion,  if  approved 
by  the  nation,  would  measure  the  progress  of  the  Doctrine 
during  seventy-two  years.  Where  Monroe  spoke  of  "the 
manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition,"  Cleveland  would 
read  "  wilful  aggression  upon  rights  and  interests."  The 
United  States,  according  to  the  former,  "  could  not  behold 
such  interposition  with  indifference,"  while  the  latter  deems 
it  their  duty  to  resist  by  every  means  in  their  power. 

It  seems  difficult,  however,  to  understand  the  argument 
that  the  interests  of  the  United  States  were  connected  with 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.   139 

the  question  actually  at  issue.  If  action  were  taken,  it 
must  be  on  account  of  an  obligation  to  enforce  the  letter 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  new  departure  in  practice, 
then,  was  accompanied  by  a  new  departure  in  theory. 
The  United  States,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Administration, 
must  interfere,  not  because  morality  prompted  them  to 
succour  the  oppressed,  nor  even  in  obedience  to  any 
appreciable  demands  of  the  law  of  self-preservation,  so 
much  as  because  a  principle  of  policy  formulated  by 
a  long-dead  President  might  be  construed  as  requiring 
them  to  take  a  given  course.  Foreign  powers,  they  held, 
must  accept  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  binding  the  Federal 
Executive  to  make  domands,  just  as  it  had  been  previously 
claimed  that  the  Constitution  forbade  them  to  yield  to 
demands  of  Others.  Their  policy,  while  it  delighted  America, 
astounded  Europe.  Lord  Salisbury,  in  his  reply  to  the 
American  despatch,  denied  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
either  a  rule  of  International  Law  or  a  formulation  of  prin- 
ciples applicable  to  the  present  dispute.  The  British  nation 
as  a  whole  expressed  the  same  belief.  The  European  press 
protested  against  the  assumption  by  the  United  States,  of 
authority  over  a  whole  hemisphere.  The  interests  of 
European,  as  opposed  to  American,  civilisation  in  the  New 
World  were  held  to  be  at  stake.  The  United  States,  it 
was  feared,  could  not  claim  to  exercise  a  protectorate  over 
their  southern  brethren  without  assuming  the  responsibility 
which  such  a  relationship  must  imply.  The  alarm  was 
heightened  by  rumours  of  a  proposed  congress  of  South 
Americans  to  endorse  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  to  place 
themselves  under  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States. 

The  European  attack  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 


140  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

valuable  as  tending  to  divest  it  of  its  disguise  as  a  part  of 
International  Law.  Of  more  importance  was  the  action  of 
the  United  States.  In  spite  of  the  criticism  of  their  publi- 
cists, East  and  West  joined  in  a  paroxysm  of  enthusiasm 
for  a  doctrine  of  which  a  hundred  conflicting  explanations 
were  on  their  lips.  The  Senate,  almost  by  acclamation, 
approved  of  the  commission  advocated  by  the  President  for 
the  investigation  of  the  British  claim; — a  measure  which  to 
English  eyes  seemed  •'  perhaps  the  most  astounding  pro- 
posal advanced  by  any  government  in  time  of  peace  since 
the  days  of  Napoleon."  Once  more  an  attempt  was  made 
to  induce  the  Legislature  to  formulate  and  endorse  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  once  more  the  result  was  failure. 
The  revised  text,  drafted  by  a  Senator,  would  have  particu- 
larly condemned  any  attempt  by  any  European  power  to 
add  to  its  territory  or  sovereignty  on  the  American  conti- 
nent or  islands  by  "  force,  purchase,  cession,  occupation, 
pledge,  colonisation,  protectorate,  or  by  control  of  the  ease- 
ment in  any  canal  or  any  other  means  of  transit  across  the 
American  isthmus." 

When  such  views  as  these  found  support  in  the  Legis- 
lature, it  is  not  surprising  that  less  responsibe  citizens  went 
to  great  lengths.  One  result  of  the  gigantic  controversy, 
indeed,  was  to  show  the  world  that  the  United  States,  as  a 
nation,  give  the  Monroe  Doctrine  a  prominent  place  in 
their  political  creed.  In  a  people  whose  great  lack  is  the 
want  of  common  questions,  it  thus  tends  strongly  to  pro- 
mote unity.  Another  gain  was  the  demonstration  that 
moderate  interpretations  of  the  Doctrine  would  command 
the  sympathy  of  Great  Britain,  whose  desire,  as  her  Premier 
in  effect  conceded,  was  not  to  enlarge  her  possessions,  so 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    141 

much  as  to  develop  them.  Many  of  the  American  inter- 
pretations, however,  could  not  be  termed  moderate.  "The 
grab-all  policy  of  England,"  wherever  possible,  was  brought 
under  the  ban.  Men  were  found  to  assert  that  the  South 
Americans  might  not  cede  their  territories  to  her  against 
the  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  that  her  dominion  in 
Canada  was  unnatural  and  inexpedient.  The  United  States, 
others  argued,  ought  to  fulfil  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  requi- 
ring every  dispute  between  a  European  and  a  South 
American  power  to  be  settled  by  arbitration.  Perhaps  the 
clearest  indication  of  its  growth,  however,  was  furnished  by 
its  popular  application  to  Cuba.  The  Cabinet  of  Monroe 
had  expressly  declined  to  assist  the  islanders  in  insurrection. 
Seventy  years  later,  they  had  rebelled  without  more  ap- 
parent justification.  Many  Americans,  none  the  less, 
believed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  commanded  the  United 
States  to  attack  Spain  in  order  to  give  Cuba  independence. 
To  reject  the  proposition  that  the  United  States  are 
compelled  by  any  doctrine  or  traditional  policy  to  take 
action  which  their  present  interests  do  not  require,  only 
common  sense  is  needed.  That  any  such  doctrine  or  policy 
can  warrant  them  in  action  which,  apart  from  it,  would  be 
condemned  by  International  Law,  has  already  been  dis- 
proved. Wherever  their  own  interests  are  reasonably 
affected,  or  their  conscience  outraged,  they,  like  any  other 
power,  have  the  right  to  interfere.  Their  private  political 
traditions  neither  augment  nor  diminish  that  right.  At- 
tention maybe  profitably  directed,  however,  to  the  tendency, 
implied  though  disavowed,  of  the  United  States  to  quote 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  assuming  a  loose  protectorate  over 
the  nations  of  South  America.    The  causes  of  this  tendency 


142  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

may  be  read  in  the  text  and  between  the  lines  of  MrOlney's 
despatch.     "Distance  and  three  thousand  miles  of  inter- 
vening ocean,"    lie   at  the  base    of  the   whole.     Having 
postulated  the  separation  of  America  from  Europe,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  concede  that  the  fiat  of  the  United  States  becomes 
law  in  the  Western  hemisphere.    Its  advantages  to  them- 
selves, and  indirectly  to  the  world,   are   obvious.     Their 
international  position  is  simplified,  their  ambition  gratified, 
and  their  blood  and  treasure  spared.     At  first  sight,  there- 
fore, this  rendering  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  fines  much  to 
recommend   it.     It  is  impossible,  however,  to  ignore  its 
bearing  on  the  future.     Hitherto,  the  internal  development 
of  the  Union  has  been  favoured  by  the  existence  of  relati- 
vely inexhaustible  supplies  of  land.    With  fertile,  territories 
crying    out    for   settlement,   a   foreign    policy    has    been 
superfluous.     It  requires  no  gift  of  second-sight,  none  the 
less,  to    predict    that   this   good    fortune    cannot,    under 
existing  conditions,  last  for  ever.     Reasons  for  acquiring 
possessions  outside  their  present  boundaries  must  tend  to 
arise  with  increasing  force.     It  is  the  duty,  therefore,  of 
all  states  which  esteem  the  right  of  national  independence, 
and  the  interest  of  all  which  have  colonial  possessions  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  United  States,   to  examine  the 
foundations  of  aDoctrine  which  would  lead  the  Government 
at  Washington  to  assume   special  powers  over  an  entire 
hemisphere. 

To  destroy  the  idea  that  there  is  a  natural  separation 
between  European  and  American  States  is  to  shatter  the 
key-stone  of  the  whole.  It  is  impossible,  indeed,  to  argue 
away  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  But  it  is  equally  impossible  to 
ignore  the  existence  of  electricity  and  steam.    The  relations 


LATER  APPEALS  TO  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.    143 

between  Europe  and  Asia,  and  between  North  and  South 
Africa,  prove  that  land,  rather  than  water,  separates  one 
nation  from  another.  With  existing  means  of  transit,  men 
journey  betwen  London  and  Washington  with  greater  speed 
and  safety  than  between  Washington  and  Mexico  or  Lima; 
and  it  is  difficult,  to  understand  why  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
should  bind  the  interests  of  South  to  those  of  North  America. 
It  is  the  intercourse  of  nations,  rather  than  their  geographi- 
cal position,  that  determines  the  rules  prevailing  between 
them.  If  Europe  and  America  are  connected  by  real  and 
important  relations,  it  is  vain  to  deny  that  those  relations 
are  controlled  by  law.  Distance  and  three  thousand  miles 
of  intervening  ocean  could  shut  out  the  Law  of  Nations 
only  if  they  cut  off  international  communication. 

There  is  reason  to  believe,  therefore,  that  the  geogra- 
phical distance  of  America  from  Europe  is  not  sufficient  to 
give  the  United  States  any  special  right  to  regulate  the 
affairs  of  their  own  hemisphere.  It  may  further  be  questioned 
Whether,  Europe  apart,  the  Southern  nations  would  accept 
even  such  political  control  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
as  is  implied  in  the  suggestion  that  they  exercise  in  America 
a  hegemony  like  that  of  the  Great  Powers  in  Europe.  To 
such  a  modification  of  the  doctrine  of  the  equality  of 
states,  there  are,  indeed,  grave  objections.  A  single  power, 
however  strong  its  moral  sense,  is  not  compelled  to 
distinguish  duty  from  interest  as  clearly  as  is  a  member  of 
a  group  of  six  endeavouring  to  induce  the  others  to  join  it 
in  concerted  action.  The  nations  of  South  America  would, 
no  doubt,  sacrifice  much  to  gain  the  United  States  as  an 
ally.  They  would  be  untrue  to  their  Spanish  ancestors, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  they  accepted  her  protection  at  the 


144  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

price  of  any  portion  of  their  political  independence.  Their 
publicists  and  people  alike,  while  desiring  to  stand  apart 
from  Europe,  seem  to  reject  the  idea  of  inferiority,  and  to 
display  no  general  affection  for  the  United  States.  In 
climate,  in  race,  in  civilisation,  and  in  religion,  Anglo- 
Saxon  and  Latin  America  are  hopelessly  diverse.  "We 
should  derive  no  improvement  to  our  own  institutions," 
prophesied  J.  Q.  Adams,  "  by  any  communion  with  theirs," 
and  the  prophecy  has  been  fulfilled.  The  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  both  in  letter  and  in  spirit,  forbids  the 
Executive  to  assume  anything  like  a  protectorate  over  a 
continent.  It  would  be  impossible,  moreover,  for  a  group 
of  sovereign  states  in  the  South  to  accept  the  habitual 
control  of  a  federation  of  sovereign  states  in  the  North.  It 
would  be  equally  impossible  to  derive  from  a  Doctrine  aimed 
at  confirming  the  independence  of  Spanish-America  any 
warrant  for  overthrowing  it.  Between  politically  controlling 
the  southern  states,  and  treating  them  as  entirely  indepen- 
dent, there  is  no  middle  course,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
cannot  find  one. 

In  its  latestdevelopment,  then,  as  throughout  its  history, 
the  Doctrine  has  induced  confusion  of  thought.  The  flood 
of  sentiment  and  rhetoric  poured  out  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  has  in  great  part  obscured  the  truth.  It  has  served, 
none  the  less,  to  establish  the  position  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  a  political  force,  which — however  esteemed— must 
be  recognised.  Above  all,  by  the  Old  World  and  the  New, 
it  must  be  understood. 


APPENDIX. 

Spanish-America  in  relation  to  the  monroe 
doctrine. 

The  nine  governments  to  which  the  rule  of  Spanish- 
America  had  been  originally  entrusted  seem,  by  their 
hostility  to  progress,  and  by  their  oppression  of  the  native 
Indians,  to  have  justified  the  rhetoric  which  has  been 
poured  forth  against  them.  In  each,  authority  was  in  the 
hands  of  a  caste  of  colonial  Spaniards,  and  each  was  an 
isolated  entity,  communicating  only  with  Spain.  The 
younger  Pitt,  and  his  successor,  had  endeavoured  without 
success  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  ally  of  Franee  by  encouraging 
her  colonies  to  revolt.  Loyal  till  loyalty  became  impossible, 
they  showed  the  bitterest  resentment  of  the  slur  cast  by 
Napoleon  upon  their  mother-country.  The  course  of  events 
in  the  Peninsula,  however,  forced  them  to  set  up  Juntas  of 
their  own,  and  their  alienation  from  Spain  was  completed 
by  the  massacres  with  which  the  movement  was  opposed. 
In  July,  1811,  Venezuela  declared  its  independence,  to  be 
followed  by  Mexico  and  New  Granada,  and,  in  181M,  by 
Buenos  Ayres.  Having  achieved  its  own  deliverance,  the 
last-named  sent  its  army  to  free  Chili  also,  and  in  1817 
succeeded  in  there  subverting  the  royal  power.  Meanwhile 
the  most  violent  fluctuations  had  marked  the  progress  of 
revolution  in  Mexico,  New  Granada  and  Venezuela.     The 

R.  10 


146  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

bloodiness  with  which  the  armies  of  Spain  carried  out  the 
principle  that  their  opponents  were  traitors  rather  than 
belligerents  established  an  uncompromising  hatred  of 
Spanish  and  even  of  monarchical  rule.  At  last,  led  by 
Bolivar,  and  stimulated  by  the  constitutional  victory  in  the 
mother-country,  the  forces  of  South  American  liberty 
triumphed  ;  while  Mexico,  though  divided  and  thrown  back 
by  the  usurpation  of  Iturbide,  had  likewise  cleansed  herself 
from  foreign  domination.  Central  America  followed  their 
example,  and  at  the  same  time  a  different  course  of  events 
had  severed  the  empire  of  Brazil  from  the  crown  of  Portugal. 
As  the  confusion  of  revolt  had  abated,  it  had  become 
evident  that  the  realm  of  Ultramar  had  split  into  seven 
chief  fragments.  At  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata, 
Buenos  Ayres  gave  its  name  to  a  loose  federation  of 
fourteen  provinces,  of  which  it  was  the  chief.  Mr  Woodbine 
Parish,  despatched  thither  as  British  Commissioner  in  1824, 
reported  that  the  total  population  of  the  league  was  less 
than  one  million.  Independence,  actually  enjoyed  since 
1810,  had  been  formally  declared  in  July  1816,  It  had 
recently  been  confirmed  by  the  interchange  of  Ministers 
with  the  United  States,  and  recognition  by  Great  Britain 
would  crown  the  work.  The  people  were  unalterably 
resolved  not  even  to  discuss  any  remaining  pretensions  of 
Spain,  and  they  had  rejected  four  several  propositions  for 
the  restoration  of  a  Bourbon  rule.  Their  chief  foreign 
relations  were  with  the  other  revolted  states  of  South 
America;  and  by  a  domestic  law  they  had  undertaken  to 
join  them  in  a  compact  to  make  no  treaty  with  the  mother- 
country  until  she  had  recognised  ail  as  independent. 
Whatever  may  have  been  their  esteem  for  the  United  States, 
to  whom  they  owed  their  model  of  government  and  its  first 
cknowledgment,  their  language  showed  that  they  looked 
rather  to  Great  Britain  for  international  establishment  and 
protection.  The  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  advancing 
against  Canning's  suggestion  of  favour  to  Spanish  commerce 
the  argument  that  "  Spain  could  hardly  expect  exclusive 


APPENDIX.  447 

privileges  from  the  enjoyment  of  which  the  natives  them- 
selves were  debarred,1'  was  careful  to  add  that  "  they 
were  sincerely  disposed  to  enter  into  any  arrangement  with 
His  Catholic  Majesty's  government  upon  such  terms  as  Great 
Britain  would  say  were  fair  and  reasonable."  The  Minister 
to  the  United  States  was  despatched  by  way  of  England. 
Another  distinguished  revolutionist  had  been  allowed  to 
leave  the  country  only  under  a  solemn  promise  to  take  no 
step  towards  altering  the  constitution  without  first  securing 
the  advice  and  approval  of  the  British  Government.  In 
spite  of  the  system  of  schools  and  universities  on  which  the 
President  could  congratulate  the  nation,  and  in  spite  of  the 
social  refinement  which  captivated  the  British  Commissioner, 
it  was  to  England  that  the  children  of  high  officials  were 
sent  for  education.  In  matters  the  most  important  and  the 
most  trivial  the  Ministers  of  Buenos  Ayres  were  eager  to 
fulfil  every  wish  of  the  power  which  might,  as  they  hoped, 
"  succeed  in  obtaining  peace  for  South  America/  and  from 
which  they  desired  intervention  even  in  their  boundary 
disputes  with  Brazil.  And  when  at  last  Great  Britain  had 
granted  the  boon  of  recognition,  their  representative  was 
instructed  to  express  the  warm  gratitude  "  common  to  all 
classes  in  his  country"  for  "the  political  transactions  which 
have  lixed  the  destiny  of  these  provinces." 

Paraguay,  the  province  through  which  flows  the  chief 
of  the  rivers  which  join  the  Atlantic  at  Buenos  Ayres,  need 
be  mentioned  only  to  be  dismissed.  Its  Dictator  surpassed 
the  exclusiveness  of  Spain  by  cutting  off  all  communication 
between  his  country  and  the  world  outside,  and  the  climate 
combined  with  Jesuitdiscipline  to  enforce  his  will.  Foreigners 
might  enter  the  country,  but  none  were  permitted  to  leave 
it.  For  thirty  years,  therefore,  his  dominions  were,  for  in" 
ternational  purposes,  blotted  from  the  map  of  South  America' 

Columbia,  less  favoured  than  Buenos  Ayres  in  the  easy 
attainment  of  its  independence,  was  a  federation  of  the 
States  now  known  as  Venezuela,  Columbia  and  Ecuador. 
British  possessions,  therefore,  in  the  shape  of  Guiana  and 

10-2 


448  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  West  Indies,  were  much  less  distant  from  its  borders 
than  was  any  sphere  of  influence  of  the  United  States.  The 
fact  which  J.  Q.  Adams  admits,  moreover,  that  South  America 
needed  the  products,  not  of  the  North,  but  of  England, 
sufficiently  indicates  the  relative  commercial  weight  which 
the  two  countries  might  be  expected  to  enjoy.  Sentiment 
and  interest  seemed  to  be  on  the  same  side.  The  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  though  American,  were  as  truly  foreign 
as  the  British.  The  people  were  devoted  to  their  President 
Bolivar,  and  the  flower  of  Bolivar's  troops  were  subjects  of 
George  III.  Hence,  though  the  agents  of  the  Republic  held 
different  language  to  different  powers,  and  though  the 
British  Commission  of  1824  misused  its  opportunities,  it 
seems  possible  to  accept  the  verdict  of  one  of  its  members 
that  all  parts  of  Columbia  showed  stronger  feelings  of  at- 
tachment to  Great  Britain  than  to  the  United  States.  The 
latter,  it  was  true,  in  Columbia  also  had  been  the  first  to 
recognise  a  government  modelled  on  their  own.  They  had 
not,  however,  gained  certain  exclusive  privileges  which 
they  were  supposed  to  have  requested  as  a  reward.  To 
Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Columbians  were  ready 
to  offer,  as  the  price  of  recognition,  a  law  which  should 
withhold  such  privileges  from  all  powers  which  dit  not 
similarly  acknowledge  them.  Here,  as  in  Buenos  Ayres, 
moreover,  distrust  of  France  prevailed.  Powerless  at  sea, 
Columbia  trusted  in  Great  Britain  to  check  the  allies  of 
Spain.  Against  Spain  unaided,  however,  Columbia  could 
more  than  hold  her  own.  Her  army  under  Bolivar  was  the 
salvation  of  Peru,  and  it  was  to  her  that  the  states  of  Latin 
America  looked  for  guidance  into  the  path  of  union. 

The  zone  of  country  which  separated  Columbia  from 
Buenos  Ayres  was  occupied  by  the  republic  of  Peru.  Of  its 
political  and  social  condition,  at  a  time  when  the  Royalists 
were  still  in  the  field,  the  British  Commissioner  draws  a 
vivid  picture.  "The  present  bayonet,"  he  says/  'Ms  the 
present  god  here."  All  estates  are  ruined.  Any  independent 
Peruvian  government  it  is  difficult  to  find.     External  rela- 


APPENDIX.  149 

tions,  therefore,  were  of  the  slightest.  In  so  far,  however, 
as  the  Peruvians  could  see  the  world  outside,  they,  like 
their  opponents,  seem  to  have  looked  to  England  rather 
than  to  the  United  States.  The  meagre  news-sheet  of  the 
country  found  space  for  the  Parliamentary  speeches  of 
Liverpool  and  Lansdowne.  The  royalist  press,  on  the  other 
hand,  derided  the  hopes  of  its  adversaries  that  their  liberty 
would  be  preserved  by  '  La  politica  Europea,'  and  traced 
them  to  a  rumour  that  England  was  about  to  send  commis- 
sioners to  South  America.  These  facts,  coupled  with  the 
prevalent  silence  as  to  the  United  States,  confirmed  the 
report  that"  all  parties  in  Peru  appear  to  want  the  influence, 
mediation  or  power  of  friends  in  Europe  to  be  exerted  for 
them."  The  Royalists  might  look  to  France  or  Russia;  the 
party  of  independence,  only  to  Great  Britain. 

Of  Chili,  a  long  strip  of  territory  between  the  southern 
Andes  ond  the  sea,  the  British  Government  could  obtain  little 
information.  The  scanty  reports  of  envoys  sent  in  4824 
proved  only  that  the  country  was  entitled  to  small  military 
or  commercial  consideration.  It  seemed  doubtful  whether 
the  insurgents  could  drive  out  the  Royalists,  or  themselves 
resist  attack  from  Europe.  The  soil,  indeed,  was  fertile 
but  the  people  poor  and  lazy.  "  All  the  population  west 
of  the  Andes,  from  Cape  Horn  up  to  the  Mexican  coast,  is 
not  equal  in  number  to  that  of  the  line  of  live  miles  or  six- 
drawn  round  St  Paul's,"  wrpte  the  British  Consul-General  in 
Peru.  Chili  had  concluded  treaties  with  Columbia,  Buenos 
Ayres  and  Peru,  and  faintly  echoed  the  cry  for  a  closer 
union.  Here,  again,  the  agents  of  France  seem  to  have 
been  at  work,  but  their  secret  offer  of  mediation  with  Spain, 
if  made,  was  declined  by  the  young  republic.  The  United 
States  had  been  the  first  power  to  establish  a  consulate  in 
the  country,  and  they  maintained  a  small  squadron  in  the 
Southern  Pacific.  Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  was  re- 
presented by  a  colony  of  merchants,  and  the  South  American 
policy  of  her  government  gave  general  satisfaction.  It  seems 
idle  to  draw  political  inferences  from  such  facts  as  these. 


150  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

At  the  time  when  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  promulgated, 
then,  Spanish  South  America  lay  in  a  rude  crescent  round 
the  western  and  southern  boundary  of  the  Guianas  and 
Brazil,  countries  which  for  more  than  a  century  and  a  half 
had  been  independencies  of  Europe  Guiana  remains  to  this 
day  subject  to  France,  Holland  and  Great  Britain.  The 
huge  territory  of  Brazil,  on  the  other  hand,  with  an  area  of 
more  than  three  million  square  miles,  had  in  '1822  quietly 
severed  its  government  from  that  of  Portugal.  Having 
become  an  independent  empire  under  a  sovereign  of  the 
House  of  Braganza,  its  example,  might  encourage  the  powers 
of  Europe  in  their  endeavours  to  accommodate  actual  facts 
to  their  Legitimist  theories.  Colonies  which  rejected  even 
the  nominal  sovereignty  of  Spain  might,  Chateaubriand 
hoped,  accept  a  monarchical  form  of  government  under 
princes  of  the  house  of  Bourbon.  The  internal  state  of  the 
new  empire,  however,  seems  to  have  been  comparable  with 
that  of  Peru  and  Chili,  while  hundreds  of  miles  of  forests 
shut  off  communication  with  its  neighbours  on  the  map. 
Between  Spaniard  and  Portuguese,  moreover,  there  was 
nothing  but  hatred,  and  the  remaining  members  of  the  South 
American  family  must  be  sought  beyond  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama. 

The  institutions  of  the  united  provinces  of  Central 
America,  otherwise  known  as  Guatemala,  presented  a 
striking  likeness  to  those  of  Columbia  and  Buenos  Ayres. 
While  the  bulk  of  the  people  looked  on  with  indifference, 
their  leaders  had  formed  a  loose  federation,  and  had  striven 
to  imitate  the  political  system  of  the  United  States.  They 
were  conscious,  however,  of  a  weakness  which  their  sister 
federations  were  slow  to  acknowledge.  "  Although,"  writes 
the  British  Commissioner,  "  the  Guatemalans  seem  naturally 
to  want  less  the  protection  of  some  European  power  than 
most  of  the  other  independent  colonies  of  the  same  hemi- 
sphere, they  do  in  fact  solicit  it  more  than  any  other." 
After  prior  relations  with  the  United  States,  and  a  rumoured 
application  for  admission  to  the  Union,  the  power  to  which 


APPENDIX.  151 

they  turned  was  Great  Britain.  It  would  be  vain,  indeed, 
to  look  to  Guatemala — a  temporary  collection  of  some  two 
million  inhabitants,  for  any  marked  individual  influence  on 
the  politics  of  the  world  at  the  era  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  frankness  with  which  it  threw  open  to  foreigners  the 
commerce  and  citizenship  of  all  its  provinces  entitles  it, 
none  the  less,  to  an  honourable  mention  among  the  new 
republics.  None  of  them  marked  more  clearly  its  improve- 
ment on  the  political  system  of  the  mother-country. 

Most  northerly  of  the  revolted  Spanish  dominions  was 
the  federal  republic  of  Mexico.  Including,  besides  its 
present  territory,  what  now  constitutes  some  eight  of  the 
United  States,  it  embraced,  according  to  its  representatives 
in  England,  an  area  live  times  as  great  as  that  of  Spain. 
Its  position  as  a  member  of  the  South  American  system 
was  defined  in  an  early  treaty  with  Columbia.  By  this  both 
powei's  bound  themselves  to  defend  their  independence 
against  the  world,  and  to  endeavour  to  bring  the  other 
states  of  Spanish-America  into  that  compact  of  "  perpetual 
union,  league  and  confederacy  "  which  was  to  be  sealed  by  a 
general  assembly  at  Panama.  The  British  Commissioners 
who  arrived  at  the  close  of  1823  found  that  thirteen  years 
of  war  had  desolated  the  country,  and  that  many  among 
the  clergy,  nobility  and  army,  encouraged  by  French  in- 
trigues, were  in  favour  of  a  monarchy.  Spain  alone,  how- 
ever, as  the  governor  of  her  remaining  island-fortress 
admitted,  could  prevail  neither  by  conquest  nor  conciliation. 
Mexico  might  reward  her  immediate  recognition  with  com- 
mercial privileges,  but  would  decline  to  purchase  it.  She 
would  look  to  England  not  merely  for  recognition  of  inde- 
pendence, but  also  for  protection  against  foreign  aggression. 
The  United  States,  the  only  commercial  rivals  of  Great 
Britain,  had  at  the  close  of  1823  no  accredited  Minister 
residing  in  her  dominions;  and  though  they  had  ventured 
much  capital  in  the  country  it  had  not  bought  them  the 
favour  of  the  inhabitants.  Canning  held,  indeed,  that  the 
two  states  were  too  neighbourly  to  be  friendly.     Distressed 


152  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

and  divided,  the  Mexican  federation  could  exercise  little 
influence  beyond  its  own  borders.  The  weight  of  evidence 
tends  to  show  however  that — as  in  all  the  more  considerable 
of  the  republics— her  respect  and  interests  alike  turned 
rather  to  Great  Britain  than  to  any  other  power. 

Such,  then,  was  the  political  condition  of  the  American 
continents  south  of  the  United  States  at  the  period  of  the 
Monroe  message.  One  common  sentiment  inspired  all  the 
former  dominions  of  Spain— a  resolution  "To  lay  waste  the 
country  and  destroy  the  towns  rather  than  permit  the  re- 
entrance  of  the  Spaniards."  In  all  else  the  several  com- 
munities were  less  homogeneous  than  distant  observers 
might  imagine.  The  governments,  much  less  the  people, 
of  Mexico  and  Guatemala  could  know  little  of  Chili  and 
Peru.  The  press  was  of  the  feeblest;  and  public  opinion, 
then  as  now,  withered  beneath  the  suns  of  the  tropics. 
The  states  were  loose  confederations  of  provinces,  and  their 
population  composed  of  the  most  motley  elements.  Its 
ignorance  of  the  world  at  large  was  only  equalled  by  the 
ignorance  of  the  world  concerning  it.  At  a  capital  so  near 
as  the  Havana,  the  accounts  received  of  the  mainland  were 
so  vague  and  contradictory  as  to  render  it  extremely 
difficult  to  judge  of  passing  events.  Despatches  of  the 
Columbian  commissioners  readied  England  in  three  months, 
while  those  from  Peru  might  take  four.  It  was  the  British 
representative  in  Chili  who  established  a  weekly  communi- 
cation with  Buenos  Ayres;  and  his  colleague  in  Buenos 
Ayres  who  secured  a  monthly  communication  with  Great 
Britain.  The  mixed  origin  of  the  population,  and  the  lack 
of  manufactures  and  common  interests,  joined  with  climate 
and  tradition  to  prevent  anything  like  Spanish-American 
concert.  Of  this  the  self- isolation  of  Paraguay,  unchecked 
for  thirty  years,  is  in  itself  sufficient  proof. 

Except  when  fighting  against  Spain,  therefore,  Spanish 
America  was  little  more  than  a  geographical  expression. 
The  mother-country,  even  when  constitutional,  proclaimed 
that  its  peoples  were  incapable  of  governing  themselves. 


APPENDIX.  153 

Peninsular  history  since  the  beginning  of  the  century  might 
incline  the  world  to  believe  her.  "  The  Spanish  character," 
owned  king  Ferdinand's  premier  to  the  ambassador  of 
Great  Britain,  "  could  not  maintain  a  very  long  struggle 
against  the  energy,  activity,  and  enterprise  of  the  race  that 
sprung  from  the  British  Isles."  With  some  show  of  reason, 
however,  he  maintained  that  its  pecularities  were  beyond 
the  comprehension  of  British  commissioners.  The  men, 
perhaps  not  altogether  disinterested,  who  now  reported  that 
Spanish-America  was  irrevocably  constitutional  might,  he 
insinuated,  be  as  mistaken  as  those  who  four  years  before 
had  said  the  same  of  Spain  in  Europe.  What  the  mother- 
country  lacked  in  force,  he  insisted  that  she  might  ac- 
complish by  moral  influence.  A  royal  army  need  only 
appear  in  South  America  and  offer  commercial  privileges, 
to  rally  round  its  banners  an  immense  party  of  the  discon- 
tented '•  With  the  cord  of  St  Francis  on  one  side,  and 
the  cordon  and  star  of  Isabella  the  Catholic  on  the  other1, 
we  shall  do  more,"  said  Monsieur  Ofalia,  "than  with  all  the 
armies  we  could  sent  out.  These  are  ties  not  easily  to  be 
broken."  Even  apart  from  conciliation,  he  maintained,  the 
revolution  was  unpopular.  The  rebel  nations,  in  effect, 
were  neither  rebellious  nor  national.  Peace  commissioners 
sent  to  Guatemala,  Mexico  and  Columbia  had  failed,  but  be 
declared  that  "the  highest  and  the  lowest  classes  through- 
out the  country  were  in  favour  of  are-union  with  Spain. 
The  middling  classes  were  perhaps  against  it  "  A  fortnight 
later,  he  could  report  that  "with  the  exception  of  the  lawyers 
(perhaps  en  masse)  and  a  few  discontented  physicians,"  all 
South  America  was  in  favour  of  accommodation. 

For  the  governments  that  claimed  the  obedience  of  the 
people,  Spain  had  nothing  but  contempt.  "What  is  the 
present  state  of  South  America,"  the  representative  of 
the  Cortes  at  Washington  had  asked,  "  and  what  are  its 
governments,  to  entitle  them  to  recognition  ?  "  Disunion 
and  despotism,  every  loyal  Spaniard  would  reply,  and  men 
outside  the  Peninsula  believed  him.     Three  years  earlier, 


154  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Bagot  had  left  Washington  in  doubt  as  to  whether  the 
insurgents  would  ever  establish  permanent  governments. 
In  1823  Polignac  maintained  that  they  had  made  no  progress. 
With  Spain  this  belief  was  a  fixed  principle  which  no 
evidence  could  assail.  While  Ofalia  acknowledged  as 
notorious  "the  fact  that  no  Spanish  army  could  be  trusted, 
— almost  every  officer  employed  in  America  had  passed 
over  to  the  side  of  the  insurgents,"  his  master  defied  the 
representatives  of  the  Allies  to  make  him  listen  to  reason. 
The  people  were  equally  deaf  to  all  save  their  own  pre- 
judices. The  press  breathed  no  surrender,  and  called  on 
Spain  to  consolidate  her  triumphs  in  Peru,  to  support  her 
handful  of  brave  men  in  Costa-Firma,  and  to  plant  the 
pennons  of  Castille  on  the  towers  of  Mexico.  Neither  king 
nor  people  however,  could  subdue  America  of  themselves. 
The  mediation  of  Great  Britain,  which  the  Spaniards 
would  have  preferred  to  any  other,  could  only  be  procured 
by  recognition.  France  refused  to  listen  to  their  request 
for  armed  intervention.  Only  the  Czar  and  the  Holy  Alliance, 
remained.  Constitutional  Spain  had  appealed  to  Europe  to 
do  nothing  that  could  prejudice  her  cause.  Monarchical 
Spain,  by  inviting  her  allies  to  Paris,  begged  her  to  make 
her  cause  her  own.  The  answer  to  the  invitation  had  been 
sealed  at  Washington,  and  was  already  in  Canning's  hands. 


14  DAY  USE 

RBTURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


-!F 


M m-~l  M 


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^D  V.r>       mv  3 


ofc^r-^ 


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OEC  1  3 1983 


flnMay'fi9MR 


JAM  |> 


>N  STACKS 


^ETD     DEC  1  9  1983 


hay  ism? 


JUN 


i  p 


'■> 


QlW^' 


30Apr'63EF 


LD  21A-50m-4,'60 
(A9562sl0)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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